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Abstract

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMBAT OPERATIONAL STRESS CONTROL
TRAINING PROGRAM:
EXPECTATIONS OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS
Marek M. Sipko
Old Dominion University, May 2010
Director: Dr. John M. Ritz

This study evaluated the effectiveness of the U.S. Marine Corps combat
operational stress preventive training program to determine whether the program meets
the training effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps. This evaluation entailed both
qualitative and quantitative inquiries to answer the subject matter research questions.
The participants consisted of active duty and reserve Marines on active duty. For
the purposes of the quantitative analysis, the researcher obtained a random sample of 480
Marines. Additionally, the researcher obtained a purposefully stratified qualitative sample
of 12 active duty Marines consisting of four junior non-commissioned Marines, four staff
non-commissioned officers, and four commissioned officers.
Since this study involved both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, there
were three data collection instruments. Regarding the quantitative inquiry, an online
based survey was utilized. This survey contained a number of Likert scale type questions
built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) four-level training evaluation constructs: reaction,
learning, changed behavior, and long-term results. Concerning the qualitative inquiry, the
researcher conducted interviews using an interview protocol form, which consisted of a
number of open-ended interview questions related to the effectiveness of the combat
operational stress preventive training. Additionally, the researcher conducted four
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qualitative observations of training sessions using an observation protocol
instrument/checklist.
For the purposes of the quantitative analysis, both descriptive and inferential
statistical methods were used. The descriptive statistics allowed the researcher to
organize, summarize, and describe the associated data. The logistic regression models
provided the researcher the opportunities to make predictions about the characteristics of
the Marine Corps population.
The findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses revealed the majority of
the Marines, regardless of rank, did not reacted favorably to the currently formatted
combat operational stress preventive training; some Marines learned the basics of the
training; most of the Marines did not apply the learned preventive skills in their daily
lives; and the current long-term combat operational stress preventive training program for
both the enlisted Marines and the officers had not been a success as evidenced by a
number of significant logistic regressions, further supported by descriptive statistics, and
triangulated by qualitative interviews and training observations. Additionally, the
respondents' self-reported experiences of effects from combat operational stress do affect
their evaluation of the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training
as evidenced by several significant logistic regressions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Men and women who participate in combat or who deploy to military operations
in support of combat could be affected by combat related experiences including combat
operational stress (Nash, 2007). Current ongoing combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have caused tremendous amounts of grief, terror, courage, honor, and selfsacrifice to our Nation's troops. Additionally, the specific characteristics of the current
American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as unclear enemy lines and the use of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside bombs, can place great psychological
strain on combatants (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006).
Currently, most American combat deployments involve counterinsurgency or
unconventional warfare efforts. A central strategy of insurgency efforts is to exploit soft
vulnerabilities within an opponent due to the prior conclusion that the enemy cannot be
defeated in direct or sustained confrontations (Nagl, 2005). Insurgents do selectively
target and engage military forces, but within the larger aim of defeating enemy decision
makers and their political will (Hammes, 2004). The violent and unpredictable manner in
which these unconventional attacks occur is designed to create fear, uncertainty,
helplessness, and ultimately, demoralization (Everly & Castellano, 2004), establishing a
battleground for the mind and will in which American service members must engage
daily. When insurgent attacks originate from within populated areas and the enemy is
able to quickly reconstitute back into these same surroundings, military personnel face
the difficult task of having to discern appropriate engagement responses in real-time
scenarios. Often, the split-second decision-making conundrum of conservative in
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opposition to aggressive responsiveness is tempered by prior losses from an enemy
seemingly operating without adherence to any rules of engagement. Further, the
unconventional nature of these attacks, via improvised explosive devices (IEDs), distant
rocket or mortar attacks, and planned ambushes within civilian settings, accentuates the
frustration of not being able to strike back directly and decisively. In these situations, the
service members must overcome the aggravations inherent in being both goodwill
ambassador and a combat soldier or Marine, and the difficulty of separating combatants
from civilians. In addition, service members must overcome constant environmental
threats to their safety while jointly managing internal assaults to instinctive desires for
control and predictability (Everly & Castellano, 2004). Both factors can significantly
undermine individual stress-resilience efforts (Everly & Castellano, 2004).
Combat operational stress significantly contributes to the loss of fighting force
and negatively affects military readiness leading to suicide, multiple psychosocial
problems, and pre-normal end of military service (Nash, 2007). Post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) has been associated with combat operational stress (National Institute
for Mental Health [NIMH], 2008). Post-traumatic stress disorder is defined as an anxiety
disorder that can develop after exposure to a terrifying event or ordeal in which grave
physical harm occurred (NIMH, 2008). According to Defense Medical Epidemiology
Database (DMED), the number of new PTSD diagnosis cases for active duty Marines has
been growing each year of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (Defense
Medical Surveillance System [DMSS], 2009).
Exposures to stress can be compared to trees subjected to winds. Most of the
trees subjected to prevailing winds adapt by bending away from the direction of such
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winds. Some trees, however, will not adapt and will simply snap and break. Similar
reactions occur in human beings. Some stronger individuals, when subjected by stress,
will adapt and adjust. They will become stronger and will continue to exhibit courage,
honor, and self-sacrifice. However, some individuals will not adapt and could even
develop mental stress related injuries. Stress injuries are permanent although their effects
can be decreased by care of mental health professionals. Normal stress reactions account
for about 70 percent of all stress cases (Nash, 2007). The remaining 30 percent is divided
between temporary stress injuries (20 percent) and stress illnesses (10 percent) (Nash,
2007). The goal is to prevent the temporary stress injuries by instituting strong stress
prevention training activities and quickly identifying and treating stress illnesses.
Current ongoing combat operations brought attention to the need for combat
operational stress control interventions. However, the evidence of negative stress
reactions, like increases in post-traumatic stress disorder cases, has made the case for
stronger and more vigorous efforts for prevention and restoration of combat operational
stress casualties (NIMH, 2008). Although a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary preventive
health approach is not a new concept, it has been minimally employed in respect to
combat operational stress control and military mental health programs. Department of
Defense directed all services to design and implement combat operational stress control
programs. Such programs should include a preventive training to preserve the mission
effectiveness and warfighting abilities and minimize the short and long-term adverse
effects of combat on the physical, psychological, intellectual, and social health of service
members (Department of Defense, 1999). According to the Defense Medical
Epidemiology Database (2009), the current Marine Corps combat operational stress
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preventive training has been ineffective as evidenced by rising combat operational stress
casualties (DMSS, 2009). This study will evaluate this claim and make recommendations
for improvements.
Statement of Problem
This study evaluated the effectiveness of the U.S. Marine Corps combat
operational stress preventive training program to determine whether the program meets
the training effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps.
Research Questions
The following were research questions used to guide this study:
1. To what extent do the respondents' self-reported experiences of effects
from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the effectiveness
of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training?
2. To what extent does the combat operational stress preventive training
program for Marine officers meet the training effectiveness criteria of the
Marine Corps?
3. To what extent does the combat operational stress preventive training
program for enlisted Marines meet the training effectiveness criteria of the
Marine Corps?
Background and Significance
The Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Operational Stress Control branch
director suggested this study because of the need to evaluate the combat operational •
stress preventive training program. This study is also significant because it concerns our
Nation's troops. The Combat Operational Stress Control branch office is relatively new,
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and the combat operational stress preventive training program has never been formally
evaluated (Gaskin, 2008). Additionally, it would be difficult to develop a more effective
combat operational stress preventive training program without first understanding the
sense and meaning of the individual experiences of Marines who perceived this
preventive training as effective or ineffective. Using insights from this research, Combat
Operational Stress Control branch officers may improve their prevention program
methodology thus positively contribute to the preservation of the Marine Corps forces.
This action could also directly benefit our Nation's combat Marines and soldiers.
Theoretical significances for this study entailed investigating relationships between
research variables and proposing research data collection instruments. These documents
could also be used as templates for follow on investigations.
Practical significances of the study included creating training evaluation
methodologies. Such methodologies could also be used by other military and civilian
training and education entities. Since this study focused on individual experiences, it may
provide other researchers with insights essential for constructing quantitative instruments
that could aid in predicting those being affected by combat operational stress.
Additionally, the study may provide other researchers with additional empirical
knowledge which could be used in evaluating other training and education activities.
Theoretical Contributions
First, the study tested the theory which guided its design. The study investigated
the relationship between reaction to training, learning, knowledge transfer, long-term
results of training, and individual perceptions whether the training was effective or
ineffective. These relationships were proposed by Kirkpatrick's (2006) Four Levels of
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Training Evaluation model: (1) reaction, (2) learning, (3) knowledge transfer, and (4)
long-term results. Information presented in this study could benefit future research to
produce predictive models of training effectiveness.
Second, the study delved into the effectiveness of combat operational stress
preventive training expanding on findings of other combat operational stress researchers
(Hoge et al., 2002; Hoge, Castro, Messer, McGurk, Cotting, & Koffman, 2004; Hoge et
al., 2006; Nash, 2006; Stevens, 2006; Iribarren, Prolo, Neagos, & Chiappelli, 2005;
Smith, Ryan, Wingard, Slymen, Sallis, & Kritz-Silverstein, 2008; Iversen, Fear, &
Ehlers, 2008). The other studies have focused more on determining whether service
members are susceptible to combat operational stress when exposed to combat and high
operational tempo. There is very little discussion of the existing preventive combat
operational stress preventive training and education practices. On the other hand, this
study evaluates the preventive aspect of combat operational stress, which when executed
properly should keep the majority of Marines and soldiers mentally healthy and free of ill
effects of combat operational stress.
Practical Significance
The most significant practical contribution of this study was the creation of the
combat operational stress preventive training evaluation template which includes surveys
and questionnaires built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) evaluation of training effectiveness
constructs. Such materials are available for use by the U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters,
and other major Marine Corps supported commands (I, II, and III Marine Expeditionary
Forces) in evaluating their respective preventive combat operational stress preventive
training and education programs. Each of the used data collection instruments was
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evaluated by independent Ph.D. experts for training evaluation efficacy, and later resulted
in statistically significant findings. Since the study's results are based on scientific
principles, the study's methodology could be replicated in evaluating other training
activities.
Limitations
This study presents several limitations relating to participants and the subject
matter:
1. The study was focused exclusively on active duty U.S. Marines.
2. Preventive Combat Operational Stress Control consisted only of formal
and informal training instituted and managed by the Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, Combat Operational Stress Control branch.
3. Full disclosure of the participants' perceptions toward effects of combat
operational stress and the effectiveness of the combat operational stress
preventive training might have been hindered by reluctance of the
individuals to disclose their feelings and opinions completely.
4. This study included only volunteers as none of the Marine participants
was forced or ordered to participate in the study.
Assumptions
There were several assumptions made in this study. These assumptions had to
hold true for the study to answer its research questions. The following were the
assumptions:
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1. The instrumentation used in the study accurately measured effects of
combat operational stress on Marines and the effectiveness of the combat
operational stress preventive training.
2. Marines had equal opportunities to attend combat operational stress
preventive formal and informal training sessions.
3. Kirkpatrick's (2006) Four Levels of Training Evaluation model effectively
measures levels of training effectiveness.
4. Voluntary respondents truly represent the entire Marine Corps population.
Procedures
For the purposes of quantitative analysis, both descriptive and inferential
statistical methods were used. The descriptive statistics allowed the researcher to
organize, summarize, and describe the associated data. The inferential statistical methods
provided predictions about the characteristics of the Marine Corps population. For
Research Question 1, descriptive statistics were used consisting of frequencies and
percentages in order to organize, summarize, and describe the data. Binary logistic
regressions were used to assess the associations between the demographic characteristics,
training effectiveness variables, and self-reported experiences of effects from combat
operational stress. For Research Questions 2 and 3, binary logistic regressions were also
used to assess the associations between biographic characteristics, training effectiveness
variables, and individual perceptions, whether the training was effective or ineffective.
The results of these statistical quantitative analyses provided insights to the effectiveness
of combat operational stress preventive training.
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Additionally, qualitative analysis of preventive training sessions and individual
interviews was conducted by investigating individual experiences that gave meaning to
the individual decision why the combat operational stress preventive training was
effective or ineffective. Specifically, the collected data were analyzed by using
interpretational analysis techniques. Interpretational analysis involves systematic
procedures to code and classify qualitative data to ensure that important themes and
patterns emerge (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 1999). This qualitative approach allowed Marines'
individual experiences to speak for themselves providing intrinsic perceptions to the real
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. The
identification and description of the individual perception of the effectiveness or the
ineffectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training was one of the
objectives of this study.
Definition of Terms
The following definitions are key terms used to design this study:
Combat Stress. Changes in physical or mental functioning or behavior due to the
experience of lethal force or its aftermath. These changes can be positive and adaptive
(e.g., increased confidence in self and peers), or they can be negative, including distress
or loss of normal functioning (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 2008).
Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC). Leader-focused actions and responsibilities
to promote resilience and psychological health in military units and individuals exposed
to the stress of combat or other military operations (USMC, 2008).
Mental Health. The absence of significant distress or impairment due to mental illness.
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Operational Stress Control (OSC). Leader-focused actions and responsibilities to
promote resilience and psychological health in military units and individuals exposed to
the stress of routine or wartime military operations in non-combat environments, whether
at sea, in the air, or on the ground, including support and logistics operations of all kinds
(USMC, 2008).
Operational Stress. Changes in mental functioning or behavior, especially distress or loss
of function, due to the experience of military operations other than combat during
peacetime or war, and on land, at sea, or in the air (USMC, 2008).
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). An anxiety disorder that can develop after
exposure to a terrifying event or ordeal in which grave physical harm occurred or was
threatened (NIMH, 2008).
Stressor. Any mental or physical challenge or set of challenges (USMC, 2008).
United States Marine Corps (USMC). Branch of the United States Armed Forces
responsible for providing force projection from the sea, using the mobility of the U.S.
Navy, rapidly delivering combined-arms task forces (Global Security, 2009).
Summary and Overview
Current ongoing worldwide combat operations underscored the need for
preventive interventions in Combat Operational Stress Control. The combat operational
stress preventive training program is an integral part of the U.S. Marine Corps Combat
Operational Stress Control branch efforts to reduce combat operational stress related
casualties. This study to evaluate the combat operational stress preventive training
program originated from Director, Combat Operational Stress Control, U.S. Marine
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Corps Headquarters and the need to conduct an evaluation of the U.S. Marine Corps
combat operational stress preventive training program.
Specifically, the purpose of this study was to confirm the effectiveness of the
Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training and education program. By
utilizing the researcher designed and independently validated survey instruments, the
researcher obtained descriptive statistics and conducted binary logistic regressions to
determine to what extent the Marines' self-reported experiences of effects from combat
operational stress affected their evaluation of the effectiveness of the Marine Corps
combat operational stress preventive training. Additionally, obtained descriptive statistics
and binary logistic regressions enabled the researcher to determine the effectiveness of
the combat operational stress preventive training program for both the enlisted Marines
and the officers.
This research also qualitatively investigated and described the individual
experiences of Marines in regards to the combat operational stress preventive training and
education services. Particularly, the researcher identified those factors that caused
Marines to think whether the current combat operational stress preventive training is
effective or ineffective. These insights provided the program officers with new
knowledge to improve and implement effective training and education methods.
Improved combat operational stress preventive training and education practices could
result in better prevention methodology thus positively influence combat readiness of the
Marine Corps forces.
Chapter I presented the problem statement that delineated the need to evaluate the
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training program to determine
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whether the program meets expectations of the Marine Corps. Chapter II contains a
literature review. Specific reviewed topics included historical background, overview of
the combat operational stress concepts, overview of the combat operational stress
preventive training, overview of the training standards in the Marine Corps, and overview
of the training effectiveness constructs for assessing knowledge and skills acquisition.
Chapter III describes the population sample included in the quantitative and qualitative
analyses, followed by design of the survey instruments. Chapter III also included data
collection methodologies and described the employed statistical analyses. Chapter IV
describes the actual findings of the study. Chapter V includes the study's summary
followed by conclusions and recommendations.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review was conducted by reviewing the subject matter literature in
order to present the reader with the knowledge-base on combat operational stress and
evaluation of the combat operational stress preventive training. The review utilized the
most current issues of journals and other Department of Defense (DoD) sources that dealt
with matters of combat operational stress and organizational training. The reviewed
variables included concepts of combat operational stress control to include Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a negative outcome of combat operational stress, the
institutional efficacy of the U.S. Marine Corps training programs, and the training
effectiveness evaluation constructs as recommended by Kirkpatrick (2006): reaction,
learning, knowledge transfer, and results as the overall success of the training program.
The intent was to provide a thorough synthesis and analysis of literature that concerns
this study. This was done by reviewing the field, validating the research topic and
methodology selection, and finally presenting a conceptual basis for the study.
Historical Background of Combat Operational Stress
Combat operational stress is not a new concept. Jones (1995) indicated that 18th
century literature labeled combat stress reactions as "nostalgia". In this sense nostalgia
means something much more than simple longing for one's home. It rather refers to an
inability to cope in realities of a military service and thus losing all hopes of returning
home sound and safe. Jones (1995) indicated that such individuals became extremely
solitary, lethargic, often losing all internal motivation for honorable military service. The
primary causes of nostalgia were psychological interwoven with some social
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underpinnings, but the main causes of it were psychological damnations of being
permanently taken away from home and loved ones (Jones, 1995).
During the American Civil War, nostalgia continued to be the most common
name for combat stress (Dean, 1997). However, many other labels were also used,
including insanity, sunstroke, and "irritable heart" or "trotting heart" (Dean, 1997).
Additionally, both combatant armies suffered from frequent desertion cases by battle
induced panic attacks (Marlowe, 2001). The heart related diagnoses concerned
occurrences of rapid heart rate at rest which often accompanied these panic attacks
(Dean, 1997).
In another study of 300 soldiers from the U.S. Civil War, Da Costa (1871)
described a condition he called "irritable heart". This condition apparently affected
soldiers exposed to combat and non-combatant civilians. It was characterized by
shortness of breath, palpitations, and exertional chest pain, as well as headache and
dizziness (Da Costa, 1871). Da Costa attributed these conditions to various causes,
including infectious diseases and stress (Da Costa, 1871). This was a significant change
in understanding the combat stress theory. Now, it was understood that combat stress
related mental illnesses could be caused by physical damage to the brain, such as by
heavy alcohol or drug use (Nash, 2006).
Toward the end of the 19th century, Sigmund Freud and Pierre Janet, two
physicians who studied mental trauma in civilians, became the supporters of two different
views of causes behind combat stress: one being the psychological and the second being
the biological. Both Freud and Janet published the concept of dissociation, currently
defined as a disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory,
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identity, or perception (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), after experiencing a
traumatic event (Breuer & Freud, 1957/1895; Janet, 1920/1907). Both of these brilliant
psychologists believed that dissociation was a key element in the development of
psychopathology after a traumatic experience (Nemiah, 1998). But while Freud saw the
fragmentation of consciousness in dissociation as a self-protective defense mechanism
intended to keep overwhelmingly disturbing perceptions or feelings out of consciousness,
Janet believed separation of emotion was due to an inborn failure to integrate information
in the brain under the impact of a "violent emotion" (Van der Kolk, Weisaeth, & Van der
Hart, 1996). In Freud's view, dissociation at the moment of trauma was a "purposeful and
intentional" choice (Breuer & Freud, 1957/1895, p. 123), although occurred
unconsciously. On the other hand, Janet thought of dissociation as a symptom of a
breakdown of brain function, or in other words a loss of adjustment abilities (Van der
Kolk & Van der Hart, 1989). This difference in theory of causation makes all the
difference in handling and diagnosis (Nash, 2006). For Freud, conscious recall of
repressed traumatic memories was therapeutic; for Janet, attempts to recall traumatic
memories before they were somehow neutralized would only again overcome the brain's
integrative capacity and cause further breakdown (Nemiah, 1998).
The series of names or labels describing combat stress in the 20th century is a
result of ongoing debates between those who believed combat stress reactions were
psychological in origin, and those who believed combat stress reactions had mainly
biological derivations (Shephard, 2000). "Shell shock" in the First World War suggested
the belief, at the time, that the varied negative mental health symptoms seen in the
trenches of France and Belgium were caused by physical damage to the brain by being
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close to the explosion of artillery shells. However, efforts to find evidence of physical
damage to the brain in shell shock cases failed, which probably made people believe in
the psychological causes of combat stress more so than the physical ones (Nash, 2006).
Additionally during World War I, a syndrome similar to the one described by Da Costa
(1871) became a major cause of medical evacuations back to England. It was given
various names: Da Costa syndrome, soldier's heart, effort syndrome, as the symptoms
were exacerbated by effort, and in the United States, it was called neurocirculatory
asthenia (Hyams, Wignall, & Roswell, 1996).
Although the identification of "neurasthenia", which means an exhaustion of the
nervous system, was used in both world wars, the purely psychological references to ill
effects of combat stress as "traumatic neurosis" and "war neurosis" gained prominence in
WW II (Shephard, 2000). "Neurosis" was a concept which grew out of the Freudian
psychoanalytic movement in the early twentieth century, defined as symptoms produced
by "emergency discharges" of psychic energy accumulated by unconscious conflict
(Fenichel, 1945, p. 20). Shell shock and neurasthenia were considered "hardware"
problems; war neurosis was thought to be a "software" problem (Nash, 2006). As WW II
neared, the most commonly used labels were "battle fatigue" and "exhaustion," both
reflecting a psychological rather than a biological etiology (Nash, 2006). Citing war
psychiatry experience in both world wars, Kormos asserted in 1978, "fortunately, it is a
relatively settled matter. All sources appear nowadays to be in agreement that we are
dealing with a functional entity" (Kormos, 1978, p. 12).
After the Vietnam War, a plethora of research on persistent combat stress related
disorders led to the official recognition in 1980 of post-traumatic stress disorder
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(American Psychiatric Association, 1980). At the same time, American psychiatry
predominately adopted the "Biopsychosocial Model," an integrative theory based on the
principle that all mental and behavioral problems have concurrent causes in the
biological, psychological, and social spheres (Engel, 1980). Since then, PTSD has
become a paradigm of a true biopsychosocial disorder, with well-documented physical,
mental, and interpersonal components (Litz, 2006).
During the Gulf War, there was an amazingly low rate of negative combat stress
cases seen during both the air war phase and the ground combat phase (Garland, 1993).
Some of the causes that attributed to the low rate of mental health problems included the
lack of easy access to alcohol and drugs; the victorious and clear-cut outcome of the
operation; the outstanding support from home; and the rapid redeployment of combat
troops out of the area of operations (Garland, 1993). These factors are vital to remember
as they constitute an important paradigm for the low incidences of negative combat stress
reactions. Additionally, one of the legacies of the Gulf War was to place preventive teams
consisting of psychologists, social workers, and other mental health professionals with
the units deployed to combat zones. This best practice program undoubtedly helped
preventing a number of mental health problems thus contributing to the reported low rate
of mental health incidences during and after the Gulf War (Doyle, 2000).
Currently, there are preventive mental health assets deployed throughout Iraq and
Afghanistan providing preventive and acute mental health services. However, both the
U.S. Army and the Marine Corps have seen resurgence of mental health problems
following combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan (Hoge et al., 2004; Hoge et al,
2006; Smith, Ryan, Wingard, Slymen, Sallis, & Kritz-Silverstein, 2008). Time will tell
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the full significance of these conflicts in terms of combat stress and how combat stress
affects individual service members.
Coping with Combat Operational Stress
Effectively coping with combat operational stress is the overarching outcome of
the combat operational stress preventive training (Gaskin, 2008). Lazarus and Folkman
(1984) defined coping as "constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to
manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or
exceeding the resources of the person" (p. 141). The actual goals of coping, in their view,
are "managing emotions and maintaining self-esteem and a positive outlook, especially in
the face of irremediable situations" (p. 139). The goal of coping is not merely to survive a
severe stress, but to go beyond it through courage, resourcefulness, and personal growth.
Successful coping not only manages distress and hardships (Lazarus, 1999), but finds
meaning in it (Frankl, 1984).
Service members in a war zone can be unbelievably resourceful in their
development and employment of coping strategies (Nash, 2006). For example, writing
letters has long been a valuable tool for deployed service members to not only retain
contact with loved ones back home, but to conceptualize their experiences into coherent
narratives in order to find meanings in them. E-mail has raised the coping strategy of
"letters from the front" to a new level of propinquity and impact. Digital cameras and
video recorders have also permitted service members to create photo and video journals
of their experiences, often set to purposefully selected music to provide personal
connotation. However, giving support to fellow combatants and receiving support from
them continue to reign as the ultimate of battlefield coping strategies (Nash, 2006).
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Relationships made in combat zones may be the most reflective and honest of any
that service members will ever have in their lives. Amazingly, humor and play continue
to thrive in the war zone, even under the most terrible of circumstances. Additionally,
many deployed service members experience an epiphany of religious faith that can do
miracles to neutralize the toxic effects of combat operational stress (Elder & Clipp,
1988). One of the most humanizing experiences possible in a war zone is the mere
conscious knowledge that, however much one may be pummeled by external factors
outside of one's control, there are always choices to be made. And these choices may not
only save lives, but give meaning to otherwise confused experiences (Nash, 2006).
The value of social support in adaptation to extreme stress cannot be
underestimated. Just as families, under ideal conditions, provide shelter, love,
compassion, and guidance for family members, relationships in cohesive military units
are vital to the survival of each individual in them. Shared danger intensifies bonding,
partly because each person's survival lies literally in the hands of his peers (Elder &
Clipp, 1988). The resulting close social association neutralizes intense, depressing
emotions, and makes each dangerous encounter seem less threatening (Cohen, Gottlieb,
& Underwood, 2000).
Effective military leaders can also encourage adaptation in their junior Marines
and sailors to extreme stress, under ideal conditions. For example, Grossman (1995)
associated a successful military leader with a "well of fortitude" into which juniors could
repeatedly tap in to restore their own deteriorating courage. Of course, relationships can
also have a negative impact on adaptation (Lazarus, 1999). Service members who are
newly joined to their units, such as replacements for combat losses, may have a
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particularly hard time since they might be initially excluded from the sustaining network
of attachments in the unit. And to the extent service members depend on attachments in
their units for their emotional survival, they are susceptible to a disastrous failure of
adaptation if those attachments are suddenly lost (Elder & Clipp, 1988).
Negative Effects of Combat Operational Stress
The effect of combat on the mental health of military personnel has been a cause
for great concern among the public, military leaders, and policy-makers. Psychological
disorders in military populations have had a menacing impact on the readiness and the
accomplishment of military goals (Hoge et al., 2002; Hoge et al., 2006). Specific
characteristics of the current American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as
unclear enemy lines, and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside
bombs, can place great psychological strain on combatants. It is extremely important to
have effective preventive services in place such as training and education to minimize the
number of actual cases of psychological disorders.
Operational and combat stress contributes significantly to the loss of fighting
forces and negatively affects military readiness while leading to suicide, multiple
psychosocial problems, and pre-normal end of military service (Nash, 2006). One of the
key indicators of ill effects of combat operational stress is post-traumatic stress disorder
(NIMH, 2008). Post-traumatic stress disorder is a mental health disorder which has been
closely associated with negative effects of combat operational stress (Hoge et al., 2004).
Consecutive annual increases in PTSD could also indicate negative effects of combat
operational stress and ineffective prevention training and education services. According
to the Defense Medical Epidemiology Database (DMED), the number of new PTSD
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diagnosis cases for active duty Marines has been growing each year of Operations Iraqi
and Enduring Freedom. Since 2003, the number of new Marine Corps PTSD cases grew
by 1,995, a very significant 836 percent increase (DMSS, 2009). This unprecedented
growth in PTSD has clearly made the case for stronger and more vigorous efforts for
prevention and restoration of operational stress casualties. The combat operational stress
prevention efforts necessitate evaluating the effectiveness of the existing combat
operational stress training and education program to determine if such a program meets
the training efficacy criteria of the Marine Corps, while providing Marines with the
necessary resources to effectively manage combat operational stress.
The ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are the most sustained U.S. combat
operations since the Vietnam war. These ongoing wars will produce a new generation of
veterans at risk for mental health problems associated with sustained combat operations.
Combat stress reactions have been identified throughout the history of war (Shay, 1994).
However, the terms associated with combat operational stress, the attributions for its
causes, the prevalence and manifestations, and how it can be prevented and managed will
continue to evolve (Shay, 1994).
Concerning current American combat operations in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), approximately 20 percent of
OIF and OEF veterans eligible to receive Veterans Administration (VA) benefits had
received some health care at a VA facility, with possible mental health disorders being
reported in 26 percent of these veterans seeking treatment (Kang & Hyams, 2004). The
most diagnoses have been adjustment disorders, including about 10 percent with a
possible diagnosis of PTSD (Kang & Hyams, 2004). In another study, about 17 percent
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of soldiers and Marines returning from OIF screened positive for PTSD, depression, and
other anxiety disorders (Hoge et al., 2004). This prevalence was approximately twice the
pre-deployment reported rate. More recently it was found that approximately one third of
OIF veterans accessed mental health services their first year after deployment, with 12
percent receiving a mental health diagnosis (Hoge et al., 2006). These findings confirm
the results from the earlier studies. For example, two different studies indicated that
lifetime prevalence of PTSD estimates have ranged from 7.8 percent to 12.3 percent in
research with civilian populations (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995;
Resnick, Kilpatrick, Dansky, Saunders, & Best, 1993). On the other hand, studies of
military members who served in the Vietnam War, have shown much higher lifetime
PTSD prevalence estimates of 30.9 percent for men and 26.0 percent for women (Weiss
et al., 1992). These findings clearly show that military members who previously deployed
to combat zones have a much higher chance of acquiring PTSD. These facts alone
necessitate the need for strong preventive combat operational stress training and
education services as early prevention is much less costly than health care treatments
later on.
After people experience a particularly stressful event, they often feel they should
be able to move on and "just handle it" or "get over it." Some experiences, however, are
so traumatic that people have a difficult time coping and functioning in their daily lives
(Stevens, 2006). The stress that results from traumatic events precipitates a spectrum of
psycho-emotional and physiopathological outcomes. In its gravest form, this response is
diagnosed as a psychiatric disorder consequential to the experience of traumatic events
(Iribarren, Prolo, Neagos, & Chiappelli, 2005). People with PTSD often relive their
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experiences through nightmares and flashbacks. They report difficulty in sleeping. Their
behavior becomes increasingly detached or estranged and is frequently aggravated by
related disorders such as depression, substance abuse, and problems of memory and
cognition. The disorder soon leads to impairment of the ability to function in social or
family life, which more often than not results in occupational instability, marital
problems, family discord, and general difficulties in parenting (Iribarren et al., 2005).
Moreover, the disorder can be severe enough and last long enough to impair the person's
daily life and, in the extreme, and may even lead to suicidal tendencies (Iribarren et al.,
2005).
A number of studies have found associations between combat exposure and PTSD
rates or symptoms. Studies conducted with Vietnam veterans, for example, found
substantial relationships between combat exposure and PTSD (Dohrenwend et al., 2007;
Fontana & Rosenheck, 1999; Koenen, Stellman, & Sommer, 2003). Similar results have
been observed for veterans of the Gulf War (Adler, Vaitkus, & Martin, 1996; Southwick,
Morgan, Darnell, Bremner, Nicolaou, Nagy, & Charney, 1995; Wolfe, Brown, & Kelley,
1993). There is less evidence for this association for the current conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, although evidence is beginning to emerge, for the U.S. (Hoge, et al., 2004;
Smith, et al., 2008) and British military service members (Iversen, Fear, & Ehlers, 2008).
This fact alone necessitates a need for a thorough review of combat operational stress
preventive services as such could play a role in decreasing PTSD rates in combat
veterans.
Veterans with PTSD also often have more severe marital and family problems
than veterans without PTSD (Jordan, 1992). Post-traumatic stress disorder manifests
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itself by significant emotional numbing and interpersonal withdrawal (Nash, 2007).
These symptoms impair veteran's family relationships causing further stress and
deepening of PTSD's vicious cycle of self destruction (Jordan, 1992). The social costs of
PTSD are tremendous with many disrupted veteran families, including neglected and
abused wives and children. Properly instituted and effectively managed preventive
combat operational stress training and education services could result in decreasing the
number of combat stress casualties, thus easing the pain of the follow-on social costs
associated with PTSD and other combat operational stress induced mental health
disorders.
Although combat exposure is typically thought of as the paramount stressor of
war, a number of investigators have emphasized the importance of other general military
deployment stress factors, which have often been labeled as operational stress (Bartone,
Vaitkus, & Adler, 1998; King, King, Gudanowski, & Vreven, 1995; Litz, King, King,
Orsillo, & Friedman, 1997). Operational stressors have been labeled in various ways,
including deployment-related stressors, low-magnitude stressors, general overseas
stressors, malevolent environment, and contextual stressors (Engelhard & van den Hout,
2007; King, King, Gudanowski, & Vreven, 1995; Litz, Orsillo, Friedman, Ehlich, &
Batres, 1997). Examples of these deployment-related operational stressors include
excessive heat and cold, concerns or problems with family members back home,
boredom, lack of sleep, lack of privacy, problems with supervisors, and inadequate
availability of supplies or equipment.
The National Center for PTSD estimated the lifetime prevalence of PTSD in
American general population was about 10 percent; however, about 30 percent of the
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veterans who were deployed to recent combat zones might experience PTSD (Iribarren et
al., 2005). In other words, about 1/3 of war veterans might be suffering from PTSD. For
instance, currently about 180,000 American combat troops are deployed to Iraq and
Afghanistan (Global Security, 2009). Based on the above logic, potentially over 60,000
of them could acquire PTSD as a direct consequence of participating in combat
operations overseas. This is a striking statistic which must be taken seriously and
definitely underscores the need for an effective combat operational stress preventive
training and education program and an evaluation of the existing one.
Risk Factors in Combat Operational Stress
Studies have found exposure to severe combat stressors relate to the subsequent
development of a range of physiological disorders (Boscarino, 1997). Other studies have
documented the association between exposure to deployment related stressors and the
development of psychiatric disorders (Hoge et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 1991; King et al.,
1999). Deployment is also associated with increased symptoms of post-traumatic stress
disorder (Hoge et al., 2004), depression (Hoge et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 1991), and anger
problems (Adler, Dolan, & Castro, 2000; McCarroll, Ursano, Liu, Thayer, Newby,
Norwood, & Fullerton, 2000). Furthermore, while symptom reports may be low during
the immediate post-deployment period, studies with soldiers have found that these
symptoms increase three to six months later (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006;
Bliese, Wright, Adler, & Thomas, 2006). In all, it is estimated that between 20-30 percent
of the U.S. military personnel returning from combat operations report significant
psychological symptoms (Cox, 1995). For these reasons alone, U.S. military services
need to institute broad combat operational stress preventive training and education
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services to teach service members how to effectively deal with negative aspects of
combat operational stress.
Research conducted after military conflicts has shown that length of deployment,
multiple deployments, and exposure to combat are positively associated with combat
operational stress reactions (Dohrenwend et al., 2007; Fontana & Rosenheck, 1999;
Koenen, Stellman, Stellman, & Sommer, 2003; Hoge et al., 2004; Jordan et al, 1991;
King et al., 1999). These might include increased risk of acquiring PTSD, depression,
anxiety disorders, substance abuse, impaired functioning in social and employment
settings, and increased utilization of health care services (Hoge, Auchterlonie, &
Milliken, 2006; Toomey, Kang, Karlinsky, Baker, Vasterling, Alpern, Reda, Henderson,
Murphy, & Eisen, 2007). The current American led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq confirm
that characteristics of military participation in these wars, which includes combat
exposure, are associated with mental disorders since the proportion of service members
reported to have PTSD was 3.7 times higher among those who served in ground units of
the Army or Marines (11 percent) as compared to deployed members of the Navy or Air
Force (3 percent) (U.S. Army Surgeon General, 2006). Additionally, deployed military
reservists are susceptible to combat stress as much and often more than their active duty
counterparts (Perconte, Wilson, Pontius, Dietrick, & Spiro, 1993). This fact further
necessitates the need for more effective training and education preventive services to
counter these very negative, damaging, and potentially costly trends.
The high operational tempo within the U.S. Marine Corps required to meet the
demands of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in extended and multiple
deployments for many Marines. There are reasonable concerns about a possible dramatic

increase in the prevalence of combat stress reactions over the next several years given
that multiple and extended deployments are positively associated with mental health
problems (Toomey et al., 2007). The rates of utilization of mental health services for the
Army and Marine Corps have already increased over time since 2000, suggesting the
current military operations are causing an increase in mental health problems and are
burdening the health care system (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006; Kang &
Hyams, 2004). The prevention training and education services, and then the identification
and early treatment of mental health problems are essential in reducing chronic mental
health impairment rates and thus overburdening the military and civilian health care
systems.
The war in Iraq is the largest sustained ground combat operation undertaken by
the U.S. military since the Vietnam War. Shortly after the end of the Vietnam War, a
study done by Horowitz and Solomon (1975) predicted that in subsequent years mental
health professionals would see the development of PTSD among many Vietnam-era
combatants. Extensive research conducted with Vietnam veterans over the past 20 years
has largely validated these earlier concerns (Kaylor, King, & King, 1987; King, King,
Foy, Keane, & Fairbank, 1999). A recent report by Hoge et al. (2004) offered some
preliminary evidence that present-day combat duty in Iraq carries a similar risk for longterm mental health problems.
A number of recent publications have highlighted the potential psychiatric impact
of combat exposure on military members serving in Iraq and Afghanistan (Friedman,
2004; Jones, 2004; Lamberg, 2004). In another study Hoge et al. (2004) screened four
combat units for emotional disorders before deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan (n =

2,530), and four other units, three to four months after their return (n = 3,671). The
percentage of participants whose responses met the screening criteria for major
depression, generalized anxiety disorder, or PTSD was significantly higher for the groups
returning from Iraq or Afghanistan compared to the groups assessed before deployment.
This was particularly true for PTSD and deployments to Iraq. The percentage of
respondents who met the strict screening criteria for PTSD after combat duty in Iraq was
more than double the rate found in the pre-deployment group (12.2 percent to 12.9
percent against 5.0 percent). This is indicative that preventive training and education
services are especially needed for military members prior to deployment, with the notion
that such prevention training would make them more resilient to ill effects of combat
operational stress.
The Hoge et al. (2004) study also found that only a minority (20-40 percent) of
service members who met the screening criteria for a mental disorder reported having
sought professional assistance. This finding is probably at least partially attributable to
stigma associated with seeking help and service members' concerns for how their helpseeking will be perceived by peers and leadership. Ideally, methods of early intervention
would be identified for use with service members exposed to combat that could
effectively reduce the risk of developing PTSD, thereby lessening the need for helpseeking in the long term. Training and education aimed both at leadership and rank and
file could also be used to lessen the ill effects of inherent stigma, thus allowing more
Marines to get the mental health care when they really need it.

Intimate Partner Violence
Another serious problem associated with combat operational stress and military
veterans is intimate partner violence. Intimate partner violence is also a serious national
public health problem. Approximately 12 percent of couples in the United States report
male-to-female violence each year (Straus & Gelles, 1990), and recent national surveys
indicate that 1.3 million women are physically assaulted by an intimate male partner
annually, with nearly half of these victims reporting injury (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2003; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). Intimate partner violence is related to
an increased frequency of physician and emergency room visits (Bergman & Brismar,
1991; McLeer & Anwar, 1989; Plichta, 1992), as well as a wide variety of negative
health consequences, including death (Campbell, 2002; Campbell et al., 2002; Coker et
al., 2002; Coker, Smith, Bethea, King, & McKeown, 2000; Eisenstat & Bancroft, 1999;
Greenfeld et al., 1998; Sutherland, Sullivan, & Bybee, 2001). Furthermore, the yearly
cost of direct medical and mental health care to victims of intimate partner violence has
been estimated at $4.1 billion (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009),
irrespective of indirect costs such as loss of work and decreased productivity.
Interest in the difficulties faced by military families has increased in recent years
due in part to the well-publicized 2002 domestic homicides at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, among Special Forces units who served in Afghanistan. There are about 26.4
million veterans residing in the United States (United States Census Bureau, 2009), and
the total United States military force is currently comprised of over 1.4 million active
duty personnel, of which 52 percent are married and 85 percent are male (Global
Security, 2009). The reported rates of intimate partner violence among military veterans
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and active duty servicemen range from 13.5 percent to 58 percent respectively, which
translate somewhere between 189,000 to 812,000 of intimate partner violence cases
among the active duty population (Marshall, Panuzio, & Casey, 2005). Intimate partner
violence is then a significant problem, with combat stress most likely contributing and
exacerbating the problem (Marshall, Panuzio, & Casey, 2005). Preventive combat
operational stress services to include training and education are then needed to help the
service members refrain from such a negative outcome as intimate partner violence.
Barriers to Mental Health Care
The prevention services, and the identification and early treatment of mental
health problems, might be difficult to achieve within the military culture due to the
existing barriers to care, either real or perceived, which prevents seeking help. A number
of barriers to formal help-seeking for mental health problems in the U.S. military have
been identified or suggested. Some of these include: lack of awareness of resources for
help, ignorance of combat stress symptoms, fear of harming one's career, perceived lack
of access to or effectiveness of treatment, fear of being placed on medications, and belief
that problems will improve on their own (Hoge et al., 2004; Litz et al., 2002). Properly
instituted and conducted combat operational stress preventive training and education
services could alleviate some of the ignorance and fear of the unknown still undoubtedly
present amongst the rank and file of the U.S. military.
The Department of Defense and Veterans Affairs have collaborated to screen for
mental health problems early in the post-deployment phase. This is done by examining all
returning soldiers and Marines by administering the Post-Deployment Health Assessment
survey. However, this one-time administered snapshot of mental health evaluation may
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prove insensitive to the complexities inherent in adaptation of war trauma. Evidence from
longitudinal studies of trauma survivors suggests that early distress and associated
symptoms are not highly predictive of long-term adaptation (Litz, Gray, Bryant, & Adler,
2002). This implies that there are some who may not be identified as needing help soon
after deployment, but subsequently develop symptoms attributable to combat stress.
Preventive combat operational stress training and education and early identification and
treatment are particularly important because there is evidence that once chronic posttraumatic adaptation difficulties develop, they tend to persist across the lifespan
(Prigerson, Maciejewski, & Rosenheck, 2001; Schnurr, Friedman, Foy, Shea, Hsieh,
Lavori, et al., 2003).
The early identification and treatment of mental health problems is a particular
challenge within the military for several reasons. First, it is reasonable to assume the
prevalence of mental health problems may be under-diagnosed and under-reported
because patients often seek their primary care for reasons other than mental health
(Regier, Narrow, Rae, Manderscheid, Locke, & Godwin, 1993). Other factors which may
cause mental health cases to go either undetected or unreported include symptoms not
being recognized as being combat stress-related (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006;
Kang & Hyams, 2004). The reasons behind this situation lie in lack of education and
allowing the mental health stigma to persist in military units (Hoge et al., 2004). One of
the primary goals of preventive combat operational stress education is to train Marines
and Marine leaders to eradicate the combat stress related stigma and encourage all
Marines to seek help from mental health providers when such help is needed. For these
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specific reasons, there is a need for effective combat operational stress training and
education program services and an evaluation of the existing ones.
Mental disorders are the second leading illness category and often co-exist with
other medical conditions in the U.S. military (Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center,
2009). However, stigma is a particular barrier to care when it comes to the treatment of
mental health problems (Hoge et al., 2004). Hoge et al. (2004) found that only half of the
recent war veterans who had a serious mental disorder were even interested in receiving
help and only 26 percent received formal mental health care. It is also plausible that
mental health specialty clinics contribute to the stigma just by being special clinics,
having special entrances, and having special mental health medical records. This problem
may be compounded by a military environment in which Marines live and work together
and therefore often lack the privacy of using a mental health clinic on base or post (Hoge,
Terhakopian, Castro, Messer, & Engel, 2007). Active duty members can also seek mental
health help from providers located off military bases and posts. However, many members
do not realize this benefit is available to them (Hoge et al., 2007). Formally instituted
preventive combat operational stress training and education could help in alleviating this
problem too, resulting in more service members seeking help for mental health disorders.
The Department of Defense has taken several measures to overcome barriers to
mental health care. One of the measures is including provisions of mental health services
in primary care clinics as opposed to specialty care services specifically for mental
health. Providing mental health services in primary care settings offers several
advantages. First, it increases awareness and treatment of mental health issues (Hoge et
al., 2004; Engel & Aquilino, 2004). Second, it establishes standardized mental health
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services as routine, which should result in increased screening (Engel & Aquilino, 2004).
Third, it improves accessibility through walk-in treatments, increases patient trust, and
reduces stigma associated with mental health care (Hoge et al., 2004; Engel & Aquilino,
2004). The Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training and education
could play a significant role in spreading these messages too, contributing to more service
members seeking help without fears of being stigmatized by their own peers and leaders.
Given the expected influx of recent war veterans with possible mental disorders
and the difficulties with identification and treatment, there is a pressing need to plan for
increased mental health care (Kang & Hyams, 2004). In spite of indicators that veterans
of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be at a significant risk for mental health problems
(Litz, 2006), there is much that is unknown about the prevalence of these barriers to care,
how these factors affect help-seeking behavior, the level of satisfaction with any care that
is received, and the level of satisfaction with the received combat operational stress
preventive training. The main purpose of this study was to assess the current level of the
Marine Corps preventive combat operational stress training and education efforts. The
data obtained from this study could also serve as a baseline to track the effects of the
Marine Corps educational training and treatment efforts related to combat operational
stress control, thus directly benefiting future evaluations.
Dealing with Death and Injury Grief
As of January 2010, more than 6,285 coalition troops have been killed in Iraq and
Afghanistan (iCasualites.org, 2010). An estimated 80 percent of soldiers and Marines
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan knew someone seriously injured or killed during their
deployment (Hoge et al., 2004). There is widespread recognition of the strong attachment

bonds that develop between service members during war (Davidovitz, Mikulincer,
Shaver, Izsak, & Popper, 2007). Because of these extremely strong attachment bonds,
grief associated with the death of a friend in combat could be enormously traumatic
(Pivar & Field, 2004). Service members need to know how to deal with combat related
death and injury grief. Timely and effective preventive combat operational stress
education could teach individual soldiers and Marines how to deal with combat related
trauma. This fact further validates the need for evaluation of the current state of the
Marine Corps preventive combat operational stress training and education services to
determine their effectiveness for dealing with traumatically stressful events.
It is extremely important to know how to deal with combat related trauma (Papa,
Neria, & Litz, 2008). The concepts of "complicated grief, "traumatic grief, or
"prolonged grief, has in recent years been advanced to highlight reactions to grief that
are pathological and beyond what is considered normal bereavement reactions (Horowitz,
Siegel, Holen, Bonanno, Milbrath, & Stonson, 1997). These reactions are particularly
unremitting and chronic and become impairing as the individual is unable to work
through the grief, integrate the loss, and continue on with his or her life. Individuals may
experience intense emotional pain and sorrow, constantly long for the deceased person,
and have intrusive thoughts about the deceased (Boelen & Prigerson, 2007). Complicated
grief reactions are more likely in the event of a sudden, traumatic loss, consequently,
combat loss is particularly insidious (Ott, Lueger, Kelber, & Prigerson, 2007). Education
and training on how to deal with combat loss has proven helpful with some individuals
showing signs of returning to normal lives following traumatic losses of close friends or
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family members (Boelen, de Keijser, Van den Hout, & Van den Bout, 2007; Shear,
Frank, Houck, & Reynolds, 2005).
Guilt and Shame in Combat Veterans
Feeling of guilt and shame is one aspect of combat stress worth special
mentioning. Combat veterans often experience guilt and shame related to various acts of
omission (Kubany, 1994; Wong & Cook, 1992), and this has been argued to be an
essential feature of combat PTSD (Shay, 1994). These experiences arguably cause "moral
injury" (Shay, 1994). Guilt and shame related to moral injury are one of the most
damaging psychological legacies of war (Nash, Silva, & Litz, 2009). Severity of guilt
symptoms correlates positively with overall PTSD severity, particularly re-experiencing
and avoidance symptoms (Henning & Freuh, 1997), and factor analytic studies show that
guilt emerges as a factor in PTSD symptoms in combat veterans (Watson, Kucala, Juba,
Manifold, Anderson, & Anderson, 1991). Some of these negative outcomes could be
alleviated by preventive education and training services. Military members who
understand how to deal with trauma could have a better chance of not experiencing the
feelings of guilt and shame following traumatic losses of close military friends, thus
decreasing chances of acquiring PTSD (Nash, Silva, & Litz, 2009).
Improvised Explosive Devices
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have had menacing effects upon our troops
morale and psychological health. One of the most common, potentially traumatizing
events for service members in Iraq and Afghanistan are IED attacks on convoys (Global
Security.org, 2009). Enemy forces hide mortar rounds, artillery projectiles, and other
explosive-filled ordnance alongside roads and highways and then remotely detonate them
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to cause maximum blast injuries to passing vehicles and their occupants. IEDs are
cleverly disguised by burying them under roads, in piles of garbage, in abandoned
vehicles, and dead animal carcasses. Often a series of munitions are wired together in a
"daisy chain," so that a single signal will detonate all of them at the same time. Attacks
on convoys by suicide bombers driving explosive-filled vehicles ("vehicle-borne
explosive devices," or "VBEDs") are also common (Global Security.org, 2009). When
protective armor on the vehicle does not adequately guard the occupants, physical
injuries from the blast tend to be the most severe in areas not covered by body armor, i.e.,
face, neck, arms, lower abdomen/back, and legs (Gawande, 2004). In the immediate
aftermath of an IED attack, survivors are at risk for further attacks by enemy forces in the
form of small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades. Any injured or dead are cared for
by their fellow service members until medical responders arrive on the scene (Gawande,
2004).
Service members who spend a significant amount of time on the road in Iraq and
Afghanistan, whether providing security to supply convoys or patrolling in search of
enemy forces, may experience multiple separate IED attacks on their convoys during
their deployment time. The risk is omnipresent when outside the secured perimeter of
American military bases (Gawande, 2004). Unless service members are seriously injured
in an IED attack, they are returned to normal duties quickly, oftentimes within a day or
two (Cigrang et al., 2005). One can imagine how stressful such experiences can be. This
is another reason behind preventive education and training services to teach soldiers and
Marines how to effectively deal with such traumatic events ubiquitous in Iraq and
Afghanistan.

Injured Service Members
Injured soldiers and those with higher levels of combat exposure have generally
had higher rates of PTSD following previous wars (Kang, Natelson, Mahan, Lee, &
Murphy, 2003; Kulka, Schlenger, Fairban, Hough, Jordan, Marmar, & Weiss, 1990; Ikin,
Sim, Creamer, Forbes, McKenzie, Kelsall, Glass, McFarlane, Abramson, Ittak, Dwyer,
Blizzard, Delaney, Horsley, Harrex, & Schwarz, 2004). However, rarely have these
soldiers been studied shortly following injury (Ikin et al., 2004; Koren, Norman, Cohen,
Berman, & Klein, 2005). A small study of Israeli soldiers found that 16.7 percent of
injured soldiers had PTSD approximately 15 months following injury, compared to 2.5
percent of non-injured soldiers with similar combat experiences (Koren et al., 2005). It is
important to work with the injured members to prevent them from lapsing into PTSD
symptoms with preventive training and education being important pieces of that work.
Training Effectiveness
One of the keys to keeping troops free of mental health problems is emphasis on
proactive and preemptive training and education (Hoyt, 2006). The Marine Corps has
been embedding mental health professionals such as chaplains, psychologists, and
psychiatrists in combat units themselves. Having such professionals in-place enables the
commanding officers to conduct preventive training and education actions continuously
as preparatory and resilience-enhancing efforts (Hoyt, 2006). Such approaches result in
the integrated delivery of psychological care to Marine infantry units throughout their
deployment cycle. These include providing training, assessment, and support before and
after a deployment while in garrison, and of course ongoing into their deployment within
the theater of operations. One particular advantage of this longitudinal involvement is an

38
understanding of recent events, experienced systemically or individually, that might
influence current psychological reactions or dispositions, and additionally, future actions
or vulnerabilities to future events (Litz et al., 2002).
There are numerous advantages to utilizing an embedded model of care with these
operational Marine units. The advantages include (1) significantly enhanced
understanding of contextualization issues necessary for accurate assessment, intervention,
and mission enhancement; (2) increased prevention, early intervention, and systemic
implementation emphasis; and (3) greater accuracy of dispositional recommendations,
with resultant increases in their utilization due to perceived credible and knowledgeable
performance. These advantages enable the embedded mental health professionals to
effectively influence the prevention efforts which include training and education (Hoyt,
2006). The one particular advantage of this long-term involvement is an understanding of
recent events, experienced systemically or individually, that might influence current
psychological reactions or dispositions, and additionally, future actions or vulnerabilities
to future events (Hoyt, 2006). Having mental health professionals in the units available
for prevention work is definitely positive and most likely results in preventing some of
the mental health problems within the unit itself (Everly & Lating, 2004; Litz, et al.,
2002; Sammons, 2005).
Recent literature indicates that embedding mental health professionals in combat
units results in enhanced addressing of combat stress reactions and disorders such as
PTSD as part of preparatory and resilience-inducing efforts (Everly & Lating, 2004; Litz,
et al., 2002; Sammons, 2005; Ursano, Grieger, & McCarroll, 1996). The chief advantage
of having mental health professionals working inside of the operating unit are expanded

opportunities for training and equipping leadership with mental health resiliency
prevention tools (Hoyt, 2006). The chief emphasis is to work with young leadership
consisting of the non-commissioned officers (NCOs), staff non-commissioned officers
(SNCOs), and junior officers. These small unit leadership groups are critical to the
mental health strength-enhancing resiliency actions (Hoyt, 2006).
Another advantage of such preventive training efforts is multiplication of the
effectiveness by mitigating stressors and difficulties among troops before they become
more entrenched. Ursano et al. (1996) characterized these efforts as assisting in the
"metabolism" of early stress symptoms and diminishing future problematic psychological
functioning and behavior. Ursano et al. (1996) also indicated such preventive stress
interventions should include educational components, preventive and early-intervention
efforts, and appropriate referral resources as appropriate. Educational and intervention
components include: (1) identification, prevention, and mitigation of acute or cumulative
combat and operational stressors, (2) the continuum of normative to non-normative
responses to these stressors, (3) awareness of the effects of acute or cumulative stressors
such as longstanding sleep deprivation or sustained hyper-arousal, (4) the powerful
moderating effects of leadership and unit cohesion as buffering forces for troops, (5) the
means to minimize the "fog and friction" of war for subordinates, (6) addressing the
fears, losses, and uncertainties of combat deployments, and finally, (7) emphasizing the
confidence enhancement resulting from sustained and realistic training experiences
(Ursano et al., 1996). Overarching goals of these normalizing and education processes
include the development of structure or meaning in difficult experiences, greater mastery

over symptoms and triggers, and a proper focus on coping mechanisms (Ursano et al.,
1996).
Central to a preemptive training approach is the importance of collaborating with
existing supportive personnel (small-unit leadership, medical officers, or chaplains) and
training structures integral to the military training pipeline. Shephard (2000) astutely
noted, "Military psychiatry is often done best, not by psychiatrists, but by doctors,
officers, and soldiers who understand the principles of group psychology and use the
defenses in the culture to help people through traumatic situations" (p. 398). Through
such preventive training interventions, integrated leaders at varying levels can provide
interventions for troops within their own spheres of influence and often do provide
normalizing and preventive psychological first-aid interventions to those who would not
traditionally come to the attention of mental health until the magnitude of their
difficulties increased (Shephard, 2002).
Another benefit of combat operational stress preventive training efforts is
reduction in stigma attached to mental health services among operational units (Hoge et
al, 2004). Corrigan, Markowitz, and Watson (2004) discussed the concept of institutional
stigma and restricted access to mental health care, a particularly significant issue within
the traditions of infantry unit functioning, Special Forces, and various other unique or
elite military groups. There can exist a strong ethos against acknowledgment of
individual or group vulnerability, with these admissions potentially influencing external
appraisals of individuals' operational functioning (Corrigan, Markowitz, & Watson,
2004). Accordingly, there exists a subtle distrust of outsider influence that may disrupt
group intactness or operational performance and lead to underutilization of mental health
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resources. For this reason, extremely effective preventive mental health training efforts
are those which originate from within the infantry unit, utilize existing infantry structure
and leadership, and are performed by integrated providers who are contextually
knowledgeable. Systemic intervention refers to the importance of leveraging one's
impact on a group, thereby affecting a greater number of individuals in the process. A
key principle of systemic interaction is facilitating a military group's ability to care for its
own needs. One of the primary vehicles to multiply one's effectiveness in this manner is
to assist leadership in training subordinates (Hoyt, 2006).
One central task of leadership in the military is the development of individual and
organizational resilience in response to mission threats. Intimately linked to the concept
of individual resilience, of turning hurdles or adversity into opportunity and even
enhancement, is the construct of personality hardiness. A significant body of research has
focused on mental constructs of commitment, control, and challenge as indicators of
hardiness and psychological stability amid highly stressful conditions (Bartone, 1999;
Bartone, Ursano, Saczynski, & Ingraham, 1989; Kobasa, 1979; Maddi, 1999). Maddi and
Khoshaba (2003) suggested that during adverse or stressful events, those high in
commitment tend to experience vitality through involvement in the situation around them
and their sense of being a part of something bigger than themselves. Those strong in
control tend to inject themselves into difficult situations, perceiving their effort to be
worthwhile as means of influencing the outcome. Finally, those strongly oriented to the
challenge construct receive significant fulfillment in learning from their experiences, that
is, benefiting from both good and bad experiences without quickly dismissing negative
experiences as unprofitable (Bartone, 1999). This hardiness construct has been shown to
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be a significant stress-resilient moderator among Gulf War veterans, with high-hardy
individuals experiencing significantly fewer combat stress symptoms than low-hardy
individuals under high-stress conditions (Bartone, 1999).
The mental constructs of commitment, control, and challenge ultimately involve
the meaning or interpretations that individuals attach to the events they experience, with
these appraisals then impacting future personal actions. This evaluative meaning-making
process of one's experiences is highly amenable to leadership influences (Bartone, 1999),
particularly notable in groups with direct and frequent contact and under high-stress
conditions. In these contexts, Bartone (1999) suggests leaders who are high in hardiness
have a unique and powerful format to communicate their appraisals of events and thereby
shape how group challenges are constructed or interpreted by subordinates. He further
highlights the powerful mediums of group orientation in military training, the
interdependent nature of small-unit work, and the authoritative counsel, experiences, and
example leaders set as powerful media on how individual experiences get interpreted
(Bartone, 1999). Using these constructs as a basis for leadership training, embedded
mental health professionals can have a significant institutional impact on the shaping and
preparation of the combatants they serve (Hoyt, 2006).
Although service members certainly experience the necessary aspects of tough,
realistic, and approximated training physically, leaders may not be appreciably modeling
or integrating the mental principles of resilience. Additionally, leadership consultation
can include emphases on modeling of hardy approaches to problem solving and sense
making of experiences; the psychological need for control, predictability, and situational
coherence amid the "fog of war" challenges; mission clarity and conviction against loss

and uncertainty; and providing the necessary confidences gained through state-dependent
learning and contingency-laden training fostering mastery (Ursano et al., 1996). Properly
instituted training and education services could teach leaders the principles of mental
resilience in addition to physical ones, further necessitating the need for quality and
holistic combat operational stress preventive training and education services.
Department of Defense and Combat Stress
Combat stress includes all the physiological and emotional stresses encountered
as a direct result of dangers and mission demands of combat. However, the Department
of Defense and the military services define combat stress differently. The Department of
Defense and the U.S. Army identify Combat Operational Stress Control as programs
developed and actions taken by military leadership to prevent, identify, and manage
adverse effects of combat and operational stress in units; optimize mission performance;
conserve fighting strength; prevent or minimize adverse effects of combat stress on
service members' physical, psychological, intellectual and social health; and return the
unit or service member to duty expeditiously (Department of Defense, 1999; Department
of the Army, 2006). On the other hand, the U.S. Marine Corps defines Combat
Operational Stress Control as specific actions encompassing all policies and programs to
prevent, identify, and holistically treat mental injuries caused by combat or other
operations (USMC, 2008). Specifically, the Marine Corps wants to treat mental health
injuries caused by stress by a holistic approach encompassing mind, body, and Marines'
families (Nash, 2007). This approach is reflected by the Marine Corps initiating
development of a very robust preventive measures training and education program
(Gaskin, 2008). However, since the program has only been recently started due to

combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, it needs to have a thorough evaluation to
establish whether it is effective and meets the training efficacy criteria of the U.S. Marine
Corps.
Combat Operational Stress Control Preventive Training
Training is a vital part of the Marine Corps preparation to go anywhere, take on
any adversary, and win our Nation's wars (USMC, 1996). As such, Marine Corps units
train as they expect to fight, which entails pragmatically using the learned skills in the
field (USMC, 1996). This training philosophy provides the Marine Corps with the
unifying goal for individual and collective training. This is a common thread woven
throughout the Marine Corps, and with the American public requiring greater
accountability of personnel utilization, public funds, effective and efficient training must
focus on attaining and maintaining the state of operational readiness to support Marine
air-ground task force (MAGTF) war fighting operations (USMC, 1996).
The Marine Corps trains constantly to develop and maintain combat-ready
Marines and units that can perform assigned tasks to specific standards. The Marine
Corps training is standards-based, performance-oriented, and prioritized in accordance
with mission requirements. The Marine Corps overarching training program aim is to
build self-confidence, promote teamwork and esprit de corps, and develop
professionalism in leaders (USMC, 1994).
The Marine Corps uses the systems approach to training to maximize training
results and focus the training principles of the unit in preparation for the conduct of the
Marine Corps wartime missions. Depending on the unit and type of training, individual
mission essential training may occur daily, weekly, monthly, or annually (USMC, 2004).
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Combat operational stress preventive training is considered mission essential training
(USMC, 2008). Marines are introduced to Combat Operational Stress Control basic
knowledge and principles while undergoing the accession training at Boot Camp or the
Basic Officer School. After graduating from the accession schooling and while at their
units, Marines have opportunities to attend Combat Operational Stress Control formal
training on an annual basis taught by qualified combat operational stress preventive
training instructors (USMC, 2008). This formal training should consist of a series of
lectures and small role play simulation exercises lasting about 6-8 hours depending on the
audience and the instructor (USMC, 2008). Additionally, Marines are exposed to
informal instruction conducted by their unit leaders almost daily. The emphasis of such
informal pieces is on ensuring that Marines incorporate the learned combat operational
stress preventive skills into their daily lives, thus maximizing the preventive goals of the
training (USMC, 2008).
Training as a unit builds teamwork, transmits skills and knowledge, and sustains
proficiency in individual and collective tasks (USMC, 1996; USMC, 2004). Commanders
should incorporate the best mix of individual and collective training to ensure that
Marines learn and sustain proficiency in mission-essential skills. Marines learn best
through performance-oriented training. This method requires them to perform tasks
according to specified behaviors and standards, but not necessarily to occupy a specified
time. The times shown on training schedules are only a guide; training is conducted until
standards are met. The emphasis of training must be on the actual performance of the
tasks. Combat operational stress preventive training is an integral part of mission

essential unit and individual training and needs to be continuously conducted to preserve
the Marine Corps most precious resource - individual Marines (USMC, 2009).
Many Navy and Marine Corps officers view appropriate training and education as
the key to prevention from negative effects of combat operational stress. In order to
facilitate this approach, the Marine Corps has recently introduced a continuum model
(Swan, 2008). Training and education based on this continuum model needs to be rank
and grade focused and standardized across the Marine Corps to include all formal
schools, pre-deployment training programs, and sustainment training. In order to
facilitate the current world-wide operations, the Marine Corps recommends development
of alternative training means, such as interactive internet resources, situational vignettes,
videos, and other best practice methods to enhance and expand training quality,
accessibility, and consistency (Gaskin, 2008).
The Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training and education
policy should be consistent with the current Marine Corps systems approach to training
(USMC, 2004). The systems approach to training process ensures that training and
education are conducted in an environment of awareness and continuous feedback
(USMC, 2004). There are three specific combat operational stress preventive training
phases: Phase I - Pre-deployment, Phase II - Redeployment, and Phase III - Postdeployment. During each phase, Marine Corps leaders, enlisted Marines, and families
have specific training roles to fulfill. The officers are to work with the enlisted Marines
on reducing stigma associated with mental health issues, and thus create a unit climate
that encourages seeking help from mental health professionals. Additionally, officers,
enlisted Marines, and their families have opportunities to conduct phase specific training

sessions. In order to facilitate this process, the Marine Corps Combat Operational Stress
Control branch has developed and provided a series of training modules which aim to
train and educate officers, enlisted Marines, and their families on topics concerning
combat operational stress (Gaskin, 2008).
Systems Approach to Training
The Marine Corps uses the systems approach to training (USMC, 2004). The
systems approach to training helps in managing the instructional process for analyzing,
designing, developing, implementing, and evaluating instruction. The systems approach
to training serves as a blueprint for organizing or structuring the instructional process.
The systems approach to training is a set of comprehensive guidelines, tools, and
techniques needed to close the gap between the current and the desired job performance
through instructional interventions (USMC, 2004). The Marine Corps originally targeted
the systems approach to training for use in its formal military occupational training
schools, but the comprehensive system applies to unit and field training in addition to
formal education, which makes it applicable to combat operational stress preventive
training and education services (Gaskin, 2008).
The systems approach to training is a dynamic, flexible system for developing and
implementing effective and efficient instruction to meet the current and the projected
needs. The systems approach to training process is flexible in that it accounts for
individual differences in ability, rate of learning, motivation, and achievement to
capitalize on the opportunity for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of instruction
(USMC, 2004). The systems approach to training process reduces the number of school
management decisions that have to be made subjectively and, instead, allows decisions to

be made based on reasonable conclusions which are based on carefully collected and
analyzed data. More than one solution to an instructional problem may be identified
through the systems approach to training, however, the selection of the best solution is a
goal of the systems approach to training (USMC, 2004).
The Marine Corps system approach of training reflects the ADDIE (Analyze,
Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate) instructional design model (Leshin, Pollock,
& Reigeluth, 1992; Dick & Carey, 1996). The systems approach to training is a
continuous, cyclical process allowing any one of these five phases, and their associated
functions, to occur at any time (USMC, 2004). In addition, each phase within the systems
approach to training further builds upon the previous phase, providing a system of checks
and balances to insure all instructional data are accounted for and that revisions to
instructional materials are identified and made. The combat operational stress preventive
training has been built around the systems approach to training reflecting the ADDIE
instructional design model (Gaskin, 2008; Leshin, Pollock, & Reigeluth, 1992; Dick &
Carey, 1996). As a result, combat operational stress preventive training is flexible in
terms of its design and implementation structure allowing for continuous improvement
thus directly benefiting the Marines (Gaskin, 2008).
Marine Corps Learning Comprehension Principles
The preventive combat operational stress preventive training needs to follow the
Marine Corps recommended steps for learning comprehension. The first step is that the
combat operational stress preventive training needs to be relevant. In order for the
training to be relevant, it needs to address the significance of the lesson to the Marine.
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The Marine needs to understand how he or she will benefit from the training (USMC,
2004).
The second step is the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework
provides two important things for Marine learners. First, it constitutes a roadmap of
where the instructor will take the learner during the training. Second, it creates gaps in
the learner's mind that must be filled (USMC, 2004). For example, if the instructor tells a
learner that he is going to talk about three things and then names them, the instructor
creates conceptual gaps in the learner's mind that can be powerful tools in the learning
process. By filling these gaps, the instructor provides the student with closure and
understanding. The combat operational stress preventive training is certainly no
exception and needs to contain a conceptual framework consisting of a roadmap along
with learning gaps which will need to be filled during the training process.
The third step involves the learning outcomes. By stating the learning outcomes,
the program's lesson plans identify specific learning tasks that Marines must be able to
perform at the end of each training session. Specifically, the proposed learning outcomes
identify what Marines will be able to do, under what conditions they will perform these
tasks, and the required proficiency (USMC, 2004). Knowing the learning outcomes can
definitely reduce the Marine's anxiety so he or she can concentrate on learning. Parlaying
this paradigm, each session of the combat operational stress preventive training needs to
have specific learning outcomes which need to be clearly understood by all participants.
The fourth step contains the actual method of instruction. The method of
instruction will identify how Marines will learn. Will it be a practical application, lecture,
or a demonstration? Knowing the method ahead of time can reduce Marines' anxieties so
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they can concentrate on learning. Combat operational stress preventive training consists
of a mix of lectures, simulations, practical applications, and demonstrations. Marines
should know ahead of time what will be the actual method of instruction so they can
focus on actual learning tasks as appropriate (USMC, 2004).
Evaluation is the fifth step in the process. The primary purpose of identifying how
a Marine will be evaluated is to decrease anxiety. Leaders and instructors should identify
the method of evaluation and when the evaluation will occur. Evaluation information is
passed to Marines so they know what to expect for feedback. Additionally, evaluation
information should directly relate to learning outcomes (USMC, 2004).
The Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training is conducted
using four instructional delivery methods: demonstrations, conferences which are also
referred as guided discussions, lectures, and practical applications. These can be used
alone or in combination (Rogers, 1986). A demonstration shows Marines the correct way
to perform operations and tactics. It helps Marines see their individual role in a collective
task. Demonstrations can be done several ways. Live demonstrations are often best
because they hold a Marine's interest. Demonstrations must be performed unhurriedly.
This allows Marines to see all the steps as they are performed. Demonstrations emphasize
key points and create pauses for discussion. If the task contains many actions, the trainer
performs the entire task first, then demonstrates each step of the task separately.
Demonstrations that integrate practice times are similar to live demonstrations,
but with an added practice session. They are sometimes referred to as talk-through, walkthrough demonstrations. After procedures are demonstrated and understood, Marines are
given a chance to practice and simulate the steps under increasingly realistic conditions
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until they can perform to desired standards. This type of training is especially valuable
because it is engaging and experiential with a great probability of Marines actually
acquiring new knowledge (Rogers, 1986).
During conferences or guided discussions, Marines discuss the information
presented. Trainers initiate and direct discussions by giving information and asking
questions. Conferences work best when there is more than one correct procedure, when
Marines have some knowledge of the tasks, or when time is not critical (USMC, 2004).
Conferences are effective when the group is familiar with the subject. Even though the
discussion is guided, experienced Marines will make many good training points,
increasing interest among others (Rogers, 1986). The subjects are interesting and open to
discussion. Conferences allow Marines to state options that trainers and other Marines
can then discuss. To encourage participation, trainers must guide the discussions.
Conferences do not require Marines to perform tasks. They encourage a free exchange of
information. Trainers must know their subject well, and they must also have developed
the ability to guide a discussion among Marines. The combat operational stress
preventive training utilizes the conference training format during International Combat
Operational Stress Control Conferences (Gaskin, 2008), resulting in a plethora of quality
training opportunities.
Lecturing presents information with little discussion. Typically, it is a one-way
form of instruction - from the instructor to the instructed. As the least preferred method of
instruction, lectures should be used only when there is a large group and no performance
activities are required. Lectures are used in the Marine Corps when the training time is
very limited and no other method allows the trainer to present information as quickly.
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Also lecturing is appropriate when Marines know very little about the subject matter and
lectures prepare them for demonstration and practice. Finally, lectures are used when
trainers want to emphasize technical material with one correct or preferred method
(Rogers, 1986).
When using practical applications or simulations, the trainer seeks to provide as
realistic training scenario as possible. Practical applications and simulations can be timeconsuming and involved, but they provide students with the best training environment for
learning a task. The Marine Corps training, which focuses on performance-oriented
training, requires the trainer to provide practical applications whenever feasible (USMC,
2004). Factors that can affect the use of practical applications are availability of facilities
and associated audio-visual equipment. Practical applications, more often than any other
presentation method, need to be fully planned in advance. However, practical
applications are worth the effort because they normally result in Marines actually
learning the topic (Rogers, 1986).
Kirkpatrick Model of Training Evaluation
The Kirkpatrick (2006) model for training evaluation was selected as a framework
to answer some of this study's research questions because it is one of the most
recognizable available training evaluation models (Wang & Shuai, 2008). According to
Kirkpatrick's (2006) methodology, there are four levels to training evaluation. The first
one is concerned with the reaction of how training participants felt about the training. The
second level considers learning. Assessing at this level moves the evaluation beyond the
sheer learner satisfaction and attempts to assess the extent participants advanced in skill
and actually gained knowledge. The third level measures knowledge transfer that has
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occurred in participants' behavior due to partaking in the training program. Basically,
evaluating at this level considers assessing whether the newly acquired skills are actually
being used in the daily lives of the participants. The fourth level measures the success of
the training program in terms of increasing or decreasing identifiable long-term
indicators. These could include increases in sales and production of units or decreases in
number of accidents or mental health disorder cases.
There are three reasons training programs are evaluated. The first one concerns
justifying the sheer existence and budget of the training department by showing how it
contributes to the organization's objectives and goals. The second reason is to have a firm
basis for determining whether to continue or discontinue a training program. The third
reason is to gather the information on how to improve existing and future training
programs (Kirkpatrick, 2006). This study is concerned with the evaluation of the
preventive combat operational stress preventive training. Based on the information
gathered in this study, the Combat Operational Stress Control branch officers will be able
to improve their training program, and thus directly contribute to the preservation of
Marines and sailors serving with the Marine Corps.
Reaction Level
Just as the word implies, evaluation at this level measures how participants in a
training program react to it. It attempts to answer questions regarding the participants'
perceptions: Did the learners like it? Was the material relevant to their work? According
to Kirkpatrick (2006), every program should at least be evaluated at this level to provide
for the improvement of a training program. In addition, the participants' reactions have
important consequences for learning. Although a positive reaction does not guarantee
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learning, a negative reaction almost certainly reduces its possibility (Kirkpatrick, 2006).
Learners are often keenly aware of what they need to know to accomplish a task. If the
training program fails to satisfy their needs, a determination should be made as to
whether it is the fault of the program's design or instructional delivery.
Evaluating and measuring reaction is important for several reasons. First, and
perhaps most importantly, reaction provides feedback and views helping the decision
makers to evaluate their training programs, which includes information needed to
improve them. Second, reaction provides trainers with information which could be used
by management and the trainers themselves to determine the training effectiveness skills
baseline and self-improvement of the trainers. Third, reaction level information provides
means for quantitative and qualitative analysis. This is especially important to the
managers who can then use the statistical analysis information for decision making
purposes. Finally, reaction level evaluation can provide quantitative information to the
trainers themselves to establish their standards of performance for future programs
(Kirkpatrick, 2006).
Reaction level evaluation is not indicative of the training's performance potential
as it does not measure what new skills the learners have acquired or what they have
learned which will transfer back to the working environment. This might cause some to
downplay the real value of reaction level evaluation (Markus & Ruvulo, 1990). However,
the interest, attention, and motivation of the participants are often critical to the success
of any training process as people often learn better when they react positively to the
learning environment by seeing the importance of the presented training. When learning
material is first presented, learners normally make a decision as to whether they will pay
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attention to it. When the training is thought of as important and achievable, then learners
are normally motivated to engage in it (Markus & Ruvulo, 1990). However, when
training is considered as non-relevant and there is a low probability of success, then a
negative effect is generated and motivation for task engagement is low (Markus &
Ruvulo, 1990).
This differs somewhat from Kirkpatrick (2006) as he indicated, "If training is
going to be effective, it is important that learners react favorably to it. Otherwise, they
will not be motivated to learn" (p. 27). However, the less relevant the learning package is
to learners, then the more effort that has to be put into the design and presentation of the
learning package. In other words, if the training package is not relevant to the learner,
then the learning material has to spark the learner's interest through a secondary means
which might include, for example, an attractive media design.
A well designed training package is important; however, use of it should be to
promote or aid the learning process rather than the learning package itself. And if a
learning package is built of sound purpose and design, then it should support the learners
in bridging a performance gap (Kirkpatrick, 2006). This bridging action should be the
actual motivation to learn. Nevertheless, reaction level evaluation should measure
whether the training participants liked, disliked, or were neutral to the conducted training.
It is because being positive about the training does normally result in learners actually
learning the material. If they were negative about the training, then in most likelihood the
learners were not motivated to learn the material. This study employed a self-assessment
quantitative satisfaction survey and qualitative interviews/training session observations
through which reaction level evaluation of training participants was determined as
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recommended by Kirkpatrick (2006). As a result, the researcher determined whether the
Marine learners actually liked, disliked, or were neutral about the combat operational
stress preventive training material.
Learning Level
Assessing at this level moves the evaluation beyond the learner satisfaction and
attempts to assess the extent students have advanced in skills, knowledge, or attitude.
Measurement at this level is more difficult and laborious than level one. Methods range
from formal to informal testing to team assessment and self-assessment. If possible,
participants need to take the test or assessment before the training (pre-test) and after
training (post-test) to determine the amount of learning that has occurred. Another option
is to employ self-assessment surveys and interviews with the training event learners and
their supervisors. Such quantitative and qualitative data can then be used to determine
whether in fact new knowledge has been gained (Kirkpatrick, 2006). This study
employed self-assessment satisfaction surveys and qualitative interviews through which
the learning level of combat operational stress preventive training participants was
determined as recommended by Kirkpatrick (2006). As a result, the researcher
determined whether the Marine learners actually learned the subject matter training
material.
Measuring the learning that takes place in a training program is important in order
to validate the learning objectives. Evaluating the learning typically focuses on such
questions as: (1) What knowledge was acquired? (2) What skills were developed or at
least enhanced? (3) What attitudes were changed? Learner assessments are created to
allow a judgment to be made about the learner's capability for performance (Kirkpatrick,
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2006). There are two parts to this process: gathering of information or evidence and
interpreting the information. The gathering of information part might include testing the
learner by administering a test or orally interviewing the learner. The judging of the
information concerns determining what does the data represent? This assessment should
not be confused with evaluation. Assessment is about the progress and achievements of
individual learners, while evaluation is about the learning program as a whole (Tovey,
1997).
Knowledge Transfer Level
This level measures the transfer that has occurred in learners' behavior due to the
training program. Evaluating at this level attempts to answer the question: Are the newly
acquired skills, knowledge, or attitude being used in the everyday environment of the
learner (Kirkpatrick, 2006)? For many trainers this level represents the truest assessment
of a training program's effectiveness. However, measuring at this level is difficult as it is
often impossible to predict when the change in behavior will occur, and thus requires
important decisions as when to evaluate, how often to evaluate, and how to evaluate
(Kirkpatrick, 2006).
This evaluation involves testing the learners capabilities to perform learned skills
while on the job, rather than in the classroom. Do learners actually employ the learned
skills in their daily lives? Knowledge transfer level evaluations can be performed
formally by live testing or informally by means of observation (Kirkpatrick, 2006).
Concerning the combat operational stress preventive training, Marine learners should
have incorporated the gained skills required for coping with combat operational stress,
thus providing themselves with preventive skills related to combat operational stress.
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This has also been the training program's overarching learning goal and objective. This
study also determined the program's state of knowledge transfer level by means of a selfassessment survey and qualitative interviews through which the effectiveness of the
knowledge transfer level of the training participants was assessed.
In Kirkpatrick's (2006) original four-levels of evaluation, he names the level three
as "behavior." However, behavior is the action that is performed, while the final result of
the behavior is the performance. Gilbert (1998) said that performance has two aspects:
behavior being the means and its consequence being the end. If this was only the
behavioral aspect, then this behavioral characteristic could have been done in the training
environment. However, the consequence of the behavior, the actual performance, is what
the training is really after (Gilbert, 1998). The results are the learners now can fully
perform and produce the needed results in the working environment.
It is important to measure performance because the primary purpose of training is
to improve results by having learners acquire new skills and knowledge and then actually
apply them to the job. Learning new skills and knowledge is not beneficial to an
organization unless the participants actually use new skills and knowledge in their work
activities. Since knowledge transfer level measurements must take place after the learners
have returned to their jobs, these measurements will typically involve someone closely
involved with the learner, such as a supervisor or a subject matter expert familiar with the
work settings (Kirkpatrick, 2006). Although it takes a greater effort to collect knowledge
transfer level data than it does to collect data during training, its value is important to the
organization as the data provides insight into the transfer of learning from the classroom
to the actual work environment. The knowledge transfer level data also provides
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information on the barriers encountered when attempting to implement the new
techniques learned in the program, which then could be used to improve the program.
Results Level
Frequently thought of as the bottom line, this level measures the success of the
program in terms which managers and executives can understand: increased production,
improved quality, decreased costs, reduced frequency of accidents, increased sales,
higher profits, higher return on investment, and in the case of the combat operational
stress preventive training, decreased number of mental health cases. From a business and
organizational perspective, results level evaluation should be the overall reason for a
training program, yet results level evaluation is not typically addressed or even
researched (Kirkpatrick, 2006).
Results level evaluation measures the effectiveness of the training program. It
determines what impact, if any, the training has achieved. Examples of impacts can
include such items as money, efficiency, moral, teamwork, better utilization rates,
decreased rates of absences from work, just to name a few. As one moves from level one
to level four of the Kirkpatrick (2006) model, the evaluation process becomes more
difficult and time-consuming. However, the higher levels provide information which is of
increasingly significant value, providing the real assessment of the conducted training
(Kirkpatrick, 2006). Perhaps the most frequent type of measurement is the reaction level
because it is the easiest to measure, yet it provides the least valuable data. Measuring
results which affect the organization is considerably more difficult, thus it is conducted
less frequently although it yields the most valuable information (Kirkpatrick, 2006).
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The first three-levels of evaluation, reaction, learning, and knowledge transfer, are
largely "soft" measurements; however, decision-makers who approve such training
programs prefer hard results (returns or impacts). This does not mean the first three are
insignificant, indeed, their use is in tracking problems within the learning package.
Reaction level evaluation informs the decision maker how relevant the training is to the
work the learners perform. It essentially measures how well the training requirement
analysis processes worked. Learning level evaluation informs about the degree of
relevance that the training package worked to transfer the learning objectives from the
training material to the learners as it actually measures how well the design and
development processes worked. Knowledge transfer level evaluation provides
information about the degree to which the learning has actually been applied to the
learner's job. It measures how well the performance analysis process worked. Finally,
results level evaluation provides information about the return on the conducted training
investment. Decision-makers prefer this harder "result," although not necessarily in
dollars and cents (Hayes, 2003).
Phillips (1996) also writes that the value of information becomes greater as it goes
up these levels of evaluation (from reaction to results). For example, the evaluation of
results has the highest value of information to the organization, while reaction provides
the least information. And like most levels of information, the ones that provide the best
value are often more difficult to obtain. Thus, there is a tendency to do the easier levels,
one and two, and obtain a little information about training efforts, while bypassing the
more difficult levels three and four which would provide the most valuable information
to the organization (Philips, 1996).
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The main goal of the combat operational stress preventive training is to decrease
the number of mental health cases (Gaskin, 2008). Based on this goal, Combat
Operational Stress Control branch officers should look at the results level perspective.
Did the conducted preventive training result in decreasing the number of mental health
cases? If not, the training might be considered as ineffective. If yes, then the training
probably was effective with other factors being equal. However, this study took a close
look at all four levels, producing a thorough combat operational stress preventive training
review. Only then, the study was able to help determine the full causes of the combat
operational stress preventive training successes or failures.
Summary
There have been several significant national studies that investigated the issues of
combat operational stress. Some of these studies focused on negative effects of combat
operational stress (Kang & Hyams, 2004; Hoge et al., 2002, Hoge et al., 2004; Hoge et
al., 2006). Other studies looked at associations of combat exposure and ill effects of
combat operational stress (Dohrenwend et al., 2007; Fontana & Rosenheck, 1999;
Koenen, Stellman, Stellman, & Sommer, 2003; Adler, Vaitkus, & Martin, 1996;
Southwick et al., 1995; Wolfe, Brown, & Kelley, 1993; Smith, et al., 2008; Iversen, Fear,
& Ehlers, 2008). Still other studies explored the correlations of general military
deployment stress factors such as deployment-related stressors, low-magnitude stressors,
general overseas stressors, malevolent environment, and contextual stressors (Bartone,
Vaitkus, & Adler, 1998; King, King, Gudanowski, & Vreven, 1995; Litz, King, King,
Orsillo, & Friedman, 1997; Engelhard & van den Hout, 2007; Litz, Orsillo, Friedman,
Ehlich, & Batres, 1997). However, none of these studies explored the effectiveness of the
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combat operational stress preventive training activities as a way to prevent mental health
problems.
This study sought to fill this important gap and determine the effectiveness of the
currently offered Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training services.
First, the study gathered quantitative data to determine whether the respondents' selfreported experiences of effects from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of
the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. Second, the study
collected quantitative and qualitative data to determine the actual efficacy of the Marine
Corps combat operational stress preventive training and education services for both the
enlisted Marines and officers. These understandings could benefit Combat Operational
Stress Control officers from all the Services on how to improve combat operational stress
preventive training and education activities, thus contribute to the preservation of our
Nation's military combat troops.
The next chapter describes how the study's design sought to accomplish these end
states. It describes in detail the methods and procedures used in the study.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Combat
Operational Stress Control training program. This evaluation entailed both qualitative and
quantitative inquiries of the combat operational stress preventive training to determine
whether the program meets the training effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps. The
researcher used reaction to training, learning through training, knowledge transfer, and
long-term training results as the key training effectiveness constructs (Kirkpatrick, 2006).
Specifically, a quantitative investigation took place to explore the individual experiences
of Marines who were subjected to combat operational stress. The results of this statistical
quantitative analysis provided insights to the effectiveness of combat operational stress
preventive training.
Additionally, a qualitative analysis of preventive training sessions was conducted
by investigating individual experiences that gave meaning to decisions why the combat
operational stress preventive training was effective or ineffective. A qualitative approach
allowed the individual experiences to speak for themselves providing intrinsic
perceptions to the real effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training
(Creswell, 2007). Together, the qualitative and the quantitative inquiries added
immensely to the validity of this study, thus directly benefitting our Nation's combat
troops.
Population
The study took place at Marine Corps Bases, Quantico, Virginia; Camp Lejune,
North Carolina; and Camp Pendleton, California. The participants consisted of active
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duty and reserve Marines on active duty. For the purposes of quantitative analysis, the
researcher sought to obtain a random sample greater than 384 Marines. The current
Marine Corps active duty population consists of about 202,000 Marines (Global Security,
2009). Based on Cochran's (1977) formula, a random sample consisting of at least 384
Marines is required for making generalizations about the entire active Marine Corps
population.
The sample size for qualitative inquiry was based on qualitative data saturation as
recommended by Creswell (2007). The researcher planned to reach the point of sample
data saturation after performing qualitative interviews using a purposefully stratified
sample of Marines. Specifically, this qualitative sample consisted of four junior noncommissioned Marines, four staff non-commissioned officers, and four commissioned
officers. Additionally, the researcher hoped to reach the point of qualitative sample data
saturation after observing four combat operational stress preventive training classes.
Research Variables
The study's data were to determine how the respondents' self-reported
experiences of effects from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the
effectiveness of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training. The
variables from this data set included suffering from effects of combat operational stress,
training effectiveness and evaluation constructs, and general military background
biographical data. Suffering from effects of combat operational stress constituted the
dependent variable, with the other three variable groups constituted the independent
variables.
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This study also investigated the individual experiences of Marines who completed
the combat operational stress preventive training. The independent variables consisted of
Kirkpatrick's (2006) training evaluation constructs, biographical information of the
participants, possessing combat operational stress preventive coping skills, the
effectiveness of the trainers, the effectiveness of the training materials, and overall
feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training. Training evaluation
constructs included reaction, learning, changed behavior, and long-term results. The
dependent variable consisted of individual perceptions of whether the combat operational
stress preventive training was effective or ineffective.
Research Design
This was a mixed method research design consisting of quantitative and
qualitative inquiries. Since this study involved both quantitative and qualitative inquiries,
there were three data collection instruments. For the purposes of quantitative inquiries, an
online based survey was utilized. This survey contained a number of Likert scale type
questions built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) four-level training evaluation constructs:
reaction, learning, changed behavior, and long-term results (see Appendices A and D).
Concerning the qualitative inquiry, the researcher conducted interviews using an
interview protocol form, which contained a number of open-ended interview questions
related to the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (see
Appendix B). These questions were also built around Kirkpatrick four-level training
evaluation constructs (see Appendix E). Additionally, the researcher conducted four
qualitative observations of training sessions using an observation protocol instrument.

The observation protocol instrument contained checklist items that are relevant to
training and conducting productive observation sessions (see Appendix C).
The researcher established validity and reliability of the above instruments by
means of expert review and pilot testing. Specifically, following approval of the proposed
research process, the researcher submitted an initial draft of the instruments for review by
a panel of experts to evaluate the appropriateness of content and ensure validity. The
panel of experts consisted of three external Ph.D. subject matter experts who possessed
requisite prior experience working with data collection instrumentations. After review
and feedback from the experts, the researcher conducted a pilot test of the survey to
ensure reliability for contextual relevance to Marines with a variety of backgrounds. The
researcher accomplished this by means of a convenience sampling method. This method
involved testing the quantitative survey with 10 Quantico, Virginia, based Marines who
were not part of the actual quantitative study sample. The qualitative instrument was also
tested with three Quantico, Virginia, based Marines who also were not part of the actual
qualitative study sample.
Method of Data Collection
The researcher sent an e-mail to Commanding Officers of randomly selected five
Marine Corps units each consisting of about 1,000 Marines and located at Marine Corps
Bases, Quantico, Virginia; Camp Lejune, North Carolina; and Camp Pendleton,
California. The units were selected using the Microsoft" Excel™ random number
generator. The sent e-mail contained a link to the web-based survey and requested each
respective unit Commanding Officer to forward that e-mail to all members of his or her
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unit in order to allow the members to voluntarily and anonymously access and complete
the survey.
For the purposes of qualitative analysis, the researcher performed individual
interviews with Marines using a purposefully stratified sample. This qualitative sample
consisted of four enlisted Marines, four staff non-commissioned officers, and four
commissioned officers. Additionally, the researcher planned to observe and reach the
point of qualitative data saturation after witnessing four combat operational stress
preventive training sessions in order to collect qualitative data related to the effectiveness
of the combat operational stress preventive training.
Statistical Analysis
For the purposes of quantitative analysis, the researcher utilized the statistical
analysis software, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Version 17.0: SPSS Base
(SPSS), to analyze the datasets. SPSS was also used to create tables and figures to display
comparisons of information. Explicitly, both descriptive and inferential statistical
methods were used. The descriptive statistics allowed the researcher to organize,
summarize, and describe the associated data. The inferential statistical methods provided
the researcher the opportunities to make predictions about the characteristics of the
Marine Corps population.
For the purposes of qualitative analysis, the researcher analyzed data by using
interpretational analysis techniques. Interpretational analysis involves systematic
procedures to code and classify qualitative data to ensure that important themes and
patterns emerge (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 1999). Interpretational analysis offers several
specific steps: preparing a database containing all the data, numbering each line of text
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sequentially and then dividing the text into meaningful segments, developing meaningful
categories to code the data; coding each segment by any and all categories that apply to
it; and then generating specific themes and constructs that emerge from the categories.
Logistic regression can be used to predict a dependent variable on the basis of
categorical independent variables and determine the percent of variance in the dependent
variable explained by the independents; rank the relative importance of independents;
assess interaction effects; and understand the impact of covariate control variables
(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). The impact of predictor variables can also be explained in
terms of odds ratios (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000).
Research Question 1 focused on whether the respondents' self-reported
experiences of effects from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the
effectiveness of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training. It was
answered by means of a dataset collected by the researcher. First, descriptive statistics
were used consisting of frequencies and percentages in order to organize, summarize, and
describe the data. Then, the researcher followed the analysis with binary logistic
regressions in order to assess the associations between the demographic variables,
training evaluation constructs, and self-reported experiences of effects from combat
operational stress. The researcher performed a series of binary logistic regressions to
determine the odds ratios (ORs) and 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CIs) for each
variable of interest.
Research Question 2 focused on whether the Combat Operational Stress Control
training program for Marine officers meets the training effectiveness criteria of the
Marine Corps. Research Question 3 focused on whether the Combat Operational Stress

Control training program for enlisted Marines meets the training effectiveness criteria of
the Marine Corps? The study answered these questions by using both quantitative and
qualitative methodologies. For the quantitative analysis, descriptive statistics consisting
of frequencies and percentages were used in order to organize, summarize, and describe
the data. The researcher followed the above with binary logistic regressions in order to
assess the associations between the demographic characteristics, impressions of the
received combat operational stress preventive training, learning specific facts/techniques,
actually using the learned skills/techniques, and individual perceptions whether the
training was effective or ineffective. The researcher performed a series of binary logistic
regressions to determine the odds ratios (ORs) and 95.0 percent confidence intervals
(CIs) for each variable of interest.
Qualitative analysis of data collected to answer Research Questions 2 and 3 were
also performed. Specifically, the researcher transcribed all interview data from a
recording device into a typed text. Each line of typed text was then divided into
meaningful segments. The researcher accomplished this by having each interview
question and the participant's response as a separate segment as recommended by
Creswell (2007). By having separate segments, the researcher was able to code the data
according to the specific themes related to training effectiveness constructs, such as
reaction, learning, changed behavior, and long-term results. A similar data analysis
methodology was applied to the observation based dataset. Conclusions were first drawn
from the data obtained individually from interviews and observations, and then from the
data as a whole, having the two categories combined as one set of qualitative data as
recommended by Creswell (2007).
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Summary
This chapter opened with a purpose of the study and the study inquiry procedures.
It described the study's population, samples, and research variables. The fourth section
reviewed instrument design, while the fifth section explained the methods of data
collection. Finally, the last section identified the statistical analyses used in the study.
The study's population consists of about 202,000 active duty Marines (Global
Security, 2009). According to Cochran's (1977) formula, a quantitative sample of at least
384 Marines is needed to allow the researcher to generalize the study's findings to the
entire Marine Corps population. Consequently, the researcher hoped to obtain a sample
greater than 384 Marines to generalize the study's findings to the entire Marine Corps
population. Additionally, the researcher hoped to reach the point of qualitative data
saturation after conducting 12 individual interviews and observing four training sessions.
As a result, the researcher planned to obtain sufficient data to perform thorough analyses
and subsequently reach conclusions.
Chapter IV reports the findings from these analyses. Biographical information
from the study's surveys is used to describe the participants. The data analyses are then
presented in the order of the research questions.

71
CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
This study was conducted from September through November 2009 at the Marine
Corps Bases, Quantico, Virginia; Camp Lejune, North Carolina; and Camp Pendleton,
California. The primary purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the
United States Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training program. This
evaluation entailed both qualitative and quantitative inquiries of the combat operational
stress preventive training to determine whether the program meets the training
effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps. Specifically, a quantitative investigation took
place to explore the individual experiences of Marines who were subjected to combat
operational stress. The results of this statistical quantitative analysis provided insights to
the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training.
Additionally, a qualitative case study analysis of preventive training sessions was
conducted by investigating individual experiences that gave meaning to decisions why
the combat operational stress preventive training was effective or ineffective. A
qualitative approach allowed the individual experiences to speak for themselves
providing intrinsic perceptions to the real effectiveness of the combat operational stress
preventive training (Creswell, 2007). Together, the qualitative and quantitative inquiries
added immensely to the validity of this study, thus directly benefitting our Nation's
combat troops.
Following this introduction is an overview of participants, including their
demographic characteristics. Next, the findings section appears ordered by the two
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research methodologies used in this study. Each analysis section reviews procedures used
and analyses outcomes.
Overview
The participants consisted of active duty and reserve Marines on active duty. For
the purposes of quantitative analysis, the researcher obtained a random sample of 480
Marines. The current Marine Corps active duty population consists of about 202,000
Marines (Global Security, 2009). Based on Cochran's (1977) formula, a random sample
consisting of at least 384 Marines was required for making generalizations about the
entire Marine Corps population. This study's quantitative random sample of 480 Marines
exceeded the minimum threshold of 384 Marines, thus allowing the researcher to make
generalizations about the entire Marine Corps population. The study's respondents
completed an online based survey. This survey contained a number of Likert scale type
questions built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) four-level training effectiveness constructs:
reaction, learning, changed behavior, and training effectiveness/long-term results (see
Appendices A and D).
Concerning the qualitative inquiry, the researcher reached the point of qualitative
data saturation after interviewing 12 Marines selected by means of a purposefully
stratified sample. This qualitative sample consisted of four junior enlisted Marines, four
senior enlisted Marines, and four commissioned officers. Additionally, the researcher
reached the point of qualitative data saturation after observing four combat operational
stress preventive training sessions. Specifically, the four observed training sessions
consisted of 924 observed Marines. Out of the observed 924 Marines, 693 were enlisted
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Marines and 231 were officers. This observed sample of 924 Marines was also sufficient
to reach the point of qualitative sample data saturation (Creswell, 2007).
Demographic Characteristics
The demographic section of the quantitative survey contained a forced-choice
format to gather information about the respondents' Military Occupational Specialty
(MOS), age, years served on active duty, gender, rank, current component status (active
duty, active duty reserve, selected reserve [mobilized], selected reserve [drilling], and
individual ready reserve [IRR]). Respondents representing combat arms, combat support,
and aviation military occupational specialties comprised over half of the sample (51.30
percent). Almost one-third of the sample (32.70 percent) reported ages between 20 and
25 years old. Likewise, over one-third of the respondents (33.89 percent) had been on
active duty between one and five years. A great majority of the respondents were males
(90.60 percent), which approximately corresponds to gender composition of the Marine
Corps active duty population (USMC, 2009). Nearly half of the respondents were enlisted
Marines with ranks of private, private first class, lance corporal, corporal, and sergeant
(43.80 percent). Finally, most of the participants were active duty Marines (92.90
percent). Demographic characteristics of the participants are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Participants (n = 480)
Demographic Characteristics

Frequency

Percentage

Military Occupational Specialty
Combat Arms

90

18.80%

Combat Support

84

17.50%
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Table 1 (continued)
Demographic Characteristics of the Participants (n = 480)
Demographic Characteristics

Frequency

Percentage

Military Occupational Specialty
Aviation

72

15.00%

Support Ground Aviation

29

6.00%

Administration

61

12.70%

Logistics

73

15.20%

Communications

55

11.50%

Intelligence

16

3.30%

Age
18-19

11

2.30%

20-25

157

32.70%

26-30

115

24.00%

31-35

87

18.10%

36-40

67

14.00%

41-45

31

6.50%

46-50

11

2.30%

1

0.20%

51 or more

Years in the Military
1-5

165

34.40%

6-10

138

28.80%

83

17.30%

11-15
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Table 1 (continued)
Demographic Characteristics of the Participants (n = 480)
Demographic Characteristics

Frequency

Percentage

Years in the Military
16-20

60

12.50%

21-25

25

5.20%

9

1.90%

25 and more

Gender
Males
Females

435

90.60%

45

9.40%

Rank
Enlisted (E-l through E-3)

39

8.10%

Non-commissioned Officer

210

43.80%

77

16.00%

2

0.40%

152

31.70%

Staff Non-commissioned Officer
Warrant Officer
Commissioned Officer

Component Status
446

92.90%

Active Duty Reserve (AR)

10

2.10%

Selected Reserve (Mobilized)

18

3.80%

Selected Reserve (Drilling)

2

0.40%

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

4

0.80%

Active Duty (AD)
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Reliability Analyses
The researcher evaluated each logistic regression model for reliability. First the
researcher evaluated each model's^ goodness-of-fit test verifying significant^ of the
model (p < .05). Significant fallowed the researcher to conclude the set of independent
variables improves prediction of outcomes (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006). Next, the
researcher confirmed the insignificant Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit (p > .05)
tests in order to accept the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis constitutes differences
between the observed and predicted values of the dependent variable (Meyers, Gamst, &
Guarino, 2006). Finally, the researcher verified both the Cox and Snell and the
Nagelkerke tests in order to confirm pseudo R of the models. Pseudo R provide the
percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables
(Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006). Only after verifying the validity of the models
through the above indicated tests, the researcher determined the models are suitable for
making predictions and inferences related to this study.
Research Questions
Research Question 1 focused on whether the respondents' self-reported
experiences of effects from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the
effectiveness of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training. Research
Question 2 focused on whether the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive
training program for Marine officers meets the training effectiveness criteria of the
Marine Corps. Research Question 3 focused on whether the Marine Corps combat
operational stress preventive training program for enlisted Marines meets the training
effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps. The researcher answered these questions using
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the quantitative and qualitative mixed methodology. For the quantitative methodology,
the researcher used a series of binary logistic regression models to assess the associations
between the biographic characteristics, Kirkpatrick's (2006) training evaluation
constructs, self-reported experiences of effects from combat operational stress which
included suffering from combat operational stress, the effectiveness of the combat
operational stress preventive training, combat operational stress coping skills, and using
the learned skills in the respondents' daily lives. For the qualitative methodology, the
researcher performed 12 interviews with four junior enlisted Marines, four senior enlisted
Marines, and four commissioned Marine officers. Additionally, the researcher observed
four combat operational stress control training sessions consisting of 924 observed
Marines. These observation sessions provided qualitative insights to the training quality,
interest level of the learners, and the effectiveness of the observed trainers.
Quantitative Methodology
The training evaluation section of the quantitative survey contained a forcedchoice format to gather information about the respondents' opinion regarding evaluation
and the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. Table 2 depicts
results of the descriptive statistics of the training evaluation section of the quantitative
survey.
Concerning the inferential statistics, the researcher conducted evaluations of a
number of simultaneous binary logistic regressions models designed and run to answer
the subject matter research questions. Dependent variables consisted of (1) suffering from
effects of combat operational stress; (2) the effectiveness of the combat operational stress
preventive training; (3) overall feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive
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training; (4) changed behavior as a result of using the learned combat operational stress
preventive skills in Marines' daily lives; (5) learning the combat operational stress
preventive skills and techniques; and (6) reacting to the presented combat operational
stress preventive training. The following are the findings ordered by the dependent
variables.
Table 2
Evaluation of Training Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics (n = 480)
Training Evaluation Characteristics

Frequency

Percentage

Have you ever attended combat operational stress preventive formal training classes?
No

196

40.80%

Yes

284

59.20%

What were your impressions of the received training?
Poor

11

2.30%

Barely Acceptable

20

4.20%

354

73.80%

Good

84

17.50%

Outstanding

11

2.30%

Neutral

Did you learn specific principles, facts, and techniques during the training?
No

171

35.60%

Yes

309

64.40%

Did you actually use any of the learned skills and techniques?
No

321

66.90%

Yes

159

33.10%
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Table 2 (continued)
Evaluation of Training Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics (n = 480)
Training Evaluation Characteristics

Frequency

Percentage

How would you rate the effectiveness of the training?
Poor

16

3.30%

Barely Acceptable

29

6.00%

339

70.60%

87

18.10%

9

1.90%

Neutral
Good
Outstanding

Have you ever suffered from effects of combat operational stress?
No

311

64.80%

Yes

169

35.20%

Was the received combat operational stress preventive training effective in helping you
cope with effects of combat operational stress?
No

47

9.80%

Barely

28

5.80%

Neutral

334

69.6%

Some

59

12.30%

Yes

12

2.5%

How would you rate the effectiveness of the currently used combat operational stress
training materials?
Poor

17

3.50%

Barely Acceptable

33

6.90%
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Table 2 (continued)
Evaluation of Training Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics (n = 480)
Training Evaluation Characteristics
Neutral
Good
Outstanding

Frequency

Percentage

346

72.10%

77

16.00%

7

1.50%

How would you rate the effectiveness of the trainers who actually presented the combat
operational stress preventive training material?
Poor

14

2.90%

Barely Acceptable

33

6.90%

316

65.80%

Good

91

19.00%

Outstanding

26

5.40%

Neutral

What are your overall feelings about the combat operational stress preventive training
program?
Poor

22

4.60%

Barely Acceptable

31

6.50%

Neutral

310

64.60%

Good

100

20.80%

17

3.50%

Outstanding

Suffering as the Dependent Variable
The first significant logistic regression model in this series considered
associations between the respondents' changed behavior (coded as ChangeBehavior)
and rank (predictor variables) and suffering from effects of combat operational stress
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(coded as Suffering). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the twopredictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only
m o d e l , / (2, n = 480) = 10.383,p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 64.8
percent. Table 3 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported using the preventive skills in Marines' daily
lives was a statistically significant predictor of suffering from effects of combat
operational stress.
Table 3
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Suffering from Combat Stress with Changed
Behavior and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

ChangeBehavior

!618

9.457

!002

Rank

-.227

1.224

Constant

-.490

5.025

Wald

Significance

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

1.855

T~25l

2.750

.269

.797

.533

1.192

.025

.613

The odds ratio for rank was .797. This implied the enlisted Marines were .797
times more likely than the officers to report suffering from combat operational stress,
controlling for the respondents' changed behavior (coded as Change_Behavior). The
odds ratio for the respondents' changed behavior was 1.855 (p < .01). This implied when
Marines used the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily lives,
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they were 1.855 times more likely to report suffering from effects of combat operational
stress, controlling for rank.
The next significant logistic regression model considered associations between
the respondents' combat operational stress preventive coping skills (coded as Coping)
and rank (predictor variables) and suffering from effects of combat operational stress
(coded as Suffering). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the twopredictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only
model, x (2, « = 480) = 14.079,/? < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 66.3
percent. Table 4 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported coping was a statistically significant predictor
of suffering from effects combat operational stress.
Table 4
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Suffering from Combat Stress with Coping and
Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
Step Entered
I

Significance

Exp(6)

Lower

Upper

!948

13.098

!000

2.580

1.544

4.310

Rank

-.144

.483

.487

.866

.578

1.299

Constant

-.665

14.134

.000

.514

Coping

B

Wald

The odds ratio for rank was .866. This implied the enlisted Marines were .866
times more likely than the officers to report suffering from effects of combat operational
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stress, controlling for the coping skills (coded as Coping). The odds ratio for coping was
2.580 (p < .01). This implied when Marines reported possessing combat operational
stress preventive coping skills, they were 2.580 times more likely to report suffering from
effects of combat operational stress, controlling for rank.
The next significant logistic regression model considered associations between
participating in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
COSCTraining) and rank (predictor variables) and suffering from effects of combat
operational stress. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor
model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, y?
(2, n = 480) = 12.748,/? < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development
of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 64.8 percent. Table
5 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each
predictor. The Wald test reported participating in the training was a statistically
significant predictor of suffering from effects of combat operational stress.
Table 5
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Suffering from Combat Stress with
Participating in the Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
I

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

^86

11.407

Tool

Rank

-.263

1.622

Constant

-.856

17.499

COSC Training

Significance

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

1.986

1.334

2.957

.203

.769

.513

1.152

.000

.425

The odds ratio for rank was .769. This implied the enlisted Marines were .769
times more likely than the officers to report suffering from effects of combat operational
stress, controlling for participating in the training (coded as COSC_Training). The odds
ratio for participating in the training was 1.986 (p < .01). This implied when Marines
reported participating in the combat operational stress preventive training, they were
1.986 times more likely to suffer from effects of combat operational stress, controlling
for rank.
The next significant logistic regression model considered associations between
the effectiveness of the training (coded as Training_Effect) and rank (predictor variables)
and suffering from effects of combat operational stress. Results of the logistic regression
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 2.365, p < .05. Prediction
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall
prediction success rate of 64.8 percent. Table 6 presents the regression coefficients (B),
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported the
effectiveness of the training was a statistically significant predictor of suffering from
effects of combat operational stress.
The odds ratio for rank was .829. This implied the enlisted Marines were .829
times more likely than the officers to report suffering from effects of combat operational
stress, controlling for the effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for the
effectiveness of the training was 1.324. This implied when Marines reported the training
as being effective, they were 1.324 times more likely to suffer from effects of combat
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operational stress, controlling for rank. Figure 1 depicts significant odds ratios for each of
the independent variables described in Tables 3 through 6.
Table 6
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Suffering from Combat Stress with the
Effectiveness of Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B^
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Lower

Upper

281

1.430

232

1.324

1?36

2.096

Rank

-.188

.850

.357

.829

.556

1.235

Constant

-.542

9.565

.002

.582

Training_Effect

Significance

Exp(5)

3.000
2.500
g

2.000

£

1.500 i

§

1.000

o
0.500

0.000

.III

Training
Effectivenss

Training
Participation

Coping

Changed Behavior

Independent Variables

Figure 1. Significant Odds Ratios with Suffering as the Dependent Variable.
Effectiveness of Training as the Dependent Variable
The first significant logistic regression model in this series considered
associations between the respondents' changed behavior (coded as ChangeBehavior)
and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness of the training. Results of the
logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically
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significant improvement over the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 108.009,/? < .01.
Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model was relatively
high, with an overall prediction success rate of 81.0 percent. Table 7 presents the
regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)],
and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald
test reported the respondents' changed behavior was a statistically significant predictor of
the effectiveness of training activities.
Table 7
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with Changed Behavior and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
Step Entered
B
Wald
Significance
Exp(2?)
Lower
Upper
1

Change_Behavior

2.583

85.656

!000

13.238

7.660

22.876

Rank

-.454

2.672

.102

.635

.368

1.095

-2.377

73.749

.000

.093

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was .635. This implied the enlisted Marines were .635
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational
stress preventive training, controlling for the respondents' changed behavior (coded as
ChangeBehavior). The odds ratio for the respondents' changed behavior was 13.238 (p
< .01). This implied when Marines reported using the learned combat operational stress
preventive skills in their daily lives, they were 13.238 times more likely to indicate the
training was effective, controlling for rank.
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The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' coping skills acquired by participating in the combat preventive stress
training (coded as Coping) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness
of the training. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor
model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, /
(2, n = 480) = 112.484, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development
of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.9 percent.
Table 8 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level,
odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each
predictor. The Wald test reported coping was a statistically significant predictor of
effective combat operational stress preventive training services.
Table 8
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with Coping Skills and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Coping

3.023

95.898

Rank

-.035

.014

-2.067

66.387

Constant

Significance

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

20.557

11.225

37.647

.904

.966

.549

1.699

.000

.127

XXX)

The odds ratio for rank was .966. This implied the enlisted Marines were .966
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational
stress preventive training, controlling for coping skills. The odds ratio for coping was
20.557 (p < .01). This implied possessing the combat operational stress preventive coping
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skills increased the odds by 20.557 times of indicating the training was effective,
controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' participating in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
COSC_Training) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness of the
training. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, % (2, n =
480) = 80.944,/? < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 80.0 percent. Table 9
presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor.
The Wald test reported participating in the combat operational stress training was a
statistically significant predictor of effective training services.
Table 9
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of Training with
Participating in the Combat Stress Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
Step Entered
B
Wald
Significance
Exp(S)
Lower
Upper
1

COSC Training

2.947

38.855

!000

19.058

7.544

48.147

Rank

-.483

3.399

.065

.617

.369

1.031

-3.364

50.454

.000

.035

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was .617. This implied the enlisted Marines were .617
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational
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stress preventive training, controlling for participating in the combat operational stress
preventive training. The odds ratio for participating in the combat operational stress
preventive training was 19.058 (p < .01). This implied participating in the combat
operational stress preventive training increased 19.058 times the odds of indicating the
training was effective, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques
(coded as Learning) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness of the
training. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, x2 (2, n =
480) = 72.794, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 80.0 percent. Table
10 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each
predictor. The Wald test reported learning the combat operational stress related
knowledge was a statistically significant predictor of effective training services.
The odds ratio for rank was .816. This implied the enlisted Marines were .816
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational
stress preventive training, controlling for learning. The odds ratio for learning was 23.999
(p < .01). This implied Marines were 23.999 times more likely to consider the combat
operational stress preventive training as being effective when they indicated actually
learning the subject matter skills and techniques, controlling for rank.
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Table 10
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with Learning and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

ExpCB)

Lower

Upper

Learning

3.178

28.469

.000

23.999

7.468

77.123

Rank

-.203

.639

.424

.816

.495

1.344

-3.887

41.111

.000

.021

Constant

Significance

The next logistic regression model considered associations between the efficacy
of the training materials (coded as MaterialEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and the
effectiveness of training. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the twopredictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only
m o d e l , / (2, n = 480) = 184.007,;? < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 90.0
percent. Table 11 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the efficacy of training materials was a
statistically significant predictor of effective training services.
The odds ratio for rank was .546. This implied the enlisted Marines were .546
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational
stress preventive training, controlling for the efficacy of training materials (coded as
MaterialEffect). The odds ratio for the efficacy of the training materials was 48.182 (p <
.01). This implied Marines were 48.182 times more likely to consider the training as
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being effective when they indicated the training materials were also effective, controlling
for rank.
Table 11
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with the Efficacy of Training Materials and Rank as Independent
Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

Exp(2?)

Lower

Upper

MaterialEffect

3.875

132.927

!000

48.182

24.935

93.105

Rank

-.605

3.386

.066

.546

.287

1.040

-2.129

65.115

.000

.119

Constant

B

Wald

Significance

The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' overall feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training
(coded as OverallFeel) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness of
the training. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, y2 (2, N =
480) = 174.738, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the
model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 87.3 percent. Table 12 presents
the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor.
The Wald test reported the respondents' overall feelings toward the preventive combat
operational stress training was a statistically significant predictor of effective training
services.

92
Table 12
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with Overall Feelings and Rank as Independent Variables
~
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
Step Entered
B
Wald Significance
Exp(5)
Lower
Upper
1

Overall_Feel

3.461

131.883

Rank

-.270

.742

-2.264

76.970

Constant

XXX)

31.859

17.647

57.516

.389

.546

.413

1.411

.000

.070

The odds ratio for rank was .546. This implied the enlisted Marines were .546
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the training, controlling
for the respondents' feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training
(coded as Overall_Feel). The odds ratio for the respondents' feelings toward the combat
operational stress preventive training was 31.859 (p < .01). This implied Marines were
31.859 times more likely to consider the training as being effective when they felt
positively about the combat operational stress preventive training, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' reaction toward the preventive combat operational stress training (coded as
Reaction) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported effectiveness of the training.
Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a
statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, / (2, n = 480) =
211.472, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model
was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 91.0 percent. Table 13 presents the
regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)],
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and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald
test reported the respondents' reaction toward the presented combat operational stress
preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of effective training services.
Table 13
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with Reaction and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B^)
Step
I

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Exp(S)

Lower

Upper

Reaction

4.058

150.483

ioOO

57.873

30.261

110.680

Rank

-.605

3.386

.066

.546

.453

1.761

-2.276

72.892

.000

.065

Constant

Significance

The odds ratio for rank was .546. This implied the enlisted Marines were .546
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the training, controlling
for the respondents' reaction toward the training (coded as Reaction). The odds ratio for
reaction was 57.873 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 57.873 times more likely to
consider the training as being effective when they reacted positively toward the received
training, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' reported effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect) and rank
(predictor variables) and the efficacy of the combat operational stress preventive training.
Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a
statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, / (2, n = 480) =
130.208, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model
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was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 84.4 percent. Table 14
presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor.
The Wald test reported the efficacy of the trainers was a statistically significant predictor
of effective combat operational stress preventive training services.
Table 14
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting the Effectiveness of the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with the Efficacy of the Trainers and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
B
Wald Significance
ExpCB)
Lower
Upper
Step Entered
1

TrainerEffect

2.881

110.006

.000

17.831

10.408

30.548

Rank

-.203

.494

.482

.817

.464

1.437

-2.386

75.621

.000

.092

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was .817. This implied the enlisted Marines were .817
times more likely than the officers to report the effectiveness of the combat operational
stress preventive training, controlling for the efficacy of the trainers (coded as
TrainerEffect). The odds ratio for the efficacy of the trainers was 17.831. This implied
Marines were 17.831 times more likely to consider the combat operational stress
preventive training as being effective when they indicated the trainers who conducted the
training were proficient, controlling for rank. Figure 2 depicts significant odds ratios for
each of the independent variables described in Tables 7 through 14.

95

70.000
60.000
J

50.000 i

^

40.000

•3

30.000

•o

°

20.000
IO.OOO H
0.000
Oianged
Behavior

UJLJJJU
Coping

Training
Participation

Learning

Materials
Effectiveness

Overall Feelings

Reaction

Trainer
Effectiveness

Independent Variables

Figure 2. Significant Odds Ratios with Training Effectiveness as the Dependent Variable.
Coping as the Dependent Variable
The first logistic regression model in this series considered associations between
the respondents' changed behavior as a result of using combat operational stress
preventive skills in their daily lives (coded as Changed_Behavior) and rank (predictor
variables) and the reported possession of coping skills. Results of the logistic regression
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model, /* (2, n = 480) = 84.859,/? < .01. Prediction
success for the cases used in the development of the model was relatively high, with an
overall prediction success rate of 85.2 percent. Table 15 presents the regression
coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0
percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported
changed behavior and rank were statistically significant predictors for possession of the
preventive combat operational stress coping skills.
The odds ratio for rank was .506 (p < .05). This implied the enlisted Marines were
.506 times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress
preventive coping skills by participating in the training, controlling for changed behavior
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(coded as ChangeBehavior). The odds ratio for changed behavior was 13.052 (p < .01).
This implied Marines were 13.052 times more likely to indicate possessing the combat
operational stress preventive coping skills when they pragmatically used the learned
skills in their daily lives, controlling for rank.
Table 15
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress
Coping Skills with Changed Behavior and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
I

Variable
Entered

Lower

Upper

Change_Behavior

2.569

62.767

!oOO

13.052

6.913

24.643

Rank

-.681

.299

.023

.506

.282

.910

-2.683

72.638

.000

.068

Constant

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(5)

The next logistic regression model considered associations between participating
in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as COSC_Training) and rank
(predictor variables) and the reported possession of the combat operational stress
preventive coping skills. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the twopredictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only
model,/ 2 (2, n = 480) = 58.577,p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of
85.2 percent. Table 16 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics,
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported participating in the combat
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operational stress preventive training and rank were statistically significant predictors of
possessing effective coping skills.
Table 16
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress
Coping Skills with Participation in the Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
Step Entered
B
Wald Significance
Exp(5)
Lower
Upper
I

COSCJTraining

2.778

27.767

!000

16.086

5.724

45.207

Rank

-.677

5.748

.017

.508

.292

.884

-3.496

44.652

.000

.030

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was .508. This implied the enlisted Marines were .508
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive
coping skills, controlling for participation in the training (coded as COSCTraining). The
odds ratio for participation in the training was 16.086. This implied Marines were 16.086
times more likely to possess the combat operational stress preventive coping skills when
they participated in the training, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between learning the
combat operational stress preventive training material (coded as Learning) and rank
(predictor variables) and the reported possession of coping skills. Results of the logistic
regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model,/ 2 (2, n = 480) = 43.579,p < .01. Prediction
success for the cases used in the development of the model was relatively high, with an
overall prediction success rate of 85.2 percent. Table 17 presents the regression
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coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0
percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported
learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques was a statistically
significant predictor of having effective coping skills.
Table 17
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress
Coping Skills with Learning and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Lower

Upper

Learning

2.440

21.616

!000

11.474

4.102

32.095

Rank

-.424

2.382

.123

.655

.382

1.121

-3.453

41.930

.000

.032

Constant

Exp(5)

The odds ratio for rank was .655. This implied the enlisted Marines were .655
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive
coping skills, controlling for learning (coded as Learning). The odds ratio for learning
was 11.474. This implied Marines were 11.474 times more likely to consider possessing
the combat operational stress preventive coping skills when they reported learning the
training material, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' overall feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training
(coded as OverallFeel) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported possession of
coping skills. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, / 2 (2, n =
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480) = 107.425,/? < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 84.6 percent. Table
18 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each
predictor. The Wald test reported the respondents' overall feelings toward the combat
operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of
possessing effective coping skills.
Table 18
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress
Coping Skills with Overall Feelings and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

I

OverailjFeei

2.158

71.951

XXX)

Rank

-.398

1.626

-8.908

88.792

Constant

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

8.650

5.254

14.241

.672

.655

.364

1.238

.000

.000

The odds ratio for rank was .655. This implied the enlisted Marines were .655
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive
coping skills, controlling for the overall feelings toward the training (coded as
OverallFeel). The odds ratio for the overall feelings toward the training was 8.650 (p <
.01). This implied Marines were 8.650 times more likely to possess the combat
operational stress preventive coping skills when they indicated having positive feelings
toward the training, controlling for rank.
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The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' reaction toward the presented combat operational stress preventive training
(coded as Reaction) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported possession of coping
skills. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, rf (2, n =
480) = 87.400, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.3 percent. Table
19 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each
predictor. The Wald test reported positive reaction was a statistically significant predictor
of possessing effective coping skills.
Table 19
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress
Coping Skills with Reaction and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
I

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Lower

Upper

Reaction

2.595

78.832

!000

13.402

7.557

23.769

Rank

-.401

1.768

.184

.670

.371

1.209

-2.406

75.171

.000

.090

Constant

Exp(Z?)

The odds ratio for rank was .670. This implied the enlisted Marines were .670
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive
coping skills, controlling for reaction toward the training (coded as Reaction). The odds
ratio for reaction was 13.402 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 13.402 times more
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likely to possess the combat operational stress preventive coping skills when they had a
positive reaction toward the training, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' suffering as a result of the combat operational stress (coded as Suffering)
and rank (predictor variables) and the reported possession of coping skills. Results of the
logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically
significant improvement over the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 15.968, p < .01.
Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model was relatively
high, with an overall prediction success rate of 85.2 percent. Table 20 presents the
regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)],
and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald
test reported suffering was a statistically significant predictor of possessing effective
coping skills.
Table 20
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress
Coping Skills with Suffering and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
I

Variable
Entered
Suffering
Rank
Constant

B

Wald

Significance

^948

13.098

!(J00

Exp(5)
2.580

Lower
1.544

Upper
4.310

-.417

2.417

.120

.659

.389

1.115

-1.891

56.917

.000

.151

The odds ratio for rank was .659. This implied the enlisted Marines were .659
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive
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coping skills, controlling for suffering as a result of combat operational stress (coded as
Suffering). The odds ratio for suffering was 2.580 (p < .01). This implied Marines were
2.580 times more likely to possess the combat operational stress preventive coping skills
when they reported having suffered from effects of combat operational stress, controlling
for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and
the reported possession of the combat operational stress preventive coping skills. Results
of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a
statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, x2 (2, n = 480) =
94.705, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model
was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.3 percent. Table 21
presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor.
The Wald test reported the effectiveness of the trainers was a statistically significant
predictor of possessing the combat operational stress preventive coping skills.
The odds ratio for rank was .635. This implied the enlisted Marines were .635
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive
coping skills, controlling for the effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect).
The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the trainers was 14.495 (p < .01). This implied
Marines were 14.495 times more likely to possess the combat operational stress
preventive coping skills when they indicated having effective trainers, controlling for
rank.
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Table 21
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress
Coping Skills with the Effectiveness of the Trainers and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
Step Entered
B
Wald
Significance
Exp(5)
Lower
Upper
1

TrainerEffect

2.674

78.660

1)00

14.495

8.028

26.171

Rank

-.454

2.248

.134

.635

.351

1.150

-2.604

76.748

.000

.074

Constant

The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
TrainingEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported possession of coping
skills. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, x2 (2, n =
480) = 114.287, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.7 percent. Table
22 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each
predictor. The Wald test reported the effectiveness of the combat operational stress
preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of possessing effective coping
skills.
The odds ratio for rank was .651. This implied the enlisted Marines were .651
times more likely than the officers to acquire the combat operational stress preventive
coping skills, controlling for the effectiveness of the training (coded as Training_Effect).
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The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the training was 20.557 (p < .01). This implied
Marines were 20.557 times more likely to possess the combat operational stress
preventive coping skills when they considered the training as being effective, controlling
for rank.
Table 22
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress
Coping Skills with the Effectiveness of Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B^)
Variable
Step Entered
B
Wald
Significance
Exp(5)
Lower
Upper
I

TrainingEffect

3.023

95.898

!000

20.557

11.225

37.647

Rank

-.429

1.833

.176

.651

.350

1.212

-2.624

76.947

.000

.073

Constant

The next logistic regression model considered associations between the combat
operational stress training materials (coded as TrainingMaterial) and rank (predictor
variables) and the reported possession of the combat operational stress preventive coping
skills. Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, rf (2, n =
480) = 167.489, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the
model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 90.6 percent. Table 23 presents
the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor.
The Wald test reported the combat operational stress preventive training materials and
rank were statistically significant predictors of possessing effective coping skills.

105
Table 23
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Possession of the Preventive Combat Stress
Coping Skills with the Efficacy of the Training Materials and Rank as Independent
Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

3.986

116.299

Rank

-1.017

Constant

-2.593

TrainingMaterial

Significance

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

.000

53.857

26.098

111.145

7.166

.008

.362

.171

.763

70.547

.000

.075
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Figure 3. Significant Odds Ratios with Coping Skills as the Dependent Variable.
The odds ratio for rank was .362. This implied the enlisted Marines were .362
times more likely than the officers to acquire combat operational stress coping skills,
controlling for the efficacy of the training materials (coded as TrainingMaterial). The
odds ratio for the efficacy of the training materials was 53.857 (p < .01). This implied
Marines were 53.857 times more likely to possess the combat operational stress

106
preventive coping skills when they considered the preventive training materials as being
effective, controlling for rank. Figure 3 depicts significant odds ratios for each of the
independent variables described in Tables 15 through 23.
Overall Feelings as the Dependent Variable
The first logistic regression model in this series considered associations between
the respondents' changed behavior (coded as Change_Behavior) and rank (predictor
variables) and the reported feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive
training (coded as OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constantonly model, x (2, n = 480) = 76.283, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 76.7
percent. Table 24 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the respondents' changed behavior was a
statistically significant predictor of feeling positive about the training.
Table 24
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with Changed Behavior and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
Step Entered
B
Wald
Significance Exp(5)
Lower
Upper
I

Change_Behavior

3.986

69.653

XJOO

7.064

26.098

111.145

Rank

-.245

.976

.323

.783

.481

1.273

-1.820

62.237

.000

.162

Constant
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The odds ratio for rank was .783. This implied the enlisted Marines were .783
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress
preventive training, controlling for changed behavior as a result of using the learned skills
in Marines' daily lives (coded as ChangeJBehavior). The odds ratio for changed behavior
was 7.064 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 7.064 times more likely to feel positive
about the combat operational stress preventive training when they indicated using the
learned preventive skills in their daily lives, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' possession of the combat operational stress preventive coping skills (coded
as Coping) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings toward the preventive
training (coded as OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constantonly model,/ 2 (2, n = 480) = 141.906, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in
the development of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate
of 85.5 percent. Table 25 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics,
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported possessing the coping skills was a
statistically significant predictor of feeling positive about the training.
The odds ratio for rank was 1.168. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.168
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress
preventive training, controlling for possessing the combat operational stress preventive
coping skills (coded as Coping). The odds ratio for coping was 34.356 (p < .01). This
implied Marines were 34.356 times more likely to feel positive about the combat
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operational stress preventive training when they reported possessing the coping skills,
controlling for rank.
Table 25
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with Coping and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered
Coping
Rank
Constant

B

Lower

Upper

34.356

16.950

69.640

.588

1.168

.666

2.046

.000

.145

Wald

Significance

3.537

96.258

.000

.155

.286

-1.930

59.519

ExpOB)

The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' attendance of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
COSCTraining) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings toward the
training (coded as OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constantonly model, x2 (2, n = 480) = 57.869, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 75.6
percent. Table 26 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported participating in the combat operational stress
preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of feeling positive about the
training.
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Table 26
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with Participating in the Training and Rank as Independent
Variables
95.0% CI
for ExpfB)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(5)

COSCJTraining

L941

42.559

1)00

Rank

-.298

1.520

-2.311

58.427

Constant

Lower

Upper

6.967

3.889

12.484

.218

.743

.463

1.192

.000

.099

The odds ratio for rank was .743. This implied the enlisted Marines were .743
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress
preventive training, controlling for participating in the training (coded as
COSCTraining). The odds ratio for participating in the training was 6.967 (p < .01).
This implied Marines were 6.967 times more likely to feel positive about the combat
operational stress preventive training when they reported participating in the training,
controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' learning the combat operational stress preventive training material (coded as
Learning) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings toward the training
(coded as OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the twopredictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only
model, x2 (2, n = 480) = 54.224, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 75.6
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percent. Table 27 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported learning the combat operational stress skills
and techniques was a statistically significant predictor of feeling positive about the
training.
Table 27
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with Learning and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
I

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(Z?)

Lower

Upper

Learning

2.025

36.758

!000

7.577

3.937

14.582

Rank

-.078

.109

.741

.925

.581

1.471

-2.623

55.617

.000

.073

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was .925. This implied the enlisted Marines were .925
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress
preventive training, controlling for learning the training material (coded as Learning).
The odds ratio for learning was 7.577 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 7.577 times
more likely to feel positive about the combat operational stress preventive training when
they reported learning the subject matter skills and techniques, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' reaction toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
Reaction) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings about the training
(coded as Overall_Feel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-

Ill
predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only
model,/ (2, n = 480) = 156.701, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of
86.3 percent. Table 28 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics,
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported positively reacting to the combat
operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of feeling
optimistic about the training.
Table 28
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with Reaction and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B^)
Step
i

Variable
Entered
Reaction
Rank
Constant

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(i?)

Lower

Upper

3.250

123.907

!000

25.784

14.549

45.693

.040

.020

.888

1.041

.594

1.826

-2.076

65.666

.000

.125

The odds ratio for rank was 1.041. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.041
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the preventive combat
operational stress training, controlling for reaction toward the presented training (coded
as Reaction). The odds ratio for reaction was 25.784 (p < .01). This implied Marines were
25.784 times more likely to feel optimistic about the combat operational stress preventive
training when they positively reacted toward the training, controlling for rank.
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The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and
the reported feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor
model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, x
(2, n = 480) = 179.337, p< .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development
of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.7 percent.
Table 29 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level,
odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each
predictor. The Wald test reported having effective trainers was a statistically significant
predictor of feeling positively about the training.
Table 29
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting of Positive Feelings toward the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with the Effectiveness of Trainers and Rank as Independent
Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
I

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

TrainerEffect

3.313

141.801

!000

27.454

15.916

47.357

Rank

-.022

.006

.941

.978

.550

1.741

-2.321

72.049

.000

.098

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was .978. This implied the enlisted Marines were .978
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress
preventive training, controlling for the effectiveness of the trainers (coded as
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TrainerEffect). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the trainers was 27.454 (p < .01).
This implied Marines were 27.454 times more likely to feel positive about the combat
operational stress preventive training when they characterized the trainers as being
effective, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
Training_Effect) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings toward the
training (coded as Overall_Feel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constantonly model,/ (2, n = 480) = 174.013, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in
the development of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate
of 87.3 percent. Table 30 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics,
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported the effectiveness of the combat
operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of feeling
positive about the training.
The odds ratio for rank was 1.037. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.037
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress
preventive training, controlling for the effectiveness of training (coded as
TrainingEffect). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of training was 31.859 (p < .01).
This implied Marines were 31.859 times more likely to feel positive about the preventive
combat operational stress training when they reported the training as being effective,
controlling for rank.
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Table 30
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with the Effectiveness of Training and Rank as Independent
Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
I

Variable
Entered
TrainingEffect
Rank
Constant

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

3.461

131.883

IKK)

31.859

17.647

57.516

.036

.015

.903

1.037

.581

1.851

-2.149

66.280

.000

.117

The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training materials (coded as
TrainingMaterial) and rank (predictor variables) and the reported feelings toward the
training (coded as OverallFeel). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constantonly m o d e l , / (2, n = 480) = 209.671, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in
the development of the model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 89.4
percent. Table 31 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the combat operational stress training materials
were a statistically significant predictor of feeling positive about the training.
The odds ratio for rank was .676. This implied the enlisted Marines were .676
times more likely than the officers to feel positive about the combat operational stress
preventive training, controlling for the effectiveness of training materials (coded as
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TrainingMaterial). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of training materials was 72.874
(p < .01). This implied Marines were 72.874 times more likely to feel positive about the
combat operational stress preventive training when they reported the training materials as
being effective, controlling for rank. Figure 4 depicts significant odds ratios for each of
the independent variables described in Tables 24 through 31.
Table 31
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting of Feeling Positive about the Combat Stress
Preventive Training with the Efficacy of Training Materials and Rank as Independent
Variables
95.0% CI
for ExpfB)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

.000

72.874

33.775

157.238

1.597

.206

.676

.368

1.241

57.195

.000

.152

B

Wald

TrainingMaterial

4.289

119.474

Rank

-.392
-1.881

Constant

Significance
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Figure 4. Significant Odds Ratios with Overall Feelings as the Dependent Variable.

116
Changed Behavior as the Dependent Variable
The first logistic regression model in this series considered associations between
the reported level of combat operational stress preventive coping skills (coded as Coping)
and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the respondents'
daily lives (coded as Change_Behavior). Results of the logistic regression analysis
indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over
the constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 82.719, p < .01. Prediction success for the
cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction
success rate of 75.8 percent. Table 32 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald
statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence
intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported possessing the
combat operational stress preventive coping skills was a statistically significant predictor
of using the learned skills in the respondents' daily lives.
Table 32
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily
Lives with Coping Skills and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
I

Variable
Entered
Coping
Rank
Constant

B

Wald

Significance

Lower

Upper

2.569

62.767

iHH)

Exp(5)
13.052

6.913

24.643

.408

2.910

.088

1.504

.941

2.403

-1.394

43.838

.000

.248

The odds ratio for rank was 1.504. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.504
times more likely than the officers to use the learned preventive combat operational stress
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skills in their daily lives, controlling for possessing the coping skills (coded as Coping).
The odds ratio for coping was 13.052 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 13.052 times
more likely to use the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily
lives when they reported possessing the coping skills, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' participation in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
COSCTraining) and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in
the respondents' daily lives (coded as Change_Behavior). Results of the logistic
regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model, y? (2, n = 480) = 67.263, p < .01. Prediction
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall
prediction success rate of 66.9 percent. Table 33 presents the regression coefficients (B),
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported
participating in the combat operational stress preventive training was a statistically
significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives.
The odds ratio for rank was 1.046. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.046
times more likely than the officers to use the learned preventive combat operational stress
skills in their daily lives, controlling for participating in the training (coded as
COSCTraining). The odds ratio for participating in the training was 6.090 (p < .01).
This implied Marines were 6.090 times more likely to use the learned combat operational
stress preventive skills in their daily lives when they reported participating in the training,
controlling for rank.

118
Table 33
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily
Lives with Participating in the Combat Stress Preventive Training and Rank as
Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered
COSCTraining
Rank
Constant

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

1.807

54.180

!000

6.090

3.764

9.852

.045

.039

.844

1.046

.671

1.629

-1.951

56.963

.000

.142

The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' learning the combat operational stress preventive training material (coded as
Learning) and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the
respondents' daily lives (coded as ChangeBehavior). Results of the logistic regression
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model, rf (2, n = 480) = 101.845,p < .01. Prediction
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall
prediction success rate of 67.7 percent. Table 34 presents the regression coefficients (B),
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported
learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques was a statistically
significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives.
The odds ratio for rank was 1.342. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.342
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive
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skills in their daily lives, controlling for learning (coded as Learning). The odds ratio for
learning was 13.606 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 13.606 times more likely to use
the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily lives when they
reported learning the subject matter preventive skills and techniques, controlling for rank.
Table 34
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily
Lives with Learning and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered
Learning
Rank
Constant

B

Wald

Significance

Lower

Upper

2.610

61.593

.000

Exp(£)
13.606

7.089

26.113

.294

1.630

.202

1.342

.854

2.107

-2.891

65.657

.000

.056

The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
OverallFeel) and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the
Marines' daily lives (coded as ChangedBehavior). Results of the logistic regression
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 76.671, p < .01. Prediction
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall
prediction success rate of 75.0 percent. Table 35 presents the regression coefficients (B),
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported feeling
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positive about the combat operational stress preventive training was a statistically
significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives.
Table 35
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily
Lives with Overall Feelings toward the Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B^)
Variable
Step Entered
B
Wald
Significance
Exp(5)
Lower
Upper
1

Overall_Feel
Rank
Constant

I~955

69.653

XXX)

7.064

4.463

11.179

.268

1.339

.247

1.307

.831

2.057

-1.435

47.347

.000

.238

The odds ratio for rank was 1.307. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.307
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive
skills in their daily lives, controlling for their feelings toward the training (coded as
Overall_Feel). The odds ratio for feelings toward the training was 7.064 (p < .01). This
implied Marines were 7.064 times more likely to use the learned combat operational
stress preventive skills in their daily lives when they reported feeling positive about the
training, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' reaction toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
Reaction) and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the
respondents' daily lives (coded as ChangeBehavior). Results of the logistic regression
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 72.993, p < .01. Prediction
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success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall
prediction success rate of 75.0 percent. Table 36 presents the regression coefficients (B),
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported
positively reacting toward the combat operational stress preventive training was a
statistically significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives.
Table 36
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines'
Lives with Reaction and Rank as Independent

Daily

Variables
95.0% CI

for
Step
1

Variable
Entered
Reaction
Rank
Constant

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(£)

2.061

64.249

.000

.321

1.909

-1.386

44.848

EXDCB^)

Lower

Upper

7.850

4.743

12.992

.167

1.378

.831

2.057

.000

.250

The odds ratio for rank was 1.378. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.378
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive
skills in their daily lives, controlling for reaction toward the training (coded as Reaction).
The odds ratio for reaction was 7.850 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 7.850 times
more likely to use the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily
lives when they reported positively reacting toward the presented training, controlling for
rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' suffering from effects of combat operational stress (coded as Suffering) and
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rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the Marines' daily lives
(coded as ChangedBehavior). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constantonly model, j 2 (2, n = 480) = 10.132, p< .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 66.9
percent. Table 37 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported suffering from effects of combat operational
stress was a statistically significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily
lives.
Table 37
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily
Lives with Suffering and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(2?)

Lower

Upper

Suffering

!618

9.457

i)02

L855

L25l

2.750

Rank

.208

.957

.328

1.231

.811

1.869

-1.076

29.739

.000

.341

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was 1.231. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.231
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive
skills in their daily lives, controlling for suffering from effects of combat operational
stress (coded as Suffering). The odds ratio for suffering was 1.855 (p < .01). This implied
Marines were 1.855 times more likely to use the learned combat operational stress
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preventive skills in their daily lives when they reported suffering from effects of combat
operational stress, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the trainers (coded as Trainer_Effect) and rank (predictor variables) and
actually using the learned skills in the respondents' daily lives (coded as
Changed_Behavior). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the twopredictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only
model,/ 2 (2, n = 480) = 40.207, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of 70.4
percent. Table 38 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the perceived effectiveness of the trainers was
a statistically significant predictor of using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives.
Table 38
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily
Lives with the Effectiveness of the Trainers and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
Step Entered
B
Wald
Significance
Exp(5)
Lower
Upper
I

TrainerEffect
Rank
Constant

1.387

38.541

!000

4.002

2.583

6.200

.245

1.230

.267

1.277

.829

1.969

-1.252

39.697

.000

.286

The odds ratio for rank was 1.277. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.277
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive
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skills in their daily lives, controlling for the effectiveness of the trainers (coded as
TrainerEffect). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the trainers was 4.002 (p < .01).
This implied Marines were 4.002 times more likely to use the learned combat operational
stress preventive skills in their daily lives when they reported the trainers were effective
in teaching the training content, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
Training_Effect) and rank (predictor variables) and actually using the learned skills in the
respondents' daily lives (coded as Changed_Behavior). Results of the logistic regression
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 107.672, p < .01.
Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with
an overall prediction success rate of 78.1 percent. Table 39 presents the regression
coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0
percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported
the perceived effectiveness of the training was a statistically significant predictor of using
the learned skills in Marines' daily lives.
The odds ratio for rank was 1.445. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.445
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive
skills in their daily lives, controlling for the effectiveness of the training (coded as
Training_Effect). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the training was 13.238 (p <
.01). This implied Marines were 13.238 times more likely to use the learned combat
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operational stress preventive skills in their daily lives when they reported the subject
matter training was effective, controlling for rank.
Table 39
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily
Lives with the Effectiveness of the Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
B
Exp(fi)
Step Entered
Wald
Significance
Lower
Upper
1

TrainingEffect
Rank
Constant

2.583
2.583

85.656

.000

13.238

7.660

22.876

.368

2.266

.132

1.445

.895

2.335

1.535

49.512

.000

.215

The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training materials (coded as
TrainingMaterial) and rank (predictor variables) and using the learned skills in the
respondents' daily lives (coded as ChangeBehavior). Results of the logistic regression
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 77.007, p < .01. Prediction
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall
prediction success rate of 75.6 percent. Table 40 presents the regression coefficients (B),
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported the
perceived effectiveness of the training materials was a statistically significant predictor of
using the learned skills in Marines' daily lives.
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The odds ratio for rank was 1.172. This implied the enlisted Marines were 1.172
times more likely than the officers to use the learned combat operational stress preventive
skills in their daily lives, controlling for the perceived effectiveness of the training
materials (coded as Training_Material). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the
training materials was 9.359 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 9.359 times more
likely to use the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily lives
when they reported the training materials were effective, controlling for rank. Figure 5
depicts significant odds ratios for each of the independent variables described in Tables
32 through 40.
Table 40
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Using the Learned Skills in Marines' Daily
Lives with the Efficacy of the Training Materials and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
Step Entered
B
Wald
Significance
Exp(5)
Lower
Upper
I

TrainingMaterial
Rank
Constant

2.236

64.679

!000

9.359

5.427

16.140

.158

.474

.491

1.172

.746

1.840

-1.248

39.751

.000

.287

Learning as the Dependent Variable
The first logistic regression model in this series considered associations between
the reported level of the combat operational stress preventive coping skills and techniques
(coded as Coping) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the subject matter skills
and techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated
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Figure 5. Significant Odds Ratios with Changed Behavior as the Dependent Variable,
the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the
constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 41.364, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases
used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success
rate of 64.4 percent. Table 41 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics,
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported possessing the combat operational
stress preventive coping skills was a statistically significant predictor of learning the
training material.
Table 41
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Skills and Techniques with
Coping Skills and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered
Coping

B

Wald

Significance

2.440

21.616

.000

Rank

-.077

.128

.424

5.540

Constant

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

11.474

4.102

32.095

.721

.926

.608

1.410

.019

1.529
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The odds ratio for rank was .926. This implied the enlisted Marines were .926
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills
and techniques, controlling for possessing the coping skills (coded as Coping). The odds
ratio for coping was 11.474 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 11.474 times more
likely to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques when they
reported possessing the coping skills, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' participating in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
COSCTraining) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the subject matter skills and
techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constantonly model, x2 (2, n = 480) = 120.660, p< .01. Prediction success for the cases used in
the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of
75.6 percent. Table 42 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics,
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported participating in the combat
operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of learning
the preventive skills and techniques.
The odds ratio for rank was .634. This implied the enlisted Marines were .634
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills
and techniques, controlling for participating in the training (coded as COSC_Training).
The odds ratio for participating in the training was 9.636 (p < .01). This implied Marines
were 9.636 times more likely to learn the subject matter skills and techniques when they
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reported participating in the combat operational stress preventive the training, controlling
for rank.
Table 42
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Skills and Techniques with
Participating in the Combat Stress Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
Exp(£)
Lower
Upper
Step Entered
B
Wald
Significance
1

COSCTraining

2.266

102.646

.000

9.636

6.217

14.936

Rank

-.456

3.623

.057

.634

.396

1.014

Constant

-.284

1.852

.174

.753

The next logistic regression model considered associations between using the
learned skills in the respondents' daily lives (coded as Change_Behavior) and rank
(predictor variables) and learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and
techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the
two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constantonly model,/ 2 (2, n = 480) = 101.770, p< .01. Prediction success for the cases used in
the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction success rate of
66.9 percent. Table 43 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics,
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported using the learned skills and
techniques in the respondents' daily lives was a statistically significant predictor of
learning the subject matter preventive skills and techniques.
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Table 43
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning Skills and Techniques with Changed
Behavior and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
I

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

Change_Behavior

2.610

61.593

!000

13.606

7.089

26.113

Rank

-.282

1.559

.212

.754

.485

1.174

.194

1.070

.301

1.214

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was .754. This implied the enlisted Marines were .754
times more likely than the officers to learn the skills and techniques, controlling for using
the learned skills in the respondents' daily lives (coded as Change_Behavior). The odds
ratio for changed behavior was 13.606 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 13.606 times
more likely to learn the subject matter skills and techniques when they reported using the
learned skills in their daily lives, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
OverallJFeel) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the subject matter preventive
skills and techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression analysis
indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over
the constant-only model,/ 2 (2, n = 480) = 54.538, p < .01. Prediction success for the
cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction
success rate of 64.4 percent. Table 44 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald
statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence
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intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported feeling positive
about the combat operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant
predictor of learning the subject matter skills and techniques.
Table 44
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning Skills and Techniques with Overall
Feelings toward the Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B^)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

Wald

Significance

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

Overall_Feel

2.025

36.758

XXX)

7.577

3.937

14.582

Rank

-.141

.420

.517

.869

.568

1.329

.335

3.339

.068

1.398

Constant

B

The odds ratio for rank was .869. This implied the enlisted Marines were .869
times more likely than the officers to learn the skills and techniques, controlling for their
feelings toward the training (coded as OverallFeel). The odds ratio for feelings toward
the training was 7.577 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 7.577 times more likely to
learn the skills and techniques when they reported feeling positive about the training,
controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' reaction toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
Reaction) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the combat operational stress
preventive skills and techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model,/ (2, n = 480) = 65.271, p < .01. Prediction
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success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall
prediction success rate of 64.4 percent. Table 45 presents the regression coefficients (B),
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported
positively reacting toward the combat operational stress preventive training was a
statistically significant predictor of learning the subject matter knowledge.
Table 45
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Combat Stress Related
Knowledge with Reaction and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for ExpCB)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

Wald

Significance

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

Reaction

2.853

29.962

!(J00

17.341

6.243

48.165

Rank

-.100

.207

.649

.905

.590

1.389

.335

3.351

.067

1.399

Constant

B

The odds ratio for rank was .905. This implied the enlisted Marines were .905
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills
and techniques, controlling for Marines' reaction toward the training (coded as Reaction).
The odds ratio for reaction was 17.341 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 17.341 times
more likely to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques when
they reported positively reacting toward the presented training, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the trainers (coded as Trainer_Effect) and rank (predictor variables) and
learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques (coded as
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Learning). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, / (2, n =
480) = 94.705, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the
model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.3 percent. Table 46 presents
the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio
[Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor.
The Wald test reported the perceived effectiveness of the trainers was a statistically
significant predictor of learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and
techniques.
Table 46
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Skills and Techniques with
Effectiveness of the Trainers and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for ExpfB)
Step
I

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

TrainerEffect

2.674

78.660

!u00

Rank

-.454

2.248

-2.604

76.748

Constant

Exp(Z?)

Lower

Upper

14.495

8.028

26.171

.134

.635

.351

1.150

.000

.074

The odds ratio for rank was .635. This implied the enlisted Marines were .635
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills
and techniques, controlling for the effectiveness of the trainers (coded as Trainer_Effect).
The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the trainers was 14.495 (p < .01). This implied
Marines were 14.495 times more likely to learn the combat operational stress preventive
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skills and techniques when they reported the trainers were effective in teaching the
training content, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
TrainingEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the subject matter preventive
skills and techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression analysis
indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over
the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 72.383, p < .01. Prediction success for the
cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall prediction
success rate of 64.4 percent. Table 47 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald
statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence
intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported the perceived
effectiveness of the training was a statistically significant predictor of learning the
combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques.
Table 47
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Skills and Techniques with the
Effectiveness of the Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(F)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(F)

Lower

Upper

TrainingEffect

3.178

28.469

!000

23.999

7.468

77.123

Rank

-.104

.223

.637

.902

.586

1.386

.323

3.091

.079

1.381

Constant
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The odds ratio for rank was .902. This implied the enlisted Marines were .902
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills
and techniques, controlling for the effectiveness of the training (coded as
TrainingEffect). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the training was 23.999 (p <
.01). This implied Marines were 23.999 times more likely to learn the combat operational
stress preventive skills and techniques when they reported the training was effective,
controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training materials (coded as
Training_Material) and rank (predictor variables) and learning the subject matter
preventive skills and techniques (coded as Learning). Results of the logistic regression
analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model, x2 (2, n = 480) = 66.832, p < .01. Prediction
success for the cases used in the development of the model was moderate, with an overall
prediction success rate of 64.4 percent. Table 48 presents the regression coefficients (B),
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported the
training materials were a statistically significant predictor of learning the combat
operational stress preventive skills and techniques.
The odds ratio for rank was .806. This implied the enlisted Marines were .806
times more likely than the officers to learn the combat operational stress preventive skills
and techniques, controlling for the effectiveness of the training materials (coded as
TrainingMaterial). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of the training materials was
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30.824 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 30.824 times more likely to learn the combat
operational stress preventive skills and techniques when they reported the training
materials were effective, controlling for rank. Figure 6 depicts significant odds ratios for
each of the independent variables described in Tables 41 through 48.
Table 48
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Learning the Skills and Techniques with the
Effectiveness of the Training Materials and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for ExpCB^
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(fi)

Lower

Upper

TrainingMaterial

3.428

22.480

.000

30.824

7.472

127.166

Rank

-.216

.995

.319

.806

.527

1.232

.441

6.061

.000

1.555

Constant

30.000
25,000

,o
3

20.000 -

K
2

15.000

§
10,000
5 000
0.000

LLLLLLLI
Coping

Training
Participation

Changed
Behavior

Overall Feelings

Reaction

Trainer
Effectiveness

Training
Effectivness

Material
Effectiveness

Independent Variables

Figure 6. Significant Odds Ratios with Learning as the Dependent Variable.
Reacting as the Dependent Variable
The first logistic regression model in this series considered associations between
the reported level of the combat operational stress preventive coping skills (coded as
Coping) and rank (predictor variables) and reacting toward the presented training (coded
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as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model
provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only model, / (2, n =
480) = 85.769, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the
model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of 84.6 percent. Table
49 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds
ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each
predictor. The Wald test reported possessing the combat operational stress preventive
coping skills was a statistically significant predictor of reacting positively toward the
presented training.
Table 49
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with
Coping Skills and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance
XXX)

Coping

2.595

78.832

Rank

-.094

.117

-1.930

64.326

Constant

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

13.402

7.557

23.769

.733

.910

.532

1.559

.000

.145

The odds ratio for rank was .910. This implied the enlisted Marines were .910
times more likely than the officers to react positively toward the preventive training,
controlling for possessing the subject matter coping skills (coded as Coping). The odds
ratio for coping was 13.402 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 13.402 times more
likely to react positively toward the preventive training when they reported possessing the
combat operational stress preventive coping skills, controlling for rank.
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The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' participating in the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
COSCTraining) and rank (predictor variables) and reacting toward the presented
training (coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the twopredictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only
m o d e l , / (2, n = 480) = 64.107, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was relatively high, with an overall prediction success rate of
80.2 percent. Table 50 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics,
significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for
odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported participating in the combat
operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of positively
reacting toward the presented training.
Table 50
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with
Participating in the Combat Stress Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Variable
Step Entered
B
Wald
Significance
Exp(5)
Lower
Upper
I

COSCTraining

2.393

38.480

IKX)

10.948

5.140

23.320

Rank

-.474

3.368

.066

.622

.375

1.033

-2.882

55.665

.000

.056

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was .622. This implied the enlisted Marines were .622
times more likely than the officers to react positively toward the presented training,
controlling for participating in the training (coded as COSCTraining). The odds ratio for
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participating in the training was 10.948 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 10.948
times more likely to react positively toward the presented combat operational stress
preventive training when they reported participating in the training, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between using the
learned skills in the respondents' daily lives (coded as Change_Behavior) and rank
(predictor variables) and reacting toward the presented combat operational stress
preventive training (coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis
indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over
the constant-only model, rf (2, n = 480) = 73.502, p < .01. Prediction success for the
cases used in the development of the model was relatively high, with an overall
prediction success rate of 80.2 percent. Table 51 presents the regression coefficients (B),
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent
confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported using
the learned skills in the respondents' daily lives was a statistically significant predictor of
positively reacting toward the presented training.
Table 51
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with
Changed Behavior and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
i

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(£)

Lower

Upper

Change_Behavior

2.061

64.249

^000

7.850

4.743

12.992

Rank

-.416

2.480

.115

.660

.393

1.107

-2.087

68.749

.000

.124

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was .660. This implied the enlisted Marines were .660
times more likely than the officers to positively react toward the presented combat
operational stress preventive training, controlling for using the learned skills in the
respondents' daily lives (coded as ChangeBehavior). The odds ratio for changed
behavior was 7.850 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 7.850 times more likely to
positively react toward the combat operational stress preventive training when they
reported using the learned skills in their daily lives, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the
respondents' feelings toward the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
Overall_Feel) and rank (predictor variables) and reacting toward the presented training
(coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the twopredictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only
m o d e l , / (2, n = 480) = 157.598, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 86.3
percent. Table 52 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported feeling optimistic about the combat operational
stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of learning the subject
matter preventive skills and techniques.
The odds ratio for rank was .747. This implied the enlisted Marines were .747
times more likely than the officers to positively react toward the presented training,
controlling for their feelings toward the training (coded as OverallFeel). The odds ratio
for feelings toward the training was 25.784 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 25.784
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times more likely to react positively toward the presented training when they reported
feeling optimistic about the training, controlling for rank.
Table 52
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with
Overall Feelings about the Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

Wald

Significance

Lower

Upper

OverallFeel

3.250

123.907

.000

25.784

14.549

45.693

Rank

-.292

.921

.337

.747

.411

1.356

.-2.549

76.431

.000

.078

Constant

B

Exp(5)

The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and
reacting toward the presented training (coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic
regression analysis indicated the two-predictor model provided a statistically significant
improvement over the constant-only model, x (2, n = 480) = 132.649, p < .01.
Prediction success for the cases used in the development of the model was high, with an
overall prediction success rate of 84.6 percent. Table 53 presents the regression
coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0
percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio for each predictor. The Wald test reported
the perceived effectiveness of the trainers was a statistically significant predictor of
positively reacting toward the combat operational stress preventive training.
The odds ratio for rank was .793. This implied the enlisted Marines were .793
times more likely than the officers to positively react toward the presented training,

142
controlling for the effectiveness of the trainers (coded as TrainerEffect). The odds ratio
for the effectiveness of the trainers was 18.579 (p < .01). This implied Marines were
18.579 times more likely to react positively toward the presented training when they
reported the trainers were effective in teaching the training content, controlling for rank.
Table 53
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with the
Effectiveness of the Trainers and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Lower

Upper

TrainerEffect

2.922

111.013

.000

18.579

10.788

31.995

Rank

-.232

.639

.134

.793

.449

1.401

-2.407

75.715

.000

.090

Constant

Exp(5)

The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training (coded as
TrainingEffect) and rank (predictor variables) and reacting toward the presented training
(coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the twopredictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only
model,/ 2 (2, n = 480) = 211.645, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 91.0
percent. Table 54 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the perceived effectiveness of the combat
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operational stress preventive training was a statistically significant predictor of positively
reacting toward the training.
Table 54
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with the
Effectiveness of the Training and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
I

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(5)

Lower

Upper

TrainingEffect

4.058

150.483

!000

57.873

30.261

110.680

Rank

-.184

.280

.597

.832

.421

1.644

-2.726

72.892

.000

.065

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was .832. This implied the enlisted Marines were .832
times more likely than the officers to react positively toward the presented training,
controlling for the effectiveness of the training (coded as Training_Effect). The odds ratio
for training effectiveness was 57.873 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 57.873 times
more likely to react positively toward the presented combat operational stress preventive
training when they reported the training was effective, controlling for rank.
The next logistic regression model considered associations between the reported
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training materials (coded as
TrainingMaterial) and rank (predictor variables) and reacting toward the presented
training (coded as Reaction). Results of the logistic regression analysis indicated the twopredictor model provided a statistically significant improvement over the constant-only
m o d e l , / (2, n = 480) = 143.516, p < .01. Prediction success for the cases used in the
development of the model was high, with an overall prediction success rate of 87.7
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percent. Table 55 presents the regression coefficients (B), the Wald statistics, significance
level, odds ratio [Exp(B)], and the 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CI) for odds ratio
for each predictor. The Wald test reported the perceived effectiveness of training
materials was a statistically significant predictor of positively reacting toward the
presented training.
Table 55
Logistic Regression Results for Predicting Positive Reaction toward the Training with
Training Materials and Rank as Independent Variables
95.0% CI
for Exp(B)
Step
1

Variable
Entered

B

Wald

Significance

Exp(2?)

Lower

Upper

Training_Material

3.304

116.886

!000

27.222

14.955

49.551

Rank

-.530

3.071

.080

.588

.325

1.065

-2.002

65.005

.000

.135

Constant

The odds ratio for rank was .588. This implied the enlisted Marines were .588
times more likely than the officers to positively react toward the presented combat
operational stress preventive training, controlling for the perceived effectiveness of
training materials (coded as Training_Material). The odds ratio for the effectiveness of
training materials was 27.222 (p < .01). This implied Marines were 27.222 times more
likely to positively react toward the presented combat operational stress preventive
training when they reported the training materials were effective, controlling for rank.
Figure 7 depicts significant odds ratios for each of the independent variables described in
Tables 49 through 55.
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Figure 7. Significant Odds Ratios with Positive Reaction as the Dependent Variable.
Qualitative Methodology
The primary purpose of the qualitative methodology was to supplement and
support the quantitative methodology. Consequently, the researcher conducted training
observations and interviews as part of data collection efforts to meet the objectives of this
study. The researcher also used triangulation of data techniques in order to confirm and
validate the findings as they emerged. This approach was based on the principle that no
single technique could fully and objectively answer the research questions (Creswell,
2007). By having two different qualitative methods, the researcher was able to
objectively cross-check and confirm the emerging themes, interpretations, and
conclusions. Specifically, the researcher compared observations with interviews in order
to substantiate what the interview respondents voiced. The researcher also used a
research log for keeping track of data and emerging understandings resultant from this
inquiry.

Data Analysis
The researcher used spiral methodology technique to analyze the data collected in
this study. Spiral methodology analysis involved systematic procedures to code and
classify qualitative data to ensure that important themes and patterns emerged (Creswell,
2007). It was also essential to reduce the data for analysis and allow for drawing and
verifying appropriate conclusions (Creswell, 2007). Adhering to these principles, the
researcher transcribed all interview data from the recording device into a typed text, and
then divided the text into meaningful segments by having each interview question and the
participant's response becoming a separate segment. As a result, the researcher was able
to code the data according to the training effectiveness related themes, which included
reaction, learning, knowledge transfer, and long term results. The researcher applied a
similar data analysis methodology to the training observation data. Conclusions were
drawn by looking at the data as a whole, having the two categories combined as one set
of qualitative data as recommended by Creswell (2007).
Qualitative Findings
While this qualitative inquiry provided a plethora of information, the four
dominant themes were dissatisfaction with training, being able to learn the basics, not
applying the learned material in the field, and lack of long-term success of the training.
Dissatisfaction with training refers to participants' negative perceptions of the combat
operational stress preventive training. Being able to learn the basics refers to Marines
successfully learning the combat operational stress preventive training essentials. Not
applying the learned material in the field concerns Marines not actually putting into use
new combat operational stress training knowledge in their daily lives. Finally, lack of
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long-term success of the training concerns the combat operational stress preventive
training not resulting in lasting tangible and quantifiable successes.
Dissatisfaction with Training
Almost all of the interviewed Marines expressed a general dissatisfaction with the
combat operational stress preventive training. Four junior enlisted, three out of four
senior enlisted Marines, and three out of four officers, described the training as one where
"no one paid attention," which gave opportunities for "some sleep and respite", and
referred to the instructors as "poor," leaving "lots of room for improvement." On the
other hand, just two other interviewees, an officer and one senior enlisted Marine, called
the training "an interesting talk" and "rather informative." The senior enlisted Marine
also voiced "the instructor was pretty good, not great, but simply got the job done."
Observing the training sessions resulted in similar findings. While the majority of
the participants listened and paid attention, an estimated 15-20 percent of the observed
participants were inattentive and visibly not trying to learn. These individuals elected to
engage in sidebar conversations with fellow Marines, read other non-training materials,
and even some Marines had difficulties remaining alert. Such negative signs of not
paying attention to the instruction could be indicative of a poorly designed and delivered
training activity (Kirkpatrick, 2006).
Additionally, a review of post-training anonymous feedback forms suggested that
the training slides were poorly designed and contained too much information, with many
of the observed training participants describing the presentation slides as "confusing" and
"hard to follow". Furthermore, many comments referred to a lack of instructor-learner
interaction and not providing opportunities for learner involvement and exchanges either

with the instructor or fellow students. The sheer number of the negative comments
confirmed the current format of training, consisting of static PowerPoint™ slides, was
not satisfactory.
Ability to Learn the Basics
In general, all of the interviewees indicated they understood what was meant by
combat operational stress. They indicated this new knowledge came either from
attending formal training sessions or informal training provided by their leaders.
Moreover, 10 out of 12 interviewees pointed out they did not like the training because of
a poor training delivery format as all the currently formatted training consists of lectures
which utilize static PowerPoint™ slides. Eight interviewees also specified questionable
knowledge and "unqualified" background of some instructors, which could translate into
overall poor quality of the training sessions (Kirkpatrick, 2006).
Ten out of 12 interviewees were also unable to identify specific techniques
learned from the combat operational stress preventive training. Observing the training
sessions did not provide insights into understanding whether participants actually learned
the training material. The instructors asked the observed Marines basic questions and
consequently received correct answers. Review of the post-training feedback forms also
echoed the lack of learning specific skills and techniques. The training participants
reported now being confused and puzzled by having too much information provided in
such a short time. None of the post-training feedback forms indicated the training
participants learned something new and useful in terms of practical knowledge, skills,
and techniques.
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Not Applying the Learned Material in the Field
All of the interviewees also noted an inability to transfer knowledge from the
training sessions. Additionally, three out of 12 interviewees alluded that the ability to
transfer learning was "up to someone's personality and being able to maintain the
composure." "It had nothing to do with the combat stress preventive training." All
interviewed senior enlisted Marines and officers voiced that as far as actually seeing
changed behavior in their Marines applying learned combat operational stress preventive
skills in their daily lives, they "simply did not see it." The emerging theme from the
qualitative comments was the current training format was not effective in having Marines
apply the learned skills in their daily lives.
Lack of Long-Term Success of the Training
None of the interviewees reported any drastic decreases in new mental health
cases, family related problems, alcohol, and drug abuse cases around their immediate
working environments. The emerging theme was the training was not being effective in
ensuring the long-term successes of the combat operational stress preventive training.
This theme was triangulated with the program training documents and the Defense
Medical Surveillance System (DMSS), which revealed meaningful statistical data.
Specifically, the Marine Corps medical database showed increases in new mental health,
PTSD, drug, and alcohol dependence and abuse cases amongst active duty Marines
between years 2003 and 2008, resulting in re-emergence of the powerful theme of lack of
the long-term success (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008).
Particularly, the number of new medically diagnosed mental health disorder cases,
amongst active duty Marines, grew each year of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
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Freedom. Since year 2003, the number of new mental health disorder cases grew by
9,375 cases (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008). This was a very serious increase and in most
likelihood could be attributed to the Marine Corps' continued combat deployments to
Iraq and Afghanistan. Figure 8 depicts the rise of new medically diagnosed mental health
disorder cases in the Marine Corps between January 1, 2003 (11,972 new cases) and
December 31, 2008 (21,347 new cases) (DMSS, 2009).
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Figure 8. New Mental Health Cases in the Marine Corps.
Similarly, the number of new medically diagnosed post traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) cases grew each year of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Since
year 2003, the number of new PTSD cases increased by 1,998 new cases which translated
into a whopping 734 percent increase (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008). Indeed, it was a very
powerful statistic and very few would doubt this increase could not be attributed to the
Marine Corps' continued participation in the current war effort and lack of the long-term
success of the preventive combat operational stress training and education practices.
Figure 9 depicts the rise of new medically diagnosed post traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) cases in the Marine Corps between January 1, 2003 (271 new cases) and
December 31, 2008 (2,266 new cases) (DMSS, 2009).
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Figure 9. New Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Cases in the Marine Corps.
Additionally, after dropping slightly in years 2004 and 2005, the number of new
medically diagnosed drug abuse or dependence cases grew sharply each year of
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Since year 2003, new drug abuse or
dependence cases in the Marine Corps grew by 2,677 cases which translated into a
considerable 98 percent increase (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008). This increase had
especially become evident during the last three years and in most likelihood could be
correlated to "weariness of war participation" as perhaps some Marines did not see "the
light at the end of the tunnel" and turned to drugs for stress relief. Figure 10 depicts the
rise of new medically diagnosed drug abuse and dependence cases in the Marine Corps
between January 1, 2003 (2,744 new cases) and December 31, 2008 (5,421 new cases)
(DMSS, 2009).
Likewise, after dropping slightly in year 2005, the number of new medically
diagnosed alcohol abuse or dependence cases also grew in the Marine Corps. Since year
2003, the number of new alcohol abuse or dependence cases increased by 715 cases
which translated into a 22 percent increase (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008). This increase
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had also become evident during the last three years and probably could be correlated to
"weariness of war participation" as more Marines turned to drinking for stress relief.
Figure 11 depicts the rise of new medically diagnosed alcohol abuse and dependence
cases in the Marine Corps between January 1, 2003 (3,212 new cases) and December 31,
2008 (3,927 new cases) (DMSS, 2009).
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Figure 10. New Drug Dependence and Abuse Cases in the Marine Corps.
4,500
4,000
3,500 w

3,000

jg 2,500
o
> 2,000 a>
Z 1,500
1,000
500
0
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Year

Figure 11. New Alcohol Dependence and Abuse Cases in the Marine Corps.
The above showed descriptions and qualitatively derived statistical data indicated
rises in new mental health disorders, post traumatic stress disorders, substance
dependence and abuse cases in the Marine Corps triangulated with what the interviewees
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pointed out. Specifically, the currently formatted combat operational stress preventive
training was not effective in ensuring the long-term successes of the training. This
qualitative theme was particularly noteworthy and significant because it had also been
triangulated by this study's quantitative descriptive and inferential statistical findings,
which added immensely to its validity.
Summary
The findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses revealed the majority of
the Marines, regardless of rank, did not react favorably to the currently formatted combat
operational stress preventive training. Some of the Marines learned the basics of the
training, most of the Marines did not apply the learned preventive skills in their daily
lives, and the currently formatted combat operational stress preventive training program
for both the enlisted Marines and officers had not been a success as evidenced by a
number of statistically significant logistic regressions, further supported by descriptive
statistics, and finally triangulated by qualitative interviews and training observations.
Additionally, the respondents' self-reported experiences of effects from combat
operational stress do affect their evaluation of the effectiveness of the combat operational
stress preventive training as evidenced by several statistically significant logistic
regressions.
Chapter V discusses the study's findings. It opens with a summary of the study.
Next conclusions are presented for each of the research questions ordered by quantitative
and qualitative inquiries. The findings are discussed relative to the theoretical and
practical foundations used for this study. Finally, Chapter V closes with
recommendations for use of this study and for future research.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter summarizes the study, presents conclusions, and makes
recommendations for use of this study. The conclusions discuss the findings from logistic
regressions, descriptive statistics, and the qualitative methodology. The recommendations
address uses for this study as well as ideas for future research in this area.
Summary
The problem investigated in this study was whether the Marine Corps combat
operational stress preventive training program meets the training effectiveness criteria of
the Marine Corps. There were three questions which guided this study:
1. To what extent do the respondents' self-reported experiences of effects
from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the effectiveness
of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training?
2. To what extent does the Marine Corps combat operational stress
preventive training program for Marine officers meet the training
effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps?
3. To what extent does the Marine Corps combat operational stress
preventive training program for enlisted Marines meet the training
effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps?
This study was significant in several aspects. Most important, this study is
significant because it concerns our Nation's troops. Additionally, it would be difficult to
develop a more effective combat operational stress preventive training program without
first understanding the sense and meaning of the individual experiences of Marines who
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perceived the training as effective or ineffective. Using insights from this research, the
Marine Corps Combat Operational Stress Control program officers may improve their
prevention program methodology thus positively contribute to the preservation of the
Marine Corps forces. Theoretical significances for this study entailed investigating
relationships between research variables and proposing research data collection
instruments. These documents could also be used as templates for follow on
investigations.
Practical significances of the study included creating training evaluation
methodologies. Such methodologies could also be used by other military and civilian
training and education entities. Since this study focused on individual experiences, it may
provide other researchers with insights essential for constructing quantitative instruments
that could aid in predicting those being affected by effects of combat operational stress.
Additionally, the study may provide other researchers with additional empirical
knowledge which could be used in evaluating other training and education activities.
The study faced several limitations related to its participants and the subject
matter. First, the study was focused exclusively on active duty U.S. Marines. Second,
preventive Combat Operational Stress Control consisted only of formal and informal
training instituted and managed by the Combat Operational Stress Control branch of the
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Third, full disclosure of the participants' perceptions
toward effects of combat operational stress and the effectiveness of the combat
operational stress preventive training might have been hindered by reluctance of the
individuals to disclose their feelings and opinions completely. Fourth, this study included
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only volunteers as none of the Marine participants was forced or ordered to participate in
the study.
The participants consisted of active duty and reserve Marines on active duty
stationed at the Marine Corps bases located in Quantico, Virginia; Camp Lejune, North
Carolina; and Camp Pendleton, California. For the purposes of the quantitative analysis,
the researcher obtained a random sample of 480 Marines. The sample size for the
qualitative inquiry was based on qualitative data saturation as recommended by Creswell
(2007). The researcher reached the point of sample data saturation after performing 12
qualitative interviews using a purposefully stratified sample of 12 Marines.
There were three instruments used for this study. For the purposes of quantitative
inquiry, an online based survey was utilized. This survey contained a number of Likert
scale type questions built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) four-level evaluation of training
effectiveness constructs: reaction, learning, knowledge transfer, and long-term results.
Concerning the qualitative inquiry, the researcher conducted interviews using an
interview protocol form, which contained a number of open-ended interview questions
related to the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. These
questions were also built around Kirkpatrick's (2006) four-level evaluation of training
effectiveness constructs. An observation protocol instrument/checklist was used for the
purposes of qualitative observations of training sessions. The observation protocol
instrument contained checklist items that are relevant to training and conducting
productive observation sessions.
For the purposes of quantitative data collection, the researcher sent an e-mail to
Commanding Officers of randomly selected five Marine Corps units each consisting of
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about 1,000 Marines. The sent e-mail contained a link to the web-based survey and
requested each respective unit Commanding Officer to forward that e-mail to all
members of his or her unit in order to allow the members to voluntarily and anonymously
access and complete the survey. As a result, the researcher obtained completed responses
from 480 Marines.
For the purposes of qualitative analysis, the researcher performed and then
reached a qualitative data saturation after conducting 12 individual interviews with
Marines using a purposefully stratified sample. This qualitative sample consisted of four
enlisted Marines, four staff non-commissioned officers, and four commissioned officers.
Additionally, the researcher observed and reached the point of qualitative data saturation
after observing four combat operational stress training sessions in order to collect
qualitative data related to the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive
training.
The researcher used both descriptive and inferential statistical methods. The
descriptive statistics allowed the researcher to organize, summarize, and describe the
associated data. The inferential statistical methods provided the researcher the
opportunities to make predictions about the characteristics of the Marine Corps
population. In order to answer Research Question 1, the researcher used descriptive
statistics consisting of frequencies and percentages in order to organize, summarize, and
describe the data. Then, the researcher followed the analysis with binary logistic
regressions in order to assess the associations between the demographic variables,
training evaluation constructs, and self-reported experiences of effects from combat
related stress. The researcher performed a series of binary logistic regressions to
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determine the odds ratios (ORs) and 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CIs) for each
variable of interest.
The researcher answered Research Questions 2 and 3 using both quantitative and
qualitative methodologies. For the quantitative analysis, descriptive statistics consisting
of frequencies and percentages were used in order to organize, summarize, and describe
the data. The researcher followed this with binary logistic regressions in order to assess
the associations between the demographic characteristics, impressions of the received
combat operational stress preventive training, learning preventive combat operational
stress concepts and techniques, actually using the learned skills and techniques, overall
feelings toward the combat operational stress training, possessing combat operational
stress coping skills, and individual perceptions whether the training was effective or
ineffective. The researcher performed a series of binary logistic regressions to determine
the odds ratios (ORs) and 95.0 percent confidence intervals (CIs) for each variable of
interest.
A qualitative analysis of data collected to answer Research Questions 2 and 3
were also performed. A similar data analysis methodology was applied to the observation
based dataset. Conclusions were first drawn from the data obtained individually from
interviews, observations, and documents review and then from the data as a whole,
having the three categories combined as one set of qualitative data as recommended by
Creswell (2007).
Quantitative Conclusions
The following section outlines conclusions for each of the research questions.
Conclusions were drawn by considering the study's results in the context of Kirkpatrick's
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(2006) constructs for training evaluation: reaction, learning, changed behavior, and
effectiveness of training/long terms results.
Research Question 1
Research Question 1 focused on whether the respondents' self-reported
experiences of effects from combat operational stress affect their evaluation of the
effectiveness of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive training program.
There were a number of findings which helped in answering the question. The following
lists each specific finding followed by a discussion:
Finding #1: The descriptive statistics reported that 169 respondents out of 480
(35.20 percent) indicated suffering from effects of combat operational stress. This
statistic supports findings of the prior studies which reported that approximately 30
percent of the veterans who were deployed to recent combat zones might suffer from
effects of combat operational stress (Iribarren, Prolo, Neagos, & Chiappelli, 2005). This
is obviously a very serious outcome as potentially over one-third of the American combat
Marines with prior deployment histories in support of Operations Enduring and Iraqi
Freedom might suffer from effects of combat operational stress with potentially severe
implications on themselves. The researcher feels strongly these suggestions need to be
taken seriously by the senior leadership in the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense,
and eventually Congress with appropriate preventive program actions enacted or
instituted by these branches and agencies of the U.S. government.
Finding #2: The first significant logistic regression model considered associations
between the respondents' changed behavior and suffering from effects of combat
operational stress. The odds ratio for changed behavior as a result of the Marines using

160
the learned combat operational stress preventive skills was 1.855 (p < .01). This implied
when Marines used the learned combat operational stress preventive skills in their daily
lives, they were 1.855 times more likely to report suffering from effects of combat
operational stress. This finding was important because it showed the significance of using
the learned skills and techniques in Marines' daily lives. Marines, by virtue of learning
and then actually using the newly acquired skills and techniques, had a greater chance of
disclosing their suffering from effects of combat operational stress. By knowing and
understanding more about effects of combat operational stress, Marines were then better
prepared to seek the needed help from mental health professionals (Gaskin, 2008; Nash,
2007). This is, in itself, a very positive outcome. This study had confirmed this fact and
further supported the soundness and holistic value of properly instituted preventive
training and education activities as recommended by Gaskin (2008) and Nash (2007) .
Finding #3: The next significant logistic regression model considered associations
between the respondents' possessing the combat operational stress coping skills and
suffering from effects of combat operational stress. The odds ratio for possessing the
coping skills was 2.580 (p < .01). This implied when Marines reported possessing the
combat operational stress coping skills, they were 2.580 times more likely to disclose
suffering from effects of combat operational stress.
The Marine respondents should had acquired their preventive combat operational
stress coping skills as a result of the subject matter training and education efforts. By
possessing the requisite coping skills, the respondents had a significantly greater chance
of disclosing their suffering from effects of combat operational stress. Similarly to the
earlier finding, this result confirmed the importance of preventive training and education
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services in terms of Marines' ability to learn and understand what it meant to suffer from
effects of combat operational stress. As a result, the affected Marines were able to seek
the needed help more effectively with positive effects upon themselves and their families.
Such inherent abilities to seek needed help from mental health professionals was also one
of the main goals of the preventive combat stress training and education efforts (Gaskin,
2008, Nash, 2007).
Finding #4: The next significant logistic regression model considered
associations between participating in the combat operational stress preventive training
and suffering from effects of combat operational stress. The odds ratio for participating in
the combat operational stress preventive training was 1.986 (p < .01). This implied when
Marines reported participating in the combat operational stress preventive training, they
were 1.986 times more likely to report suffering from effects of combat operational
stress.
This finding profoundly underscored the importance of preventive training and
education efforts. Just sheer participation in formal combat operational stress preventive
training classes significantly increased the likelihood of the respondents admitting they
actually suffered from effects of combat operational stress. As a result, the affected
Marines could seek the needed help being fully informed, which often means getting the
mental health help quicker and before their mental health conditions actually worsen.
This was also one of the main goals of the preventive combat operation stress control
training (Gaskin, 2008; Nash, 2007).
Finding #5: The next significant logistic regression model considered associations
between the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training and
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suffering from effects of combat operational stress. The odds ratio for the effectiveness of
the training was 1.324. This implied when Marines reported the training as being
effective, they were 1.324 times more likely to report suffering from effects of combat
operational stress. This finding further stresses the importance of effective preventive
training services. By knowing and understanding concepts related to combat operational
stress preventive training and education efforts, Marines had a higher propensity to
disclose their suffering from effects of combat operational stress as shown by this
finding's logistic regression. This meant the affected Marines could then seek the needed
help more effectively, which was essential from both the mental health care point of view
and the efficacy of the preventive combat operational stress control training and
education efforts (Gaskin, 2008; Nash, 2007). Table 56 summarizes the findings used to
answer Research Question 1.
Table 56
Summary of Findings Used to Answer Research Question 1

Key Points for Findings 1 through 5

Finding #1: 35.20 percent of the respondents disclosed suffering from effects of combat
stress.
Finding #2: When Marines reported using the learned combat operational stress
preventive skills in their daily lives, they were 1.855 times more likely to disclose
suffering from effects of combat operational stress.
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Table 56 (continued)
Summary of Findings Used to Answer Research Question 1

Key Points for Findings 1 through 5

Finding #3: When Marines reported possessing the combat operational stress coping
skills, they were 2.580 times more likely to disclose suffering from effects of combat
operational stress.
Finding #4: When Marines reported participating in the combat operational stress
preventive training, they were 1.986 times more likely to report suffering from effects of
combat operational stress.
Finding #5: When Marines reported the training as being effective, they were 1.324
times more likely to report suffering from effects of combat operational stress.
Research Questions 2 and 3
Research Question 2 focused on whether the Marine Corps combat operational
stress preventive training program for Marine officers meets the training effectiveness
criteria of the Marine Corps. Research Question 3 focused on whether the Marine Corps
combat operational stress preventive training program for enlisted Marines meets the
training effectiveness criteria of the Marine Corps. None of the logistic regressions was
statistically significant in differentiating between the enlisted and the officers in terms of
determining the effectiveness or the ineffectiveness of the combat operational stress
preventive training. In other words, there were not reportable statistical differences
between the officers and the enlisted Marines as far as reporting the effectiveness of the

164
combat operational stress preventive training. Hence, the following findings pertain
equally to both groups - the enlisted Marines and the officers.
Finding #1: From the descriptive statistics report, only 96 respondents out of 480
(20.00 percent) considered the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive
training either as fully effective or at least acceptable. This straightforward descriptive
statistic was significant in itself because it powerfully showed the inherent shortcomings
of the current combat operational stress preventive program as 80.00 percent of the
respondents considered the training either as not fully effective or not effective at all. The
Marine Corps needs to examine closely this area and consider this finding as
unacceptable. This was because having an ineffective preventive training program
negatively impacted the mental health of our Nation's combat Marines (Gaskin, 2008;
Nash, 2007).
Finding #2: The first significant logistic regression model in this series considered
associations between the respondents' changed behavior as a result of using the learned
subject matter skills and techniques in Marines' daily lives and the reported effectiveness
of the combat operational stress preventive training. The odds ratio for changed behavior
was 13.238 (p < .01). This implied when Marines reported using the learned combat
operational stress preventive skills in their daily lives, they were 13.238 times more likely
to indicate the training was effective.
This finding had profound implications on the effectiveness and long term results
of the combat operational stress preventive training. The Marine Corps, as an
underwriting organization of the combat operational stress preventive training efforts,
would greatly benefit from Marines actually changing their behavior by using the learned
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combat operational stress preventive skills on a daily basis. This was because actually
using the learned skills prevents occurrences of combat stress related illnesses and results
in the long term success of the whole program - a very desirable end state (Gaskin, 2008;
Nash, 2007).
Finding #3: The next logistic regression model considered associations between
the respondents' coping skills acquired by participating in the combat stress preventive
training and the reported effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for possessing
combat operational stress preventive coping skills was 20.557 (p < .01). This implied
possessing the combat operational stress preventive coping skills increased the odds by
20.557 times of indicating the training was effective. This finding further underscored the
importance of the combat operational stress preventive training in ensuring the training
participants actually acquired preventive coping skills. This was because possessing such
skills significantly increased the chances of having an effective combat operational stress
preventive training - an extremely desirable outcome.
Finding #4: The next logistic regression model considered associations between
the respondents' participating in the combat operational stress preventive training and the
reported effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for participating in the combat
operational stress preventive training was 19.058 (p < .01). This finding implied
participating in the combat operational stress preventive training increased 19.058 times
the odds of reporting the training was effective. It also further validated and showed the
immense importance of the combat operational stress preventive training and education
efforts. In this case, sheer participation in the training greatly increased the chances of
indicating the entire training effort had been effective. The current program was
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definitely less effective than it could have been since only 60 percent of the respondents
reported attending any formal training classes. The Marine Corps leaders needed to
ensure their Marines actually attended the preventive training classes. This was because
participating in combat operational stress preventive training classes positively impacted
the effectiveness of the whole training program, as shown by this finding's statistically
significant logistic regression.
Finding #5: The next logistic regression model considered associations between
the efficacy of the training materials and the effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio
for the effectiveness of the training materials was 48.182 (p < .01). This implied Marines
were 48.182 times more likely to consider the training as being effective when they
indicated the associated training materials were also effective. This finding was
particularly important because it directly linked the efficacy of the training materials to
the overall effectiveness of the training as suggested by this statistically significant
logistic regression. Currently, only 84 out of 480 (17.50 percent) respondents considered
the current format of the related training materials as at least acceptable. The associated
logistic regression suggested an extremely strong relationship between the respondents'
thinking of the training materials as effective and the overall efficacy of the presented
training.
The Marine Corps should be, therefore, concerned with ensuring the associated
training materials were attractive to Marines in terms of usability, accessibility,
readability, and actually helping them acquire the subject matter new knowledge. Ideally,
the training materials should be experiential, which in itself often results in an enhanced
post-training memory retention of the presented learning materials as recommended by
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Knowles (1984) and Kirkpatrick (2006). As of now, there were too many Marines who
reported the current state of the training materials as poor and ineffectual. Since, there
was a direct relationship between the quality of the training materials and the
effectiveness of the training (Kirkpatrick, 2006), the Marine Corps needed to ensure the
combat operational stress preventive training materials possess an appropriate level of
quality to reflect what Marines wanted and needed. Otherwise, the effectiveness of the
whole combat operational stress preventive training program could be and unfortunately
had been negatively impacted.
Finding #6: The next logistic regression model considered associations between
the respondents' overall feelings toward the preventive combat operational stress training
and the effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for the Marines' overall feelings
toward the preventive combat operational stress training was 31.859 (p < .01). This
implied Marines were 31.859 times more likely to consider the subject matter preventive
training as being effective when they indicated having positive feelings toward the
combat operational stress preventive training.
The implications of this finding were also significant. Marines' positive feelings
toward the combat operational stress training were directly related to the effectiveness of
the whole training program. Currently, only 117 out of 480 (24.30 percent) respondents
reported having definitely positive feelings about the combat operational stress
preventive training program. The associated logistic regression suggested an extremely
strong relationship between the respondents having positive feelings about the preventive
training program and the effectiveness of the whole training effort.
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The Marine Corps should be concerned with ensuring the training participants
have positive feelings toward the training. As of now, there were too many Marines who
indicated having negative feelings toward it, which in turn had harmfully impacted the
overall effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. This was
definitely an undesirable end state. In order to counter this, the Marine Corps should
strive to improve the overall quality of the training. By improving the quality of the
training and thus its image, the overall effectiveness of the training could be enhanced too
(Kirkpatrick, 2006), which was obviously a desirable end state.
Finding #7: The next logistic regression model considered associations between
the respondents' reported efficacy of the trainers and the effectiveness of the combat
operational stress preventive training. The odds ratio for the efficacy of the trainers was
17.831. This implied Marines were 17.831 times more likely to consider the combat
operational stress preventive training as being effective when they indicated the trainers
who conducted the training were proficient.
Currently, only 117 out of 480 (24.40 percent) respondents thought of the trainers
as being fully effective. The associated logistic regression suggested a very strong
relationship between the efficacy of the trainers and the effectiveness of the whole
training program. The Marine Corps should be concerned with the quality of the training
presenters. This was because having effective trainers directly correlated with an eventual
success of the whole training program as recommended by Kirkpatrick (2006). As of
now, there were too many Marines who did not think very highly of the combat
operational stress preventive training instructors, which in turn had negatively impacted
the overall effectiveness of the training. Without doubt, the Marine Corps needed to
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improve the proficiency of the trainers since having capable and subject matter
knowledgeable instructors was one of the fundamental requirements for an effective
preventive training program (Kirkpatrick, 2006).
Finding #8: The next logistic regression model considered associations between
the respondents' learning the combat operational stress preventive skills and techniques
and the reported effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for learning was 23.999 (p <
.01). This implied Marines were 23.999 times more likely to consider the combat
operational stress preventive training as being effective when they indicated they actually
learned the subject matter skills and techniques.
Currently, 309 out of 480 (64.40 percent) respondents indicated learning new
knowledge related to combat operational stress preventive training. However, 171 out of
480 (36.60 percent), or over one third of the respondents, indicated they did not acquire
any new knowledge related to combat operational stress preventive training, which
should be a concern. The associated logistic regression suggested a very strong
relationship between learning new combat operational stress knowledge and the
effectiveness of the subject matter training program. The Marine Corps should be
concerned with the fact the training participants actually learned the subject matter new
knowledge. This was because learning new combat operational stress knowledge strongly
correlated with the success of the whole training program, as shown by the associated
logistic regression. As of now, there were too many Marines who did not consider their
combat operational stress preventive learning a success, which in turn had negatively
impacted the effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training program.
The Marine Corps needed to do a better job at ensuring Marines actually learned new
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knowledge during the training, since learning new subject matter knowledge had such a
positive consequence upon the overall effectiveness of the combat operational preventive
training as indicated by this finding's logistic regression.
Finding #9: The next logistic regression model considered associations between
the respondents' reaction toward the preventive combat operational stress training and the
effectiveness of the training. The odds ratio for reaction was 57.873 (p < .01). This
implied Marines were 57.873 times more likely to consider the training as being effective
when they had positive reaction toward the received training.
Currently, only 96 out of 480 (20.00 percent) respondents indicated reacting
positively toward the presented combat operational stress preventive training. The
associated logistic regression suggested a strong relationship between the positive
reaction to the presented training and the effectiveness of the whole training effort. The
Marine Corps should be concerned with Marines positively reacting toward the presented
training and thus enjoying the training. This was because having a positive reaction to the
presented training directly correlated with success of the whole training program, as
suggested by the associated logistic regression and Kirkpatrick (2006). As of now, there
were too many Marines who did not react favorably to the presented combat operational
stress preventive training, which in turn had negatively affected the overall effectiveness
of the training. The presented training format needed to be attractive to Marines in such a
way, so they would react favorably to the presented training. When Marines react
favorably and consequently enjoy the training, the whole training program could be then
positively affected with desirable end states of decreased number of PTSD cases, other
mental health related disorders, drug and alcohol abuse cases, and instances of intimate
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partner violence. Table 57 provides a summary of findings used to answer Research
Questions 2 and 3.
Table 57
Summary of Findings Used to Answer Research Questions 2 and 3

Key Points For Findings 1 through 9

Finding #1: Only 96 respondents out of 480 (20.00 percent) considered the Marine Corps
combat operational stress preventive training either as fully effective or at least
acceptable.
Finding #2: When Marines reported using the learned combat operational stress
preventive skills in their daily lives, they were 13.238 times more likely to indicate the
subject matter training was effective.
Finding #3: When Marines reported possessing the combat operational stress coping
skills, they were 20.557 times more likely to indicate the subject matter training was
effective.
Finding #4: When Marines reported participating in the combat operational stress
preventive formal training, they were 19.058 times more likely to report the subject
matter training was effective.
Finding #5: When Marines indicated the combat stress preventive training materials
were effective, they were 48.182 times more likely to consider the subject matter training
as effective. Only 84 out of 480 (17.50 percent) respondents considered the current
format of the subject matter training materials as at least acceptable.
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Table 57 (continued)
Summary of Findings Used to Answer Research Questions 2 and 3

Key Points For Findings 1 through 9

Finding #6: When Marines indicated having positive feelings toward the combat
operational stress preventive training, they were 31.859 times more likely to consider the
subject matter training as being effective. Only 117 out of 480 (24.40 percent)
respondents reported having definitely positive feelings about the combat operational
stress preventive training program.
Finding #7: When Marines indicated the trainers who conducted the combat operational
stress preventive training were proficient, they were 17.831 times more likely to consider
the subject matter training as being effective. Only 117 out of 480 (24.40 percent)
respondents thought of the trainers as being fully effective.
Finding #8: When Marines indicated actually learning the subject matter skills and
techniques, they were 23.999 times more likely to consider the combat operational stress
preventive training as being effective.
Finding #9: When Marines positively reacted toward the received combat stress
preventive training they were 57.873 times more likely to consider the training as being
effective. Only 96 out of 480 (20.00 percent) respondents indicated reacting positively
toward the presented combat operational stress preventive training.

Qualitative Conclusions
The primary purpose of the study's qualitative segment was to explore the
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training services in order to
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answer Research Questions 2 and 3. Overall, the qualitative study's participants were
dissatisfied with the training. This finding applies equally to both officers and enlisted as
there were no discernible differences of stated opinions between both groups. While the
current format of the preventive training had been successful in providing some basic
information about the combat operational stress preventive training, it had not resulted in
Marines learning specific pragmatic skills that could be readily applied in the field. This
fact had been confirmed by all the interviewees, who indicated they did not see Marines
applying learned preventive combat stress skills and techniques in their daily lives.
Additionally, the observed instructors did not provide any post-training tests, so there
were no means of measuring whether the participants acquired new knowledge as
recommended by Kirkpatrick (2006). Although some of the participants correctly
answered a few basic questions from the instructors, this was certainly not enough to
assess whether in fact all the participants or at least a majority of them actually learned
the subject matter new knowledge.
Additionally, any training activity should result in transfer of knowledge with the
training participants applying the learned skills in real life situations (Kirkpatrick, 2006).
However, other than increasing awareness of the combat operational stress preventive
training program, the training did not provide the Marines with the specific tools to deal
with effects of combat operational stress. As mentioned earlier, all the interviewees did
not see their Marines applying the learned preventive combat stress skills in their daily
lives, which meant the expected transfer of knowledge did not occur. The researcher
triangulated this finding with the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS), which
showed consecutive annual increases in new mental health, PTSD, drug, and alcohol
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abuse cases in the Marine Corps starting at the onset of the 9/11 related hostilities and
continuing to this date (DMSS, 2009; Sipko, 2008). The rising combat operational stress
casualties indicated the training program participants were having difficulties in applying
what they had learned in the combat operational stress preventive training program.
Actual military combat operations often resulted in a rise of mental health
casualties (Hoge et al., 2004; Hoge et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2008). Early intervention
practices, such as properly instituted training and education, could result in a decrease of
mental health occurrences (Litz, Gray, Bryant, & Adler, 2002; Hall, Cipriano, &
Bicknell, 1997). Based on this paradigm, it was important the Service properly instituted
preventive combat operational stress education and training services. Such training
activities should be effective in teaching and instilling Marines with appropriate
pragmatic coping skills and techniques as required by the Marine Corps (Gaskin, 2008;
USMC, 2004). As a result, the newly learned coping skills and techniques could be then
readily applied in Marines' daily lives. The Marine Corps had preventive education and
training services in place; however, this study suggested the currently formatted and
delivered combat operational stress preventive training was not effective in decreasing
the Marine Corps mental health casualty rates.
Synopsis of the Conclusions
In summary, several conclusions resulted from this study. First, the Marines'
experiences from effects of combat operational stress, evidenced by instances of suffering
from effects of combat operational stress, influenced how they evaluated the
effectiveness of the combat operational stress preventive training. This study reported
statistically significant relationships between using the learned preventive combat skills
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in Marines' daily lives, possessing combat operational stress coping skills, participating
in combat operational stress preventive training classes, reporting the effectiveness of the
combat operational stress preventive training program, and admitting to having suffered
from effects of combat operational stress. This implied the combat operational stress
preventive training program does significantly influence Marines in admitting they had
combat operational stress related problems. This finding was also beneficial in terms of
Marines' ability to seek the needed mental health therapy. By virtue of being better
informed about the combat operational stress concepts and principles, they should be
much better prepared to voluntarily seek and then get the needed help from mental health
professionals. This positive effect of the combat operational stress preventive training had
also been one of the main goals of the preventive combat operational stress training
(Gaskin, 2008; Nash, 2007).
Second, the current state of the program does not seem to be fully effective in
having Marines, regardless of rank, use the learned combat skills in their daily lives
which also negatively impacts the effectiveness of the whole training program. These
claims have been evidenced by several descriptive statistics and associated significant
logistic regression models. Specifically, the study reported statistically significant
relationships between Marines using the newly acquired combat operational stress
preventive knowledge in their daily lives, possessing preventive coping skills,
participating in combat operational stress preventive classes, positively reacting toward
the presented training, actually learning new combat operational stress related
knowledge, the efficacy of the combat operational stress training materials, having
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positive feelings toward the combat operational stress training program, reported
proficiency of the trainers, and the effectiveness of the whole training program.
These findings strongly imply the whole program was significantly dependent on
Kirkpatrick's (2006) evaluation of the training effectiveness constructs. In order for the
program to be fully effective, Marines needed to positively react to the presented training,
and then they needed to learn new knowledge associated with the preventive combat
operational stress training. After they successfully acquired this new knowledge, they
needed to incorporate the learned skills and techniques into their daily lives by actually
using this newly developed proficiency on a daily basis. Only then, the whole program
might achieve its intended overarching goal of fewer cases of mental health problems,
fewer alcohol and drug related incident cases, and fewer instances of intimate partner
violence amongst the active duty Marines.
Unfortunately, the current state of the combat operational stress prevention
training program had not been fully effective. Both quantitative and qualitative inquiries
revealed the fact that only a relatively small number of Marines reacted positively and
consequently enjoyed the training. There were some Marines who learned basic facts
about the combat operational stress, but only a small number of them indicated using this
new knowledge in their daily lives. Finally, the majority of the Marines indicated the
whole combat operational stress preventive training program had not been fully effective.
This fact had been triangulated by the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS)
which indicated consecutive rises in PTSD, drug, and alcohol related mental health cases
in the Marine Corps since the beginning of the 9/11 related hostilities (DMSS, 2009;
Sipko, 2008).
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Recommendations
Based upon the outcomes of this study, several recommendations are proposed.
The first set of recommendations addresses using the study's findings to guide immediate
corrective suggestions for improving the current state of the Marine Corps combat
operational stress preventive program. The next recommendations concern future
research in the area of combat operational stress preventive training and education
services.
Implementing Findings of the Study
This study's findings can be implemented in several ways. First, the researcher
needs to share the study's findings with the Marine Corps Combat Operational Stress
Control branch officers. The goal of sharing the findings with the officers is to enhance
the current combat operational stress preventive training and education services. Findings
will be shared through face-to-face presentations to the entire branch staff and the
Combat Operational Stress Control program Director. By virtue of personally making the
presentations, the researcher will make the program officers aware of the shortcomings in
the current state of the combat operational stress preventive training and education
services discovered or confirmed by this study. By knowing and fully understanding the
discrepancies, the program officers will be able to take corrective actions in order to
improve the subject matter training program.
Some of the noted discrepancies included using inadequate training materials
consisting of static Microsoft® PowerPoint™ slides. A number of the respondents,
observed trainees, and interviewees indicated the presented training material was
inherently dull, unattractive, and non-engaging. As a result, a majority of the respondents
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did not react favorably to the training. Despite two thirds of the respondents indicated
learning the basic combat operational stress related concepts, a majority of the
respondents did not use the learned skills in their daily lives. Consequently, the whole
combat operational stress training program was not fully effective, as suggested by this
study's quantitative and qualitative inquiries.
Doctrinally, the Marine Corps trains as it fights which means individual Marines
are expected to use the learned knowledge pragmatically in the field and if applicable in
their daily lives (USMC, 2004). Presently, the preventive combat operational stress
training program has fallen short of this goal. The Marine Corps leaders need to strive
and encourage Marines assigned under them to use the learned combat operational stress
preventive skills and techniques in their daily lives. As more Marines practice what they
learn, eventually the whole preventive training program should improve in terms of
discernible decreases in new mental health related cases which include fewer new
instances of PTSD, fewer new cases of other combat operational stress related mental
health maladies, fewer drug and alcohol abuse cases, and fewer instances of intimate
partner violence.
The Marine Corps Combat Operational Stress Control branch officers need to
start the program improvement with the actual training process. Per the Marine Corps
training doctrine, the combat operational stress preventive training needs to be rank and
grade focused and standardized across the Marine Corps to include all formal schools,
pre-deployment training requirements, and sustainment training (USMC, 2004).
Additionally, in order to facilitate the current world-wide operations, it is recommended
to develop alternative training means, such as interactive internet resources, situational

vignettes, videos, and other best practice training solutions to enhance and expand the
training program quality, accessibility, and consistency.
It is fascinating that instructional technology might be the key to the future for
improved combat operational stress preventive training. For instance, web-based
applications accessible anywhere, anytime could be an answer to distributed operations
faced by many Marine Corps units deployed in support of combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Web-based asynchronous presentations and situational vignettes would be
reused many times by thousands of Marines. This reuse factor would drive the overall
costs down - a great benefit of the information technology. Moreover, the training
presentations and situational vignettes should be interactive in nature to reinforce the
learning process and boost the retention rates as much as possible as recommended by
Knowles (1984). Additionally, there should be computer-based training (CBT) available
through digital video discs (DVDs) which could be used in situations when the Internet
connectivity is spotty or just not available. This is especially true in forward deployed
situations. By having available DVD-based training materials, forward deployed troops
would simply insert DVDs into their unit training laptops and conduct the needed training
as appropriate.
Combat operational stress preventive training based on state of the art
instructional technology has a chance of becoming a force-multiplier by virtue of its
flexibility and reusability. This is because today's instructional technology provides the
capability for training and education that is continuous and accessible 24/7 anywhere in
the world. Combat Operational Stress Control is a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary
approach to prevent, identify, and manage the adverse effects of combat operational
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stress on the physical, psychological, social, and spiritual health of Marines (Gaskin,
2008; Nash, 2007). Likewise, instructional technology based combat operational stress
preventive training also needs to be comprehensive and multi-faceted to mirror the multidisciplinary approach to the combat stress preventive training.
State of the art instructional technology delivery methods allow for a high degree
of interactivity and simulations which translate into a successful memory retention of the
associated learning material (Knowles, 1984). The technology enhanced training would
teach the basics of the expected, predictable, emotional, intellectual, physical, and
behavioral reactions to combat operational stress. Such training would stress the
employment of effective leadership, enhancement of unit cohesion, morale, and effectual
interpersonal communications. Instructional technology could be the enabler to achieve
these goals. All of this could be accomplished with less bureaucracy and more flexibility
directly benefiting the Marine Corps' greatest and most important resources - the
individual Marines.
In order to achieve these goals, the Combat Operational Stress Control branch
officers need to revamp the current training format in such a way that it is truly
interesting, captivating, and engaging as judged by the program's ultimate customers, the
individual Marines. When more Marines start to react positively to the presented training,
in most likelihood, they will learn more effectively with increased memory retention
rates. By knowing more about the combat operational stress preventive concepts and with
preventive skills and techniques committed to the long-term memory, Marines should be
more prone to use the learned skills and techniques in their daily lives. Only then, the
whole program could become more effective as evidenced by discernible decreases in
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new PTSD cases, fewer new other mental health problems and illnesses, fewer drug and
alcohol abuse cases, and fewer instances of intimate partner violence.
Future Research
Based on the study's findings, several follow-on studies are recommended. First,
another study which would compare longitudinally whether the Marine Corps combat
operational stress preventive training has in fact improved, providing the Service
incorporated the suggestions derived and described by this study. Second, each sister
Service (the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force) has also been required by the
Department of Defense to institute their own combat operational stress preventive
training programs (Department of Defense, 1999). It is recommended to conduct an
assessment of each of the Services respective combat operational stress preventive
training programs to determine their effectiveness or ineffectiveness. As a value added
benefit of such assessments, best practices derived from the Service specific program
reviews could be then shared through a peer-reviewed published article. Third, each
military service has its own special and elite groups (e.g., Special Forces in the Army, the
Navy SEALs, or fighter pilots in the Air Force). It is interesting to find out how each
specific military service branch deals with combat operational stress inherently and
undoubtedly found within the rank and file of these special military groups.
The recommendations described in this study have a strong potential to result in
perceptible improvements of the Marine Corps combat operational stress preventive
training program. And utmost importantly, the recommendations have a potential to
directly benefit our Nation's individual Marines, thus directly contribute to their mental
health well being. This is significant because having fully mentally fit Marines also
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holistically contributes to both preservation of the Marine Corps forces and the overall
combat readiness of the Marine Corps (Gaskin, 2008; Nash, 2007). It is the Marine
Corps' best interest to incorporate the study's recommendations. The implementation of
the recommendations would also meet expectations of the American public who in good
faith entrusted their daughters and sons into the Marine Corps care and thus justifiably
expect their daughters and sons back home healthy and ready for full and productive
civilian lives.
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APPENDIX A
Effectiveness of Combat Operational Stress Preventive Training Survey
Marines:
You are invited to participate in the Effectiveness of Preventive Combat Operational
Stress Control Training survey. The purpose of the survey is to assess the effectiveness
of combat operational stress preventive training services. The survey is completely
anonymous. Your participation in this study is voluntary. Participation in the survey
poses minimal risk since subject's responses are anonymous and cannot be traced to an
individual. By completing this survey you acknowledge that you understand the purpose
of this research and that you are willing to participate.
Thank you very much for your time and support. If you wish to participate, please start
the survey now by clicking on the Continue button below.
What is your MOS type?

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Combat Arms
Combat Support
Aviation
Ground Aviation
Administration
Logistics
Communications
Intelligence

How old are you?

|

|

18-19

I

I 20-25

I

| 26-30

I

I 31-35

•

36-40

•

41-45

•

46-50
51 or more

How many years in the military?

I

I 1-5

I

I 6-10

I

I 11-15

I

I 16-20

•

21-25
25 and more

What is your gender?
|

|

Male

I

I

Female

What is your rank?
|

|

Enlisted (E-1 through E-3)

I

I

Non-commissioned Officer

I

I

Staff Non-commissioned Officer

I

I

Warrant Officer
Commissioned Officer

What is your component status?
|

|

Active Duty (AD)

I

1 Active Duty Reserve (AR)

I

I

I

1 Selected Reserve (Drilling)

Selected Reserve (Mobilized)

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

Have you ever attended combat operational stress preventive training classes?
I

I

Yes

I

I

No

What were your impressions of the training received?
Poor

Neutral

•

•

•

Outstanding

•

Did you learn specific principles, facts, and techniques during the training?
|

|

Yes

I

I

No

Did you actually use any of the learned skills and techniques?

•
I

Yes
I

No

n

How would you rate the effectiveness of the training?
Poor

Neutral

•

•

•

Outstanding

n

•

Have you ever suffered from the effects of combat operational stress?

•

Yes

I

I

No

Was the received combat operational stress preventive training effective in helping you cope with
the effects of combat operational stress?
No

n

Neutral

n

•

Yes

•

•

How would you rate the effectiveness of the currently used combat operational stress preventive
training materials?
Poor

•

Neutral

•

•

Outstanding

•

•

How would you rate the effectiveness of the trainers who actually presented the combat operational
stress preventive training material?
Poor

•

Neutral

•

•

Outstanding

•

•

What are your overall feelings about the combat operational stress preventive training program?
Poor

•

Neutral

•

•

Outstanding

•

•

APPENDIX B
Interview Protocol
Combat Operational Stress Preventive Training
The following steps need to be taken in order to schedule and conduct interviews
concerning combat operational stress preventive training sessions.
Schedule the interview with the Marine a week before the interview needs to be
conducted. The already scheduled interview needs to be confirmed three days before the
actual day to include the meeting time and place.
On the day and time of the interview, meet the Marine, introduce yourself, and establish
rapport.
"The Marine Corps Operational Stress Control branch would like to know more
about your personal experiences concerning previously conducted combat
operational stress preventive training. I would like to talk with you to learn about
your experiences during the training and if the training and education you received
helped you cope with stress during the actual combat deployment overseas."
"I would like to tape record our conversation if that is okay with you, so that I will
have an accurate record. Our conversation will be confidential. I will not use your
name in any discussions or in any writings related to the research. Only group data
will be reported. Is that okay?"
<Be sure to voice record the above paragraphs and the student's answer.>
"Do you have any questions about this project? Shall we begin?"
1.
"As I understand, you had an opportunity to attend combat operational stress
preventive training. What were your impressions of the training you received?
Topics to be used for probing questions to use if Marines cannot think of any experiences
or do not mention these areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Classroom settings
Quality of training materials
Audio-visuals
Time of day of the training
Interesting training topic
Relevance of the training topic

2.
'Can you tell me what specific principles, facts, and techniques did you
learn?"
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any
experiences or do not mention these areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

After action reviews
Stigma reduction
Resiliency training
Stress inoculation
Cohesion building
Family peer support
Family stress reduction
Decompression
Small unit support and discussions
Return and reunion preparation
Peer and self-assessment for stress
Sustain unit support

3.
"What are your thoughts on actually using knowledge acquired during the
training? Could you also comment on presumably changed behavior in yourself and
your peers resulting from the received training?"
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any
experiences or do not mention these areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Well trained and confident
Fit and tough
High level of unit cohesiveness
Professional preparedness
Taking care of younger and less experienced
Boosting confidence in others

4.
"Could you provide some thoughts on the effectiveness of the received
training? Specifically, please comment on your personal feelings on the conducted
training and if the training resulted in actual tangible results?"
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any
experiences or do not mention these areas:
•
•
•
•

Less unit mental health casualties
More unit cohesiveness
Remaining calm and steady
Being confident in self and others

Getting the job done
Remaining in control physically, mentally, and emotionally
Behaving ethically and morally
Retaining a sense of humor
Sleeping enough
Eating the right amount
Working out and staying fit
Playing well and often
Remaining active socially and spiritually
5.
"In what ways did the received training help you cope with the effects of
combat operational stress while being deployed?"
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any
expectations or do not mention these areas:
Exposure to combat situations
Exposure to live fire
Convoy operations
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
Hand to hand combat
Invisible enemy
Who is the friend or foe?
Loneliness
Separation from loved ones
Family problems back home
Extreme weather (hot during the day and cold during the night)
6.
"Currently combat operational stress control training packages consist of
static PowerPoint slides. Please, provide some thoughts and comments on the
effectiveness or the ineffectiveness of such a training format?
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any
experiences or do not mention these areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Static PowerPoint slides
Hands-on "active" training
Simulations
Role playing
Instructor relaying teaching material to his or her combat experiences
Retention of presented materials

7.
"Could you provide some thoughts on the effectiveness of the trainers who
actually presented the combat operational stress preventive training materials?"
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Topics to be used for probing questions to use if students cannot think of any experiences
or do not mention these areas:
•
•
•
•
•

Presentation skills
Ability to keep audience motivated
Appropriate tone of speaking voice
Respect toward the audience
Breaks offered every hour on the hour of the training

8.
"What are your overall personal feelings about the combat operational stress
preventive training not covered in previous questions?"
Topics to be used for probing questions to use when Marines cannot think of any
experiences or do not mention these areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Pre-deployment training requirements
Class and the instructor
Quality of training package
Material easy to understand?
Presentation material as a motivational catalyst toward the program
Is it something useful or just another typical military brief?

"Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. Is there anything else you
feel would be helpful for me to know?
Again, thank you very much. Have a
great day!"
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APPENDIX C
Observation Checklist
Pre-class

Observer Notes

1. Instructor is on time or students loitering in
hallway
2. General demeanor of instructor
a. Appears prepared, happy to be in class,
or hurried, nervous, visibly not confident.
3. Appearance of instructor and military students
a. Appropriate military or civilian attire
4. Sociability of the instructor
a. Enthusiastically greets students or shuns
away
b. Readily accessible to students, willing to
answer student questions
c. Topics of conversations relate to combat
stress or are more of personal nature
5. Readiness of room
a. Overhead projector and computer
equipment working, white board,
general classroom cleanliness, furniture
Observer Notes
During class
1. Orderly beginning
a. Instructor able to proceed with the
instruction without any delays
b. Students attentive and eager to proceed
2. Instructor
a. Seem self-confident or rather tentative
b. Profound subject matter knowledge
c. Open to questions from students
d. Skillfully manages interruptions
e. Skillfully delivers quality instruction
f. Talks to the slides
3. Students
a. Giving attention to the instructor
b. Seem interested or visibly bored
c. Sidebar conversations
d. Genuinely serious or flippant
e. Asking pertinent questions or silent
4. Equipment
a. Instructor being comfortable with the
technology, knows the equipment
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End of class
1. End on time, early, or late
2. Wrap up
a. Goes over the major points
b. Any questions from students about the
combat stress preventive training
program - instructor's ability to answer
3. Instructor
a. Students dismissal procedures
b. Instructor rushes from room or remains
available to students
c. Topics of conversations
i. Combat stress related or rather
personal
4. Students
a. Seem comfortable with the instructor
b. Conversations or comments to fellow
students about combat stress preventive
training class experience, or something
unrelated
c. Extend farewell greeting to the instructor
or just ignore and disregard the instructor

Observer Notes
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APPENDIX D
Quantitative Survey Questions and Levels of Training Evaluation
Quantitative Survey Question

Kirkpatrick's (2006) Level of Evaluation

What were your impressions of the training
received?

Reaction

Did you learn specific principles, facts, and
techniques during the training?

Learning

Did you actually use any of the learned
skills and techniques?

Behavior Change

How would you rate the effectiveness of
the training?

Long-term Results
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APPENDIX E
Qualitative Interview Questions and Levels of Training Evaluation
Qualitative Interview Question

Kirkpatrick's (2006) Level of Evaluation

As I understand, you had an opportunity to
attend combat operational stress control
training sessions. What were your
impressions of the training you received?

Reaction

Can you tell me what specific principles,
facts, and techniques did you learn?

Learning

What are your thoughts on actually using
knowledge acquired during the training?
Could you also comment on presumably
changed behavior in yourself and your
peers resulting from the received training?

Behavior Change

Could you provide some thoughts on the
effectiveness of the received training?
Specifically, please comment on your
personal feelings on the conducted training
and if the training resulted in actual
tangible outcomes?

Long-term Results
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